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ABSTRACT 
 
There is emerging corporate governance research on the problem of conflict of interest 
between shareholders (i.e., the principal-principal problem). This problem concerns the 
phenomenon of the ultimate controlling shareholder expropriating (Tunneling) or 
injecting (propping) funds through related-party transactions (RPTs) in a way that 
prejudices the rights of minority shareholders. The area of corporate governance that 
deals with minority shareholder protection is under-researched. Most corporate 
governance research treats shareholders as a homogeneous party (i.e., the principal) 
whose common rights are to be served by the agent (management and the board). 
However, the protection of minority shareholders’ interests, in balance with all 
shareholders of the firm, is one of the key corporate governance principles. Ways in 
which this study seeks to contribute to the literature concerning the principal-principal 
problem are threefold: (a) extend the evidence and understanding of governance 
problems in the context of developing and transitioning countries where the protection 
of minority shareholders from prejudicial actions by an ultimate controlling shareholder 
or set of block-holders and the executive management team has been identified as the 
primary problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Johnson, Lopez-de-silanes, La Porta and 
Shleifer 2000); (b)  develop stronger theoretical underpinning for the specification of 
models when empirically investigating relationships between corporate governance 
practices, ownership concentration, regulatory systems and the actions of controlling 
shareholders in developing and transitioning countries; and (c) establish improved 
measures used as proxies for the prejudicial proportion of total RPTs and for theory-
driven concepts that can explain the extent of Tunneling and propping phenomena as 
manifest in prejudicial RPTs.  
 
The main aim of this study, therefore, is to test theory-driven models of motivating and 
enabling influences on the extent of prejudicial RPTs. A supplementary aim is to update 
the descriptive evidence on the incidence and categorisation of RPTs in China. In 
respect of the main aim, the following lines of investigation are pursued: (a) the ultimate 
controlling shareholder’s motivation for undertaking Tunneling from the perspective of 
Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure; (b) the 
ultimate controlling shareholder’s motivation for undertaking propping from the 
xiii 
 
perspective of Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) ‘market for ownership control’ theory; and 
(c) the enabling influences of corporate governance practices on Tunneling and 
propping in a transitional economy with high government ownership from the 
perspectives of reverse bonding theory between controlling shareholders and agents, 
and the theory of markets in transition (Nee 1989) where power and privilege is 
perpetuated into the private sector from former State regimes.  
 
This study is set in the context of contemporary China. A background review is 
provided to the context of corporations, shareholders and capital markets in China.  This 
includes a brief history of economic and accounting changes, the development of 
securities markets and shares classifications, and the establishment of a corporate 
governance code including aspect of minority shareholders protection in China.  
 
Hypotheses and models are constructed to test the extent to which motivating and 
enabling/inhibiting factors can explain or predict the extent of Tunneling and propping, 
respectively.  A positivist epistemology is adopted.  China is chosen as the context 
because it is a major transitional economy, has a large share market, high State-
ownership and questionable implementation of securities regulations.  Data is sourced 
mainly from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database 
on listed companies in China. The sample is drawn from a census of all companies 
listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 2010. After making various 
exclusions, the sample size is 1,967 listed companies. Data is collected for 2010, which 
means that cross-sectional analysis is undertaken. Correlations and regressions are the 
main form of data analysis. Apart from analysing data for the sample as a whole, 
comparisons are made between groupings of State versus non-State controlled 
companies, and larger versus smaller companies.  
 
The results reveal several significant determinants of prejudicial RPTs.  The influences 
from the findings are briefly discussed.  First, in terms of the motivating conditions for 
Tunneling, results suggests that when ultimate controlling shareholders can not satisfy 
their cashflow rights through non-prejudicial means (i.e., voting rights high relative to 
cashflow rights or low dividend payout), they tend to resort to Tunneling.  This provides 
evidence in support of Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory of ownership control. 
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Alternatively, in terms of motivating conditions for propping, the reporting of prior net 
losses by the company,  which can lead to the CSRC imposing ‘special status’ penalty, 
thereby triggering the emergence of a market for ownership control, is the primary 
motivator for propping. This provides support for Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) market 
for ownership control theory.   
 
Second, in terms of enabling mechanisms for Tunneling results reveal that Tunneling is 
higher when the controlling shareholder is a ‘cadre entrepreneur’ (i.e, a person with 
high status in the former State-owned regime who has become a successful entrepreneur 
in the current market-based regime) and the Chair of the Board has high ‘path 
dependency’ on the ultimate controlling shareholder.  This supports both Nee’s (1989) 
theory of market transition in which power and privilege is perpetuated in cadre 
entrepreneurs’ and the notion of reverse bonding in which the board is bonded by the 
controlling shareholder.  Alternatively, significant enabling mechanisms for propping 
are revealed as a high level of emoluments of the top executive team and a high ‘path 
dependency’ of the CEO on the ultimate controlling shareholder.  This adds further 
support for the notion of bonding to the ultimate controlling shareholder which cuts out 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests.        
 
These results are discussed, not only in terms of their support for underlying theories, 
but also in terms of their practical implications for securities regulations and governance 
practices in China concerning the principal-principal problem. In particular, China’s 
securities regulations concerning special listing treatment when losses are reported and 
also the holding of non-tradable shares have the side-effect of motivating controlling 
shareholders to engage in propping.  These CSRC regulations on listed companies, 
therefore, need to be reviewed in order to address the principal-principal shareholder 
problem. In the broader area of implementing corporate governance guidelines, the 
issue of independence of directors needs to be reviewed if better protection of all 
shareholders rights is to be achieved. Limitations arise from the difficulty of measuring 
the concept of prejudicial RPTs, the restricting of the evidence to the context of China 
only and a single year, and the potential for endogeniety in some elements of the 
models.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Preamble 
Recent corporate governance research has moved attention from the agency problem of 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (i.e., the agent-principal 
problem) to the problem of conflict of interest within shareholders (i.e., the principal-
principal problem) (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2000; 
Claessens and Fan 2002; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2002; 
Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton and Jiang 2008). Such principal-principal conflicts of 
interest are particularly pronounced in the context of concentrated ownership and weak 
legal enforcement of property rights which are most prevalent in developing and 
transitional economies (Huyghebaert and Wang 2012). 
 
The principal-principal conflict problem is manifest in prejudicial related-party 
transactions (RPTs). These are transactions that “unfairly prejudice” minority 
shareholders and favour majority shareholders. They take the form of non-arms-length 
transactions by a company with its own controlling shareholders or their related parties. 
Empirical research confirms that controlling shareholders resort to prejudicial RPTs for 
private benefit at the cost of minority shareholders (Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis 2006; 
Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello 2008; Dow and McGuire 2009; Peng, Wei and Yang 
2011). Prejudicial RPTs are found to erode firm value (Nenova 2003; Atanasov, Black, 
Ciccotello and Gyoshev 2010; Peng et al. 2011) and many of the notorious corporate 
collapses in the early twenty-first century are associated with prejudicial RPTs (Gallery, 
Gallery and Supranowics 2008; Ge, Drury, Fortin, Liu and Tsang 2010).   
 
Research emerging over the past decade into practices involving prejudicial related-
party transactions (RPTs) has coined the terms corporate Tunneling and negative 
Tunneling (or corporate propping). Johnson, Lopez-de-Silanes, La Porta and Shleifer 
(2000) first used the concept of Tunneling in reference to the means by which 
controlling shareholders or entrepreneurs expropriate the firm’s funds to themselves, 
usually through related parties, that rightfully belong to minority shareholders. The 
reverse practice of propping was first used by Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) to 
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refer to the transferring by controlling shareholders or entrepreneurs of their private 
resources into firms, usually a subsidiary of their group, that have minority shareholders. 
Propping is perceived as a strategy adopted by controlling shareholders to rescue their 
firm from a financial shock with the intention of returning to Tunneling practices on 
recovery or, if recovery becomes unlikely, to undertake looting practices (Friedman et 
al. 2003). 
 
It is contended in this study that a firm can face prevailing conditions that motivate 
controlling shareholders to undertake Tunneling based on Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-
protection theory of corporate ownership. As well, a firm can face conditions that 
motivate controlling shareholders to undertake propping based on Jensen and Ruback’s 
(1983) theory of the market for ownership control. These conditions that motivate 
controlling shareholders to pursue prejudicial RPTs can be used as predictors of the 
extent to which total RPTs contain transactions that are prejudiced against minority 
shareholders and in favour of the controlling shareholders.  
 
Apart from conditions that motivate controlling shareholders to pursue prejudicial RPTs 
in order to preserve their self-interests, there is also the matter of the ability of 
controlling shareholders to get actual prejudicial transactions executed through the 
management of the company. The controlling shareholder will need a board and top 
management to provide advice on the best RPTs contractual arrangements that could 
meet their interests and then facilitate the execution of those transactions in accordance 
with the controlling shareholder’s wishes. In order to act in the sole interests of the 
controlling shareholder rather than all shareholders, the controlling shareholder will 
need to make the main board, supervisory board and top executives more dependent, 
rather than independent. A further perspective on factors that enable the controlling 
shareholder to execute prejudicial RPTs is found in Nee’s (1989) market transition 
theory.  This theory is concerned with ways that power and privilege is preserved in 
relationships between State-based shareholders and corporate management. 
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1.2. Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on the principal-principal conflict 
problem by developing new theory-driven models and providing evidence that achieves 
the following objectives: 
 
(1) To investigate the ultimate controlling shareholder’s motivation for undertaking 
Tunneling from the perspective of Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory of 
corporate ownership structure. 
(2) To investigate the ultimate controlling shareholder’s motivation for undertaking 
propping from the perspective of Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) ‘market for 
ownership control’ theory.  
(3) To investigate the enabling influences of corporate governance practices on 
Tunneling and propping in a transitional economy. Such economy entails high 
government ownership that tends to create a lack of independence in the 
composition of the broad, and dependence of directors, supervisors and top 
executives on the controlling shareholder through emoluments and equity stakes.  
The context for this objective exists in China – a country that has been 
transitioning from a command to a market economy and retains high State-
ownership in publicly-listed companies. It is a context of interest to the 
investigation of agency relationships between principals (shareholders) and 
agents (directors and executives), because the basic condition of separation of 
ownership and control, first articulated by Berle and Means (1932), is unlikely to 
hold in this context.  
(4) To investigate the enabling influences on Tunneling and propping of power and 
privilege perpetuated from former State regimes. Nee’s (1989) transitional 
market theory is invoked in which ‘cadre entrepreneurs’ become controlling 
shareholders, and the Board Chair and CEO have career ‘path dependency’ on 
the controlling shareholder.  
(5) To investigate whether the enabling influence of corporate governance on 
Tunneling and propping trails off in capital markets with concentrated ownership 
structure due to the non-ultimate blockholders’ control over the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. 
 
4 
 
In addition to these objectives of testing theory-driven models of motivating and 
enabling influences on the extent of prejudicial RPTs, other descriptive evidence on the 
nature of RPTs in China is provided in this study.  This evidence includes a 
categorization and comparison of differences between different types of RPT 
transactions, whether of an operating, investing or financing nature. The extent of use of 
these categories of transactions is also compared between State and non-State controlled 
companies and between larger and smaller listed companies in China. Further 
comparisons are made between the cash flow and control rights held by ultimate 
controlling shareholders, and between corporate governance features of different groups 
of companies.  
 
1.3. Motivation  
A broad motivation for this study is to make a contribution to the under-researched area 
of corporate governance that deals with minority shareholder protection. The protection 
of minority shareholders’ interests, in balance with all shareholders of the firm, is a key 
corporate governance principle. Within this broad motivation, the focus of this study is 
on understanding what motivates and enables the ultimate controlling shareholder to 
engage the company in related-party transactions that prejudice the interests of other 
shareholders and defy a principle of good corporate governance.  
 
While there is a large body of corporate governance literature on principal-agent issues, 
there is limited empirical research that addresses the principal-principal issue.  This 
study seeks to address gaps in the literature in three directions. First, the study seeks to 
contribute to the body of literature on governance problems in developing countries, 
specifically on issues for the governance system in China. This wider body of literature 
has emerged following the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) on the relationship between a country’s regulatory systems, corporate ownership 
structures and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. It has also started 
to emerge following the Asian financial crisis of 1997 in which the relationships 
between these factors are found to have contributed to this financial crisis (e.g., 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett 
2001; Claessens and Fan 2002; Li and Naughton 2007). This research has highlighted 
the corporate governance need to focus on the principal-principal problem which is 
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concerned with protecting minority shareholders from prejudicial actions by an ultimate 
controlling shareholder or set of block-holders and the executive management team 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Johnson et al. 2000). In China, issues for the corporate 
governance system that have been researched include those of weak independence of 
the board of directors (Tam 2002; Tan and Wang 2004; Feinerman 2007; Wang 2007), 
the weak role played by the supervisory board (Lin 2004; Wang 2007), the 
ineffectiveness of enforcement by corporate and securities regulatory authorities 
(Berkman, Cole and Fu 2010) and the peculiar securities market regulatory policies that 
allow State-based shareholders to distort securities markets (Fang, Su, and Chong, 
2008; Gompers, Ishii, and Matrick 2003). However, these empirical studies have been 
lacking in addressing how these corporate governance issues in China have impacted on 
the extent of the principal-principal problem. 
 
Second this study identifies a sparse use of theoretical perspectives in the literature on 
the principal-principal problem in developing countries. Few prior studies have sought 
to develop comprehensive models underpinned by theory when investigating 
relationships between corporate governance practices, ownership concentration, 
regulatory systems and the performance of companies or actions of controlling 
shareholders in developing countries.  For example, Chen et al. (2009) provide evidence 
of the impacts of various types of RPTs on the share market performance of firms with 
controlling owners. However,  a clear theoretical perspective on these impacts is not 
provided. Similarly, Huyghebaert and Wang (2010b) find a strong negative market 
reaction to the trading activities between the listed company and its related parties. They 
suggest that their result indicates related-party sales and purchases of goods and 
services are value-destroying transactions, especially for minority investors in listed 
companies. Nevertheless, they provide no theoretical rationale for this finding other 
than the view that it is easier for dominant shareholders to manipulate recurring sales 
and purchases transactions with related parties in order to expropriate funds from 
minority investors.  This study seeks to contribute to the literature by drawing on 
different theoretical perspectives to underpin the development of hypothesised 
relationships between governance, ownership and regulatory factors and their affects on 
prejudicial RPTs (or Tunneling and propping practices). The theoretical perspectives 
invoked in this study have been developed by others and applied in different contexts. 
This study is motivated to apply such theories to the modelling of factors that could help 
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explain prejudicial RPTs in listed companies in China.  This, in turn, could provide a 
better understanding to regulators and minority shareholders in China on ways to 
mitigate the principal-principal problem.   
Third, this study identifies a lack of agreement or consistency in the measures used as 
proxies for the prejudicial proportion of total RPTs. Most related-party transactions will 
be conducted for legitimate reasons that economically benefit the company and all its 
shareholders (e.g., purchases from a vertically-integrated subsidiary so as to achieve 
certainty in supply of materials). A relatively small proportion of total RPTs are 
expected to be prejudicial non-arms-length transactions that are deliberately intended to 
achieve Tunneling or propping for the benefit of the controlling shareholder. The 
measures used in the literature for distinguishing between the discriminatory and non-
discriminatory non-arms-length related-party transactions have been weak in face 
validity and, in this sense, are high in measurement error. The construct validity of a 
measurement scale is a pre-requisite for making sound statistical inferences. Prior 
studies have used a mix of different proxy measures for the prejudicial proportion of 
total RPTs. These proxy measures include the use of total dollar amount of all RPTs, 
selected types of RPTs (e.g., sales, and purchases of goods and services and total loan 
guarantees to related parties). Yet others measure prejudicial RPTs in terms of the 
strength of the relationship between selected or total RPTs and shareholders’ value, 
where a negative relationship indicates Tunneling and a positive relationship indicates 
propping. A further approach to measuring prejudicial RPTs takes account of the 
country level factors such as RPT disclosure requirements and legal protections.  A 
motivation for this study is to re-examine and seek to improve the categorization and 
choice of selected RPTs to be used as proxy measures for the prejudicial proportion of 
total RPTs. 
 
1.4. Theoretical Framework of the Study  
As mentioned, this study seeks to develop a comprehensive model of the factors that 
motivate and enable controlling shareholders to pursue Tunneling and propping through 
prejudicial RPTs. However, this comprehensive model is to be underpinned by a set of 
theoretical perspectives. In general, this study establishes a theoretical framework 
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relevant to the principal-principal conflict issue. This theoretical framework is depicted 
in Figure 1.1. 
 
At the top of Figure 1.1 is an indication of the research problem to be studied, namely, 
the principal-principal problem associated with agency theory in respect of the concerns 
about mitigating self-interest behaviour of controlling shareholders and protecting the 
rights of minority shareholders.  This principal-principal problem is manifest in the 
phenomena of Tunneling and propping through the use of RPTs that are prejudiced in 
favour of controlling shareholders and against minority shareholders. 
 
Figure 1.1 then depicts the different theoretical perspectives that are invoked to help 
explain the phenomena of Tunneling and propping.  First it theorizes about the 
motivating conditions for controlling shareholders to want their company to pursue 
Tunneling or propping, respectively.  Rent protection theory of cash rights versus 
control rights of ownership by the controlling shareholders is depicted as the motivating 
condition for Tunneling.  The theory of the potential emergence of a market for 
ownership control is depicted as the motivating condition for propping.  
 
Second, it is theorized in Figure 1.1 regarding the enabling conditions that are 
conducive to controlling shareholders getting their company to undertake Tunneling and 
propping. Two theories are invoked, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1.1.  These are 
first the principal (i.e. controlling shareholder) - agent (i.e., executives and directors) 
perspective of reverse bonding of directors and executives by controlling shareholders; 
the second is the theory of market transition that perpetuates powers for the controlling 
shareholder. 
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Figure 1.1. Theoretical Framework for the Principal-Principal Conflict Issue 
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1.5. Scope of the Research  
The scope of this study is delimited in terms of the choice of the underpinning theories, 
the choice of variables selected, the choice of context and the sample selection. 
 
The literature which this study draws upon to underpin the theoretical arguments on the 
determinants of prejudicial RPTs is based on theories of ownership control, agency 
reverse bonding and market transition.  These theories provide alternative perspectives 
on controlling shareholders’ motives and enabling conditions for Tunneling and 
propping.   Other theoretical perspectives are possible, but not included in this study.  
For example, neo-institutional theory might have perceived controlling shareholders’ 
and their related-parties as driven by incentives for preservation of their ‘institution’ 
within an environment of institutions. 
  
In relation to the choice of independent variables selected in order to operationalize the 
theories invoked to underpin arguments for the impact of motivators and enablers of 
Tunneling and propping, surrogate variables are used as these concepts are not directly 
observable. The choice of these surrogate variables is only partly based on measures 
used in prior research.  Alternative concepts are possible, but not included as variables 
in this study.  For example, the potential emergence of a market for ownership control 
could be proxied by variables chosen from the view point of professional analysts or 
private equity groups concerned with merges and takeovers. 
 
Turning to the choice of context, only China is included in this study, not other 
developing or transitioning countries.  Hence, the scope of the data is confined to listed 
companies in China.  China has a context which contains specific regulatory and 
cultural characteristics.  Therefore, generalisation of findings beyond the scope of this 
context is cautioned.   
 
1.6. Thesis Organisation 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter two provides the background to the 
context of corporations, shareholders and capital markets in China.  This chapter traces 
the history of economic and accounting changes, the development of securities markets 
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and shares classifications, and the establishment of a corporate governance code 
including aspect of minority shareholders protection in China. 
 
Chapter three reviews literature on agency theory based aspects of corporate governance 
in developing countries, and the nature and use of RPTs including Tunneling and 
propping practices.   It then introduces theory that seeks to explain the motivations and 
conditions for predicting the extent of Tunneling and propping.  These theories are rent 
protection theory, market for ownership control theory and market transition theory.    
Chapter three explains the models used in this research, the rationale for their use and 
other related theories in this area of research. It then goes on to outline the research 
questions for the thesis and develops the quantitative models for answering those 
questions.  
 
Chapter four develops hypotheses for the study.  These hypotheses are grouped into the 
following areas: (a) motivations for prejudicial RPTs arising from controlling 
shareholders’ needs for rent protection and the prevention of the emergence of a market 
for ownership control, (b) dependence and independence of directors, supervisors and 
executives in governance structures, (c) cadre entrepreneurs and career path 
dependencies arising from market transition and (d) the influence of non-ultimate 
blockholders.     
 
Chapter five presents the research methods of the thesis. It covers the philosophical 
stance for the research, the conceptual framework and specification of models, 
definitions of variables, sources of data, the sampling approach, data checking, and 
methods of analysis. 
 
Chapter six presents the result of the study. It first provides descriptive statistics of the 
sampled companies.  It then gives preliminary tests of hypotheses using bi-variate 
correlation analysis. Finally, results are provided for a set of regression models that test 
the hypotheses using the whole sample and sub-samples.  Additional robustness 
analysis is presented for the regression results.  
      
Chapter seven concludes the thesis and discusses the implication of the findings, the 
limitation and the directions for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
2.1. Introduction 
During the past three-and-a-half decades, China has being in transition from a centrally 
planned to a market-oriented economy which has become open to the world.  The 
country has sustained economic growth of over 10% per annum during most of this time, 
enabling it to emerge as one of the economic giants in the world.   
 
The carve-out of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), the establishment of stock exchanges, 
the promulgation of securities and corporation regulations and a code of corporate 
governance have been major steps in this economy transition.   
 
This chapter provides a background on these regulatory and structural reforms.  Section 
2 provides a brief history of the development of China’s economic and accounting 
systems.  It contains an outline of the changes from centrally-planned to market-
oriented systems; accounting and corporate regulatory reforms; and disclosure 
requirements for related-party transactions.  Section 3 gives a review of securities 
markets in China and their regulations.  It includes a brief history of China’s securities 
markets; an explanation of the classification of shares; and the nature of the split share 
reform.  Section 4 presents the nature of corporate governance and its reforms in China.  
It contains sub-sections about models of corporate governance; the establishment of a 
code of corporate governance; other board-related regulations; minority shareholder 
protection; and the key issues for China’s corporate governance practices.  
 
2.2. Brief History of the Development of China’s Economic and 
Accounting Systems  
2.2.1. From centrally-planned to market-oriented economic and accounting 
systems in China 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was found in 1949 and adopted a planned 
economy and State ownership model based on the system in the Soviet Union. Under a 
State plan, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was created to administer all accounting and 
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finance matters.   A new socialist model and economic system appropriate to the central 
government’s command-oriented management policies was implemented and remained 
in force for 30 years until 1978.   
 
The initial task of the MOF was to unify the various accounting systems and practices 
inherited from the pre-1949 society in order to enhance the legitimacy of the accounting 
function.  Having just recovered from the effects of many years of war, the ‘New China’ 
wanted to restructure its economy but it was not feasible to promulgate a completely 
new set of accounting regulations and laws immediately (Zhou 1988).  Two important 
accounting regulations were initially promulgated by the MOF in 1950.  These were the 
General Budgetary Accounting System for Administrative Department of Central 
Government and the Unit Budgetary Accounting System for Local Government.  They 
became the start of a uniform accounting system based on the Soviet Union’s system of 
uniform accounting.  Subsequently, under the first five-year plan in 1953, a number of 
new regulations were issued:  the Uniform Approach to Cost Calculation in State 
Enterprises, the Chart of Accounts, the Form of Accounting Statements used by State 
and Private Enterprises, and the Simplified Accounting System Used in Local 
Enterprises. 
 
These uniform accounting systems were funded-based.  Accounting practices were 
developed on the concept of ‘fund’, with the two basic accounting elements being ‘fund 
applications’ and ‘fund sources’.  Fund applications refer to the employment and 
utilisation of funds in acquiring property, goods and materials for production needs; 
‘fund sources’ refer to the channel for gaining and generating funds (Chow, Chau and 
Gray 1995). 
 
Accounting practices in China fell into decline between 1958 and 1962.   Under the 
reforms of the ‘Great Leap Forward’, a blueprint was developed to significantly boost 
the output of the nation’s industries.  The basic concept was of maximum use of the 
nation’s immense human resources.  As a part of this socio-economic devolvement, 
administrative work was given a much lower priority than the practical and productive 
work that Chairman Mao expected (Breth 1977; De Crespigny 1992).  This 
downgrading of administrative and professional work led to ineffective accounting 
practices.  All fund accounting procedures were greatly simplified by the MOF to 
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enable peasants to understand all aspects of an organisation’s activities.  The Great Leap 
Forward resulted in the ruin of the country’s economy, with poor planning and control, 
and especially lack of financial control resulting from inappropriate accounting records 
(Lawrence 1997).  Economic recovery began in 1962, and at the same time the next 
level of accounting development took place. 
After 1962, new accounting regulations were formulated by the MOF for State 
enterprises.  These included the Regulation Concerning Accountants’ Duties and Rights. 
Various methods of bookkeeping were also developed during this recovery period.  In 
practice, the usual debit/credit double-entry system took the form of an 
increase/decrease system for government bodies.  This approach spread rapidly to small 
and medium-sized industrial enterprises (Lawrence 1997; Lin 2003; Lu and Gary 2005).  
At the same time, another system of receipt/disbursement was adopted by banks and 
some government agencies (Lawrence 1997; Lin 2003).  Although accounting played a 
significant role in the planning and control of enterprises, diversified accounting 
methods made it difficult to amalgamate financial results or to compare financial 
performance (Lu and Gary 2005). 
 
In 1966 the Cultural Revolution began with the aim of returning the operation of the 
nation back to the peasants and factory workers.  Accounting as a business function and 
accountancy as a profession suffered severe setbacks (Lu and Gary 2005).  During the 
ten-year Cultural Revolution, no further accounting regulations were issued except for 
the Procedure of Accounting Work in State Enterprises.  Only basic financial records 
were maintained as part of the simple unified systems. Accounting had a minimum role 
in the planning and control of economic activities with serious consequence for China’s 
economy (Lawrence 1997).   
 
The features of centrally-planned economic and accounting systems in China between 
1949 and 1979 have relevance to this thesis.  These details establish the setting in which 
cadres from the former regime have perpetuated power and privilege under Nee’s 
market transition theory. It is an important theory used later in the thesis. 
 
These features of the centrally-planned economic and accounting systems in China 
between 1949 and 1979 have been outlined in order to establish the setting in which 
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cadres from the former regime have pertuatated  power and privilege under Nee’s 
market transition theory. It is an important theory that is used later in the thesis. 
 
In 1978, the ‘Open-Door’ Policy of Deng Xiaoping, which advocated that China open 
its borders to the rest of the world, signalled the start of a major change in China’s 
economy and accounting systems. New objectives for financial reporting were 
established following China’s opening to foreign investment in 1979. After 1979 there 
was an era in China of rapid economic growth, expansion of international trade and the 
establishment of securities markets.   
 
SOEs were recast as profit-oriented businesses.  Concurrently, China opened to 
international businesses by forming joint ventures and gaining greater access to new 
technologies and the world’s capital markets.  The period of transition since 1979 has 
been widely referred to as a transition from a centrally planned economy to a ‘market-
oriented economy with socialist characteristics’. This transforming economy meant 
managers and investors needed relevant and reliable financial information for decision 
making. It also raised the need for a set of accounting standards that could meet the 
expectations of a diverse range of stakeholders.  As a result, a series of significant 
accounting reforms were witnessed in China after 1979 (De Crespigny 1992). An 
outline of accounting reforms in this transition era is given in the next section.  
 
2.2.2. Accounting and corporate regulatory reforms in China’s transitional 
economy  
 
After the ‘open door’ reform, public accountants were in high demand to provide 
bookkeeping, consulting and auditing services. Accounting systems designed for the 
command economy were no longer fulfilling the needs of the market-based economy.  
Accounting began to move towards systems more in line with the frameworks used by 
industrialised nations (Lawrence 1997).  During the early 1980s, rules and regulations 
were developed to account for joint ventures between Chinese enterprises and their 
foreign partners and to account for the wholly foreign owned enterprises that were now 
permitted to operate in China.  The accounting regulations develop in the 1980s to 
achieve this are summarized in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Accounting Regulations to Attract Foreign Business and Investment 
 
Authorities Issued Year Accounting Regulation 
National People’s Congress 1980 Income Tax Law of Sino-Foreign Joint Venture 
Ministry of finance  1980 Detailed Principles for Implementation of Income Tax 
Law for Sino- Foreign Joint Venture 
Ministry of finance 1980 Provisional Regulations Concerning the Establishment of 
Accounting Consultancies 
Chinese CPA 1982 Detailed Regulations of Implementation of Income Tax 
for Foreign-owned Enterprise 
Ministry of finance 1983 Some Regulation for Joint Venture and Foreign-owned 
Companies to entrust CPAs for Auditing 
National People’s Congress 1985 Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China (see 
appendix 2) 
 
The regulatory framework affecting accounting which has developed since the 1980s 
and continues to the present day is summarised in Figure 2.1 below.  Figure 2.1 shows 
there are four levels of legislative authority in China.  At the top level, the National 
People’s Congress is the only authority empowered to enact laws according to the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The legislative body at the next 
level is the State Council, which can publish administrative rules and regulations.  At 
the third and fourth levels, the national ministries (especially the Ministry of Finance), 
as well as provincial bureaus and local government, are empowered to issue directives, 
standards and regulations on business, commerce and accounting matters within their 
jurisdictions.   
 
Before July 1993, this regulatory framework had promulgated a large number of 
specific accounting regulations prescribing various accounting and reporting systems to 
different government authorities and enterprises. Overarching these numerous 
accounting regulations is the Accounting Law enacted by the National People’s 
Congress in 1985. Details contains in Accounting Law are provided in Appendix 2.  
These details cover accounting practices generally, special provisions on accounting 
practice for companies and enterprises, accounting supervision, accounting offices and 
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accounting personnel and Legal Liability.  The Accounting Law gives it rationale in 
Article 1 as follows: 
 
This Law is enacted with a view to standardizing accounting acts, 
ensuring the truthfulness and completeness of the accounting 
materials, strengthening economic management and financial control, 
raising economic results and maintaining the order of the socialist 
market economy. 
 
 
This national law broadly stated the functions of accounting, the organisation of 
accounting work and the powers and duties of accounting personnel as well as their 
legal responsibilities (Chen, Jubb and Tran 1997).  It applied to all State enterprises, 
Tax Laws 
The Accounting Law National People’s 
Congress 
 Regulation on cost management for 
state enterprises 
 Tentative regulations on fixed asset 
depreciation for state enterprises – 
 Accounting Standard for Business 
Enterprises (ASBE) – 1993 to 2007 
 Accounting regulations for specific 
industries and type of ownership – 
1993 to 2007 
 IFRS-based Chinese Accounting 
State Council 
Ministry of Finance 
Finance/pricing 
bureaus and local 
governments 
Supplementary regulations 
Laws and Regulations Issuing Authority 
Regulations 
Companies 
& securities 
laws 
Source: adapted and extended from Chow, Chau and Gray (1995, p.34)  
 
Figure 2.1. Regulatory Framework for Accounting in China 
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State non-business units, government agencies and social organisations, and the armed 
forces. It required all these organisations to adopt the uniform accounting regulations 
issued by the MOF. Additionally, the Accounting Law allowed functional departments 
to formulate supplementary regulations to meet diverse business environments in line 
with the fundamental principles in the Accounting Law (Chow et al. 1995).  The MOF 
was empowered to administer accounting affairs and issue accounting and auditing 
standards and regulations for specific industries and various types of ownership (Chow 
et al. 1995). 
 
As explained by Tang and Lau (2000), the drivers of China’s accounting reforms during 
the 1980s and 1990s were threefold. First, all levels of government released autonomy 
over the operations and finances of former SOEs in order to reduce reliance on fund 
appropriations from government, and to promote a socialist market-oriented economy. 
Second, private and Sino-foreign joint venture enterprises were allowed and encouraged 
to operate. Third, new business transactions arose, such as asset leasing, real estate 
valuation, business mergers and foreign exchange transaction. 
 
Various authors have reviewed the accounting reforms in China during the past three 
decades. (Winkle, Huss and Chen 1994; Chow et al. 1995; Lin and Chen 2000; Xiao, 
Weetman and Sun 2004; Pacter 2007).  They concur that these reforms can be divided 
into three phases:  accounting for foreign-invested enterprises (1985-92), accounting for 
listed companies and the start of accounting standards (1992-3), and a complete set of 
accounting standards (1994-present). 
 
The first phase from 1985-1992 is referred to as “accounting for foreign-invested 
enterprises”.  This phase has been mentioned above. It mainly focused on accounting 
reforms to accommodate financial reporting requirements for Sino-foreign joint venture 
enterprises and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.  These regulations were largely 
established by reference to international accounting practices.  
 
The second phase started in 1992 due to the establishment of stock markets in Shenzhen 
and Shanghai. This resulted in the need for a change in the objectives of financial 
reporting to make the objectives more appropriate to investors entering the emerging 
Chinese stock markets and for Chinese companies attempting to list on foreign stock 
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exchanges. In 1992, the MOF released The Accounting Regulation for Experimental 
Share Enterprises (the 1992 regulation).  Under this regulation, the format of Western-
style financial statements (balance sheet, income statement and statement of change in 
financial position) was more fully followed. Also definitions and recognition criteria for 
assets, liabilities and equity were made compatible to those widely used by foreign 
companies. Thus, the 1992 regulation was the first accounting regulation to apply 
international accounting principles to domestic enterprises.  
 
During this time, the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), which 
had been formed in 1988 under the guidance of the MOF, put a case to the MOF for the 
publishing of a coherent set of accounting theories or concepts, similar to the 
accounting conceptual framework developed in the US and Australia. The CICPA 
argued that such a conceptual framework would provide a theoretical justification for 
accounting practices and serve as guidance for resolving contemporary accounting 
issues.  The outcome was the promulgation of the Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises (ASBE) by the MOF which came into force on 1 July 1993.  This first 
accounting ‘standard’ in China was a combination of core elements of a conceptual 
framework and a set of general-purpose reporting standards built into a single 
accounting standard. There were some variations in the ASBE from the accounting 
conceptual framework developed in Anglo-American countries, such as the specific 
retention of the principle of conservatism. 
 
With the promulgation of the new ASBE standard (known as the ‘base’ standard), the 
fund-orientated accounting regulations for publicly owned enterprises were withdrawn 
(Davidson, Gelardi and Li 1996).  Because a complete set of operational accounting 
standards would be expected to take several years to develop, the MOF issued new 
industry-based accounting regulations for thirteen industries as a transitional 
arrangement.  These industry-based accounting regulations became a supplement to the 
ASBE for the purpose of providing technical guidelines, particularly on accrual 
accounting methods, to different industries. They also came into effect on 1 July 1993.  
These new regulations were compatible with the principles given in the ASBE and were 
based on Western accounting methods. 
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The third phase has been on-going from 1994 to the present. It is referred to as the 
phase of “adopting a complete set of accounting standards”.  This phase has involved a 
continuation of the significant move towards the Anglo-American model of financial 
regulation. By law all companies must prepare their financial statements using the 
Chinese specification of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  The 
principal sources of Chinese GAAP are The Accounting Law and Chinese Accounting 
Standards (Pacter 2007).  From 1997 to 2001, the MOF issued thirty Exposure Drafts 
and sixteen final Chinese Accounting Standards (CASs), plus supporting guidance.   
 
In February 2006, the MOF issued an entirely new set of CASs, comprising a Basic 
Standard (a conceptual framework) and thirty-eight specific CASs.  The new CASs 
became effective for publicly listed companies on 1 January 2007, and replaced the 
ASBE ‘base standard’ and industry accounting regulations.  Non-listed companies in 
China were also encouraged to adopt the new set of CASs.  The new CASs became 
mandatory for all SOEs controlled by the central government starting in 2008, and have 
been phased in as a mandatory requirement for all large and medium-sized unlisted 
enterprises from 2009 onwards.  These new standards cover nearly all topics in the 
current International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs).  With a few exceptions, 
the CASs (given ASBE numbers) are substantially in line with IFRSs. This has meant 
they are much more focused on asset measurement at fair value, and take much more of 
an investor-creditor reporting focus than before.   
 
The primary benefits advocated by CICPA for this adoption of IFRSs in China are the 
same as those advocated in other IFRS-adopting countries.  First, these new IFRS-based 
local standards were expected to increase confidence in China’s capital markets because 
they incorporate accounting principles and methods familiar to investors worldwide. 
Second, for Chinese companies increasingly setting up operations and listings overseas, 
these IFRS-based standards were expected to reduce the cost of complying with 
accounting regimes in the different jurisdictions in which multi-national Chinese 
companies operate. 
2.2.3. Disclosure requirements for related-party transactions 
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Listed companies in China have been required to disclose related-party transactions and 
relationships to a limited extent under the accounting regulations for specific industries 
and ownership types since 2000. These limited requirements were superseded by the 
issue of IFRS-based CASs in 2007. Among these CASs was the standard, ASBE 36 
Related Party Disclosures. Extracts from the important sections (i.e., articles) in ASBE 
36 are given in Table 2.2. As noted in Table 2.2, the standard requires an expanded 
definition of related-parties and greater disclosures than the former accounting 
regulations. First, in relation to the definition of related-parties, under ASBE 36 the 
breadth of the definition is seen in Table 2.2 in the following statement: “When a party 
controls, jointly controls or exercises significant influence over another party, or when 
two or more parties are under the control, joint control or significant influence of the 
same party, then affiliated party relationships are constituted” (Article 3). ASBE 36 
further defines control, joint control and significant relationships under Article 3 as 
being quite all-embracing (see Table 2.2). It lists parties that would constitute the 
affiliated parties of an enterprise as ranging from the parent company, the subsidiaries, 
other enterprises under the control of the parent, investors with joint venture control or 
significant influence, the main individual investors and the close family members 
thereof, and key managerial personnel (Article 4). 
 
Second, in terms of expanded disclosure requirements under ASBE 36, the standard 
requires that “an enterprise shall, in its financial statements, disclose the related 
information about all affiliated party relationships and the transactions among them” 
(Article 2). It allows transactions to be disclosed as aggregations of affiliated party 
transactions of similar types provided “it does not affect readers' correct understanding 
of the financial statements” (Article 11). A supplementary ruling on the materiality of 
related-party transactions to be separately disclosed is given in the regulation on 
Information Disclosure by Publicly Traded Companies No. 2, issued by the Chinese 
Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC). This ruling states that listed companies 
in China are required to report the aggregated amounts of all types of related-party 
transactions, but separate detailed disclosures within these aggregates are required on 
these transactions if for one party, the total amount of RPT is larger than the official 
currency of China Renminbi (RMB) 30,000,000, five per cent of the audited net asset 
value, or ten per cent of net income (Huyghebaert and Wang 2010a). 
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Table 2.2. Extracts of Provisions in Accounting Standard for Enterprises (ASBE) 
No. 36 – Related Party Disclosures (2006) 
 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 2 
 An enterprise shall, in its financial statements, disclose the related information about all affiliated 
party relationships and the transactions among them.  
Chapter II Affiliated Parties 
Article 3 
 When a party controls, jointly controls or exercises significant influence over another party, or 
when two or more parties are under the control, joint control or significant influence of the same 
party, the affiliated party relationships are constituted. 
 The term "control" means having the power to decide an enterprise's financial and operating policy 
and obtain benefits from its business activities. 
 The term "joint control" means control over an economic activity as specified by contract, which 
exists only when the investing parties that need to share the power of control in important 
financial and operating decision-making agree unanimously. 
 The term "significant influence" means having the power to participate in the formulation of 
financial and operating policies of an enterprise, but not the power to control or jointly control the 
formulation of these policies together with other parties. 
Article 4 
The following parties constitute the affiliated parties of an enterprise: 
 The parent company thereof; 
 The subsidiaries thereof; 
 Other enterprises under the control of the same parent company thereof; 
 The investors having joint control over the enterprise; 
 The investors having significant influence thereon; 
 The joint ventures thereof; 
 The associated enterprises thereof; 
 The main individual investors and the close family members thereof. A main individual investor 
refers to an individual investor who can control or jointly control an enterprise, or has significant 
influence thereon; and 
 Key managerial personnel of the enterprise or of its parent company and the close family members 
thereof. Key managerial personnel refer to those who have the power of and responsibility for 
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planning, directing and controlling the activities of the enterprise. The close family members of a 
main individual investor or of a key managerial person refer to the family members who may 
influence or be influenced by that individual in handling transactions with the enterprise. 
 Other enterprises the main individual investors, key managerial personnel, or close family 
members of such individuals control, jointly control or have significant influence over. 
Article 6 
 Enterprises shall not be regarded as affiliated parties simply because they are all under the control 
of the state. 
Chapter III Affiliated Party Transaction 
Article 7 
 The term "affiliated party transaction" refers to an event whereby a transfer of resources, labour 
services or obligations takes place between affiliated parties, irrespective of whether money is 
charged. 
Article 8 
The types of affiliated party transaction usually include as follows: 
 Purchases or sales of goods; 
 Purchasing or selling assets other than goods; 
 Rendering or receiving labor services; 
 Guaranteeing; 
 Providing capital (including loans or equity contributions); 
 Leasing; 
 Agency; 
 Transfer of research and development projects; 
 License agreements; 
 Settling debts on behalf of an enterprise or by this enterprise that represents another party; and; 
and 
 The emoluments for key managerial personnel. 
Chapter IV Disclosure 
Article 9 
 An enterprise shall, in the annotations to the financial statements, disclose the following 
information about the parent company and subsidiaries thereof, irrespective of whether there 
have been transactions between them: the names of the parent company and subsidiaries thereof. 
Where the parent company is not the ultimate controlling party of the enterprise, it shall disclose 
the name of the ultimate controlling party. 
 The nature of business, name, place of registration, and registered capital (or actually paid-in 
capital, stock capital) and changes therein of the parent company and its subsidiaries; and 
 The proportion of shares or voting rights held by the parent company in this enterprise or by this 
enterprise in its subsidiaries. 
Article 10 
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 Where there have been transactions between an enterprise and its affiliated parties, it shall disclose 
the nature of the affiliated party relationships, the types of transactions and the elements of 
transaction in the annotations.  
 The elements of transaction shall at least include: 
(1) the amount of transactions, 
(2) the amounts, terms and conditions of outstanding items, and the information about the 
guaranties granted to others or obtained, 
(3) the amounts of provisions for non-performing debts under outstanding items, and 
(4) price policies. 
Article 11 
 Affiliated party transactions shall be disclosed on the basis of the affiliated parties and the types of 
the transactions involved. 
 The affiliated party transactions of similar types may be disclosed in aggregate in case that it does 
not affect readers' correct understanding of the financial statements. 
Article 12 
 No enterprise may disclose an affiliated party transaction as a fair transaction unless it provides 
exact proofs. 
 
Source: ASBE No 36 (2006), Disclosure of Affiliated Parties, Laws Of The People's Republic 
Of China. 
 
2.3. Securities Markets in China and their Regulations 
2.3.1. A brief history of China’s securities markets 
 
During the initial establishment of the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, 
China's list firms were mostly created as a ‘carved out’ from SOEs. The reason for this 
development was to overcome the financial burden on governments of having many 
SOEs that made chronic operating deficits. The quality of the assets held by SOEs was 
highly variable. By restructuring themselves, the higher quality core assets of the SOE 
could be spun off in order to successfully implement an initial public offering (IPO), 
while leaving its non-core assets, debts, and surplus manpower in the residual State 
body. The original SOE retained control by becoming the parent or holding company of 
the listed company (Aharony, Lee and Wong 2000; Aharony, Wang and Yuan 2010). 
The implication is, however, that having spun off their core assets, the controlling State 
body would often be forced to rely on the listed entity for financial support.  
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Hence, at the outset of the stock market in China, the great majority of listed firms were 
formed from SOEs who retained a controlling ownership stake. The State’s ownership 
in listed companies is held by a State ministry, a provincial or local government, or 
State bureaus and other statutory authorities.  These government bodies may not 
necessary hold 50% or more of the shares, but they will ensure they hold a ‘controlling 
stake’.  This means having effective control of the voting shares and/or the board of 
directors (Berkman et al. 2010). 
 
In respect of the history of securities markets under the communist regime in China, the 
Tianjin Stock Exchange was retained from 1949 to 1956. However, it was viewed as a 
temporary trial for the remains of China’s former capitalist industry which functioned 
under socialism.  By 1957 all aspects of a securities market were discontinued and the 
market disappeared for the next twenty-five years. 
 
It was not until 1981 that China restarted its securities market in order to drive its 
economic reforms.  The Government issued the first treasury bonds in 1981 to finance 
its budget deficit.  Soon after, many SOEs issued financial and construction bonds to 
solve fund shortages, with these funds being urgently needed for economic 
reconstruction of the country (Tan 1999).  For example, The China International and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC) ‘privately’ floated JPY10 billion in the Tokyo capital 
market.  In January 1984 the Bank of China issued JPY20 billion worth of public bonds 
that were given a AAA rating by a Japanese credit rating institution. 
 
Prior to the formation of stock exchanges in China in 1990-91, the first Chinese 
company to issue public share certificates (A-shares) was a joint investment company in 
Shenzhen in 1983.  In July 1984, the first join-stock company, the Beijing Tianqiao 
Departmental Store Company, issued shares to the public.  In November 1984, the 
Shanghai Feiyue Hi-Fi Corporation floated 10,000 shares at RMB50 each.  Two months 
later, the Yanzhong Realty Company floated 100,000 shares to the public.  Both share 
issues were handled by a trust and investment company, a unit of the Shanghai Branch 
of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC).  The first Chinese company to issue B-shares 
was pioneered by the Shanghai Vacuum Electronic Devices Co Ltd on 30 November 
1990. 
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Secondary markets were established and developed in ‘securities trading centres’ across 
the country in major provincial cities such as Guangzhou, Changzhou, Wuhan, Harbin 
and Dalian under Central Government supervision.  In April 1990 the Central 
Government approved these trading centres, and provincial officials started designing 
their own exchanges and applying to Beijing for permission to open them.  This idea 
was supported by legislators in the National People’s Congress (Green 2003).  By the 
end of 1992 there were about 5,000 securities trading centres, spawning the growth of 
approximately 70 specialised securities companies and 1,000 institutions with securities 
operations.   
 
In 1989, the State Council decided to establish two stock exchanges to allow SOEs to 
raise external equity capital from the public.  At this time, laws and regulations were 
established to allow stock-holding companies. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
was the first and opened on 26 November 1990, trading eight kinds of stock with a 
market value of RMB1 billion.  The second, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SZSE), was 
inaugurated on 3 July 1991 with five listed companies (Fung and Leung 2001). 
 
China faced new dynamics following its admittance to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) on 11 December 2001.  This meant the reducing of trade barriers and an 
increase in international competition. It made the reform of China’s financial markets 
and corporate governance even more urgent (China Stock Market Handbook 2008). The 
expected challenges for China’s securities markets that would result from the country’s 
WTO membership are summed up by Reuvid (2005) as follows: 
 
The first challenge is that the entry of foreign securities institutions will generate new 
tasks for China’s securities regulation and supervision.  International political and 
economic factors will have an increased impact on China’s financial markets, which 
will consequently increase the level of difficulty in regulating and supervising the 
securities market and therefore in handling possible crises. 
 
The second challenge results from the great gap that has existed between Chinese 
securities institutions and their foreign counterparts in terms of size of capital, level of 
corporate governance and risk control.  Although foreign securities institutions can only 
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enter China’s securities market in the form of joint ventures, their direct entry into the 
securities market could potentially occur in the future.  
 
The third challenge is that domestic listed companies will be subject to the ordeal of the 
law of the market when competing with international giants on the same stage. In the 
opinion of Reuvid (2005), China’s securities market needs to converge with 
international practices, which will require major reforms in an effort to improve market 
transparency and to crack down on illegal conduct.  The process of reform is a great 
challenge for China’s securities industry (Reuvid 2005, p.273). 
 
There have been several significant achievements of the Chinese securities market since 
the SHSE and SZSE were established in 1990-91. First, the Chinese securities market 
has become a basic means for allocating economic resources (Yu, Zhang and Qi 2005).  
Its growth in the 20 years has largely caught up with developments in more mature 
market economies (China Stock Market Handbook 2008). Second, the fast growth of 
the Chinese securities market has fostered and enhanced the sense of risk-bearing 
investments in the economy (Yu et al. 2005).  By 2005 there were approximately 70 
million investor accounts opened across the country, based on CSRC’s data. Third, 
listed companies have been required to establish and improve their corporate 
governance (Tan and Wang 2004; Yu et al. 2005). Finally, Chinese securities market 
reforms have resulted in an improved regulatory system and a market-oriented appraisal 
system for initial public offerings (IPOs) as well as an expanded capital supply to the 
market (Pistor and Xu 2005; China Stock Market Handbook 2008). However, although 
the rapid growth and development of the securities market in China is impressive, it is 
still regarded to be an emerging market in terms of its maturity and stability.  This is 
reflected in the high proportion of financing and investing transactions that are between 
listed companies and their related parties (Peng et al. 2011). 
2.3.2. Classification of shares  
 
All classifications of shares in China have the same voting and cash flow rights by law. 
Chinese listed shares can be classified according to the residency of their owner as 
domestic (A shares) or foreign (B, H, and N shares). Foreign owners of shares in a listed 
company in China are mostly either non-Chinese citizens (B-shares) or non-Chinese 
27 
 
companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-shares) or companies listed on 
New York Stock Exchange (N-shares).  A-shares are available exclusively to Chinese 
domestic investors, and are denominated in the Chinese currency RMB (Cheung et al. 
2009a). 
 
For the A-shares, holders can be categorised into ‘State’ or ‘Legal-persons’.  State 
shares are those held by government agencies (e.g., the Bureau of State Property 
Management and local finance bureaus) and by some types of corporatized SOEs. Legal 
person shares are those owned by domestic corporations or other non-individual legal 
persons. State shares are non-tradable shares.  Legal person shares cannot be traded on 
the two exchanges or transferred to foreign investors but can be transferred to domestic 
corporations when approved by the CSRC. Tradable-A shares are the only type of 
equity that can be publicly traded among domestic investors. The market price of a 
listed company refers to the price of Tradable-A shares.  
 
Delios, Wu, and Zhou (2006) assessed the official share classification for listed firms in 
China for purposes of analysing the corporate governance of these listed firms. They 
identified ambiguity and overlay between 17 ownership categories. Because of these 
ambiguities, Berkman et al. (2010) adopted a classification scheme of Chinese listed 
company ownership developed by the National University of Singapore Business 
School (NUS). Based upon NUS’s detailed classifications, Berkman et al. (2010) define 
three broad groups of block-holder owners of listed companies in China.  These broad 
groupings are based on the criteria of closeness of the block-holder’s ties to the 
government, and the incentives and experience of the block-holders. These three groups 
of block-holder owners are:  
 
i. STATE BUREAUCRATS - including central government, local governments, 
government ministries, government bureaus, state asset-investment bureaus, state 
asset-management bureaus, state research institutes, and state-owned banks.  
They have the most direct ties to the State, as these block-holders are (an integral 
part of) the government, government agencies, or government institutions.  ‘State 
bureaucrats’ typically have the least experience in running a company and are 
less concerned about the profits of the firm. 
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ii. MARKET ORIENTED STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (MOSOEs) - 
including companies that formerly were government ministries, market-oriented 
state-owned enterprises, and infrastructure-construction companies. They have 
the next closest ties to the State, as they are controlled by the State, but have been 
through a transition toward the market-oriented structure of for-profit 
organizations.  ‘MOSOEs’ are corporations with more experience in running a 
company and a stronger focus on profit maximization. 
iii. PRIVATE ENTITIES - including security companies, investment funds, private 
companies, private individuals, foreign companies and individuals, and work 
unions. They have the least direct ties to the State, in that their management is 
controlled by private firms and/or investors, even if the State has a partial 
ownership stake.  ‘Private entities’ have the greatest incentive to maximize 
profits because they receive the greatest degree of rewards based upon financial 
performance (Berkman et al. 2010). 
2.3.3. The split share reform 
 
CSRC initiated the split-share structure reform in 2005 to allow conversion of publicly 
listed firms’ non-tradable A-shares to tradable A-shares (Liao, Liu and Wang 2011). 
Since 2005, listed companies have progressively sought authorisation from the CSRC to 
have new share issues from their holding of non-tradable shares. Authorizations of 
conversions of non-tradable to tradable shares did not gain significant momentum until 
2007.   
 
This reform was for the intention of breaking down the rigidity of the segmentation into 
non-tradable and tradable A-shares held by State-owned and State legal person owned 
listed companies.  According to Chen et al. (2009), the CSRC’s objectives in 
implementing this reform to the ‘split share structure’ were: 
 
i. promote improved corporate governance and stronger capital markets. 
ii. reduce the disparity in earnings between tradable and non-tradable shares. 
iii. ensure all of the shareholders in a given company have a common interest. 
iv. reduce the decision making cost accompanying major decisions. 
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v. facilitate the leveraging of the stock markets for mergers and acquisitions 
activity by high-growth companies. 
vi. enhance the overall quality of China’s listed companies and strengthening the 
investing public’s confidence in the stock market.   
At the time of the CSRC’s launch of the split share structure reform in April 2005, listed 
companies had approximately one-third freely traded public shares and two-thirds non-
tradable state-owned shares, according to Fang et al. (2008). The holders of non-
tradable have the same voting, dividend and other rights as the holders of tradable 
shares, but they cannot sell the stocks.  As a relatively low portion of issued shares were 
tradable in the market, the Chinese stock markets were limited in volume of trades. This 
caused higher illiquid and volatile in the market (Fang et al. 2008). As investors’ 
confidence in the reform grew, almost all the share prices of companies holding non-
tradable A-shares rose after the reform and market liquidity improved (Fang, Su, and 
Chong 2008). 
 
The Nature of Corporate Governance and its Reforms in China Models of corporate 
governance Market-based economies require effective corporate governance.  Corporate 
governance has received much attention in China in recent years.  At the core of the 
scholarly debate is how China can develop an effective corporate governance system to 
improve its listed companies’ performance and protect minority shareholders (Liu 2005; 
Liu, Atinc and Kroll 2011).  
 
Broadly, there are two models of corporate governance, associated with whether a 
country has a common law or civil law system. They are the Anglo-American model 
and the German-Japanese model of corporate governance (Tam 2002, Cernat 2004; Tan 
and Wang 2004).  In the Anglo-American model, the corporate concept is based on the 
fiduciary relationship between shareholders and managers (Cernat 2004).  It is 
characterised by a clear separation between management control and shareholder 
ownership.  Thus, it is also called the outside system of corporation governance (Cook 
and Deakin 1999; Cernat 2004).  Based on the underlying belief in a free-market 
economy, the Anglo-American system is founded on the premise that self-interest and 
decentralised markets can function in a self-regulating and balanced manner (Cernat 
2004).  
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 Tan and Wang (2004) compare the different features of these two models. First they 
give the following summary of the features of the Anglo-American model: 
 
i. Separation of ownership and control – this feature was first recognised by Berle 
and Means (1932). As companies grow, owners will need to source capital 
funds from diverse investors.  Benfield (1995) suggests that such diversified 
equity investment has created a class of passive investors from the public who 
lack the ability, information and incentive to actively monitor the companies in 
which they invest. 
ii. Role of shareholders – theoretically, shareholders may rely on the courts to 
ensure that directors fulfil their role as managerial monitors (Wei 2003). 
iii. Role of institutional shareholder activism – as ownership levels of institutional 
investors (e.g., superannuation funds, insurance companies, nominee trusts) 
increase, they become more active in corporate governance (Tan and Wang 
2004). 
iv. One-tier board – the mechanism of single board is applied for the purpose of 
restrain managerial power and protecting shareholders’ interests, while 
minimizing agency costs (Benfield 1995; Tan and Wang 2004).   
v. In common law countries three organs of corporate governance established: 
shareholders’ meetings, a board of directors and management. Corporate laws 
provide that the board shall oversee or monitor the management of the company 
on behalf of the shareholders.  Thus, accountability and independent and fair 
supervision and monitoring are vital components of this system (Benfield 1995; 
Tan and Wang 2004). 
Second, Tan and Wang (2004) give the following summary of the features on the 
German-Japanese model: 
i. Consideration is given to the interests of not only shareholders but also the 
relevant stakeholders (Cernat 2004).  It is often believed that the special 
positions of financial institutions as shareholder and creditors can equip them 
with better information regarding companies and their financial conditions, 
thereby leading to more efficient monitoring and lending (Tan and Wang 2004) 
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ii. Role of financial institutions – the German-Japanese model does not have an 
active market for corporation control.  Instead, financial institutions play a 
central role as corporate governance monitors.  German companies raise funds 
from banks rather than the public.  Other than their role as creditors, banks hold 
large stakes in numerous public companies and often have board representation 
(Boehmer 1998).  Thus, the banks are able to exercise their influence not only 
from direct ownership of equity but also through their holding of proxy votes 
(Benfield 1995).  In Japan, the special relationship between the main banks and 
large companies forms the core of the main banking system. The main banks 
not only intervene to recue companies in financial distress but also monitor 
governance (Aoki 1990). 
iii. Concentration of ownership – the banks’ substantial holdings of equity means 
that ownership structure of German companies is highly concentrated compared 
to American companies (Benfield 1995).  In Japan, corporate equity ownership 
structure is very stable and entails the holding of equity for long periods, 
without engaging in active trading of shares (Sheard 1991). 
iv. Two-tier board – a unique feature of the German-Japanese model is the 
existence of a mandatory two-tier board system that separates the management 
(or main) board from the supervisory board.  The management board is 
responsible for managing the enterprise and the supervisory board appoints, 
supervises and advises the members of the management board.  To ensure 
independence, the two boards have absolutely separate functions and the 
supervisory board cannot undertake any managerial duties. 
In 2001, the CSRC published The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
in China (The Code) . Since then, evidence in China has shown a trend towards a mix of 
these two corporate governance models (Ho 2003). Tam (2002) has summarised the 
characteristics of corporate governance for the specific Chinese model as compared to 
the features of the Anglo-American and German-Japanese models.  This comparison is 
shown in Table 2.3, reproduced from Tam (2002). 
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Table 2.3. Characteristics of Corporate Governance Models 
 
Anglo-American Model German-Japanese Model Chinese Model 
Dispersed ownership Concentrated ownership 
with cross shareholding 
among investors 
Concentrated ownership with 
the state as majority 
shareholder 
Investors usually free riders 
with little interest in the 
exercise of control except 
for some active institutional 
investors 
 
Investors, banks and 
employees participate 
actively in the control of 
companies 
Control primarily by insider 
managers supported by their 
Party-ministerial associates 
Investment horizon of 
shareholders usually short 
term 
Investment horizon of 
shareholders usually long 
term 
Investment horizon of 
shareholders usually short 
term and highly speculative 
Shareholder as the primary 
stakeholder in setting 
company objectives; 
primacy of the protection of 
minority shareholders’ 
rights 
Multiple stakeholders’ 
interest represented in 
company objectives that 
incorporate social and 
employment goals 
Ineffective shareholder 
representation but company 
objectives subject to 
government interventions 
Reliance on securities 
market financing 
Reliance on bank credit 
for corporate financing 
Reliance on bank credit from 
state-owned banks. 
Active market for corporate 
control, with highly liquid 
and transparent securities 
market 
Absence of active market 
for corporate control 
Absence of active market for 
corporate control 
Arm’s length transactions A greater extent of 
network and alliance 
dealings 
Rampant insider and 
government directed 
transactions 
Active market for senior 
managerial manpower 
Less active market for 
senior managerial 
manpower 
Obstacles to development of 
an active market 
Executive remuneration 
linked to corporate 
performance 
Executive remuneration 
less linked to corporate 
performance 
Executive remuneration not 
linked to corporate 
performance 
Board with majority of 
outside directors 
Insider-dominated board Insider-manager-dominated 
board with appointments 
influenced by the authorities 
Active monitoring role of 
professional organisations 
and the mass media 
Monitoring role 
performed mainly by 
banks and cross 
shareholders 
Weak or absence of 
monitoring role by banks, 
professional organisations 
and the mass media 
Source: Tam (2002, p.309) 
In terms of Board features in China, there is a two-tier board structure in which the main 
board is relatively weak in independence and the supervisory board has little power 
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(Wang 2007).  In these circumstances, upholding the corporate governance principle of 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights becomes an issue. Under CSRC’s Code of 
Corporate Governance, the main Board is expected to contain 5 to 19 directors, of 
whom a minimum of one-third are required to be independent directors.  
 
Wang (2007) gives evidence that the supervisory Board in China has played an 
ineffective governance role because of its composition. This composition is established 
under guidelines to include representatives from a range of organisations in society and 
from the company’s shareholders and management. Supervisory Board members can 
represent labour unions, professions, party members (political officers), close friends 
and allies of the major shareholder and a top manager representative (Tam 2002; Dahya, 
Karbhari, Xiao and Yang 2003; Lin 2004). 
2.3.4. Establishment of a code of corporate governance in China 
 
When stock exchanges were formed to enable companies (mostly carved-out parts of 
SOEs) to issue public share and when China became part of the WTO, there arose a 
need to set codes of corporate governance in place. According to Mallin (2007), there 
was a need for a code of corporate governance in order to improve and protect 
shareholders’ rights, insulate companies’ boards from inappropriate influences, and 
improve transparency so as to reduce information asymmetry (Mallin 2007).  In the 
early 2000s corporate governance had become a pressing issue as a means of enhancing 
the international acceptability of Chinese enterprises (Tan and Wang 2004).  With the 
objectives of developing a prosperous socialist market-oriented economy and attracting 
more foreign institutional investors, the government sought to create a corporate 
governance system that could protect minority shareholders’ rights and give confidence 
in the corporate structure and operations of listed companies (Malin 2007). 
 
The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China was issued jointly 
by the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in January 2002.  
The Code is applicable to all listed companies in China, and provides the major 
benchmark for evaluating whether a listed company has good corporate governance or 
not.  All listed companies are required to act in the spirit of The Code in their efforts to 
improve corporate governance. The CSRC acts in the dominant role in overseeing the 
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implementation of The Code as part of its responsible for the regulation of securities 
markets.  
 
The Code contains seven chapters consisting of sub-sections as follows: 
 
Chapter 1. Shareholders and Shareholders' Meetings: (1) Rights of Shareholders; (2) 
Rules for Shareholders' Meetings; (3) Related Party Transactions. 
Chapter 2. Listed Company and Its Controlling Shareholders: (1) Behavior Rules for 
Controlling Shareholders; (2) Independence of Listed Company.  
Chapter 3.Directors and Board of Directors: (1) Election Procedures for Directors; 
(2) The Duties and Responsibilities of Directors; (3) Duties and Composition of the 
Board of Directors; (4) Rules and Procedure of the Board of Directors (5) 
Independent Directors; (6) Specialized Committees of the Board of Directors. 
Chapter 4. The Supervisors and the supervisory Board: (1) Duties and 
Responsibilities of the supervisory Board; (2) The Composition and Steering of the 
supervisory Board. 
Chapter 5. Performance Assessments and Incentive and Disciplinary Systems: (1) 
Performance Assessment for Directors, Supervisors and Management Personnel; (2) 
Selection of Management Personnel; (3) Incentive and Disciplinary Systems for 
Management. 
Chapter 6. Stakeholders. 
Chapter 7. Information Disclosure and Transparency: (1) Listed Companies' 
Ongoing Information Disclosure; (2) Disclosure of Information Regarding 
Corporate Governance; (3) Disclosure of Controlling Shareholder's Interests. 
2.3.5. Other board-related regulations  
 
According to The Company Law, the basic organisational structure of a limited liability 
company consists of three tiers of control: 
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i. Shareholders’ meeting – the shareholders’ meeting in China is known as “the 
organ of power” of the corporation and it assumes supreme sovereignty in 
corporate governance.  By statute, shareholders have the power to call meetings, 
elect and replace directors and supervisors, and approve their reports.  They are 
also conferred with the right to examine corporate financial accounts, decide 
whether to issue additional shares and make decisions regarding corporate 
mergers, dissolution and liquidation.  However, some problems stem from these 
shareholders’ powers.  First, if shareholders deny the decisions of the board of 
directors and exercise powers purportedly reserved exclusively to the board, it 
will result in unnecessary power struggles between the two parties (Schipani and 
Liu 2002).  Second, the shareholders’ meeting is often simply a rubber stamp for 
the wishes of the majority shareholders in reality, and provides little protection 
for minority shareholders (Schiani and Liu 2001).  Finally, although 
shareholders are allowed to file a suit individually or jointly with other 
shareholders, class action is excluded as a permitted method due to the courts 
lack of experience or resources to deal with thousands of shareholders in a class 
action (Liu and Ren 2003). 
 
ii. Board of directors – the boards of directors of Chinese listed companies have the 
usual breadth of managerial powers comparable to their Western counterparts.  
Essentially, the board of directors is the critical link between ownership and 
corporate governance.  Major ownership of shares in listed companies is held by 
the State since most listed companies come from restructured SOEs.  This 
dominance of state ownership implies that the government exerts control over 
managerial appointments and incentive (Qu 2003).  In addition, the chairman of 
the board of directors and the CEO are often combined in China.  It may be 
argued that this CEO duality offers clear direction by a single leadership and a 
concomitantly faster response to external events.  Despite this, the CEO duality 
also results in a high possibility of the board of directors being controlled by the 
‘insiders’, thus resulting in ineffective board control and weak independence 
(Conyon and Peck 1998; Lin 2004).  In order to bring independence to corporate 
structure, The Company Law requires that all listed companies have independent 
directors.  Since 2003 The Code further mandates that the boards of listed 
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companies should have at least one-third independent directors (Firth, Fung and 
Rui 2007; Shan and Taylor 2008). 
 
iii. Supervisory board – the major responsibility of a supervisory board is to oversee 
the corporate board of directors.  The company Law places several requirements 
on the composition and operation of the supervisory board:  it shall comprise at 
least three members; members shall include representatives of shareholders and 
an appropriate percentage of representatives of the firm’s employees; the 
proportion of representatives of employees shall account for not less than one-
third of all members;  representatives of employees who serve as members of the 
supervisory board shall be democratically elected through the meeting of 
representatives of the firm’s employees, shareholders’ meeting or by other 
means; the supervisory board shall have one chairman, and may have a deputy 
chairman; and the chairman and deputy chairman shall be elected by more than 
half of all members.  Due to the independent nature of the supervisory boards, 
no directors or senior managers may concurrently act as a member.  The duties 
and responsibilities of a supervisory board have been clarified by The Code: 
supervising corporate finance, assessing the legitimacy of directors, managers 
and other senior management personnel’s performance of duties; protecting the 
firm’s and the shareholder’s legal rights and interests, having the right to 
investigate the operating status, and having the corresponding obligation of 
confidentiality; receiving necessary corporate  information and assistance from 
management in order to satisfy the supervisors’ rights to be informed about the 
company’s matters; preparing and presenting a report of the supervisory board 
as an important basis for performance assessment of directors, managers and 
other senior management personnel; and reporting as a supervisory board, if 
necessary, directly to securities regulatory authorities and other related 
authorities.  The supervisory board and the board of directors are legally on the 
same hierarchical level, and so the former has no power to dismiss the 
management nor does it have the power to report to the shareholders’ meeting 
on the performance of the company and management (Tan and Wang 2004). 
 
When The Code was issued in 2001, the CSRC also issued The Guidelines on the 
Introduction of the Independent Directors System in Listed Companies in August 2001.  
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These Guidelines require a one-year break before ex-employees can be appointed 
independent directors.  Various powers are granted to independent directors under the 
guidelines.  First, independent directors should approve a proposed related-party 
transaction between the listed company and related parties before it is submitted to the 
board of directors for discussion. Second, independent directors can appoint and dismiss 
an outside auditor and consultant.  Third, they can solicit proxies in advance of the 
shareholders’ meeting.  Fourth, they can propose that the board of directors call an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting or a meeting of the board of directors.  Fifth, they 
can issue ‘independent opinions’ with regards to directors and senior managers’ 
appointment, replacement and remuneration, as well as significant financing matters.  
 
2.3.6. Minority shareholder protection in China 
 
The protection of minority shareholders is officially regarded as a major regulatory 
objective by securities market regulator in China.  However, there is evidence that in 
practice the position of minority shareholders is poorly protected, especially as regards 
to Chinese listed companies (Tomasic and Andrews 2007).  In fact, minority 
shareholders are poorly protected in a number of countries in East Asia (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang 2008).  In the Chinese context, the limits of the rule of law have 
been described as “rule by law rather than the rule of law” (Abel 1973) or as the “bird in 
a cage” (Lubman, 1999).  As explained by Tomasic and Andrews (2007) “this may also 
be said of the shareholding structure in China's listed companies that, in many respects, 
is also constrained by ideas that have their roots in the experiences of state-owned 
enterprises and the 'cage' of China's once-planned economy “ (p.89).   
 
In terms of the official guidelines on the protection of minority shareholders in listed 
companies, the CSRC proclaims the following general principles in Chapter 1 of The 
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2001): 
 
i. A listed company shall establish a corporate governance structure sufficient for 
ensuring the full exercise of shareholders' rights. 
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ii. The corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair treatment 
toward all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. All shareholders are to 
enjoy equal rights and to bear the corresponding duties based on the shares they 
hold. 
 
iii. Shareholders shall have the right to know about and the right to participate in 
major matters of the company set forth in the laws . 
 
iv. Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights through 
civil litigation or other legal means in accordance with laws and administrative 
regulations. 
 
The CSRC's Code of Corporate Governance also contains a clause (19) that controlling 
shareholders have a responsibility to not abuse their power.   It states:  
 
19. The controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed 
company and other shareholders. The controlling shareholders of a listed 
company shall strictly comply with laws and regulations while exercising 
their rights as investors, and shall be prevented from damaging the listed 
company's or other shareholders' legal rights and interests, through means 
such as assets restructuring, or from taking advantage of their privileged 
position to gain additional benefit.  
 
In addition, in a 2003 report on China's corporate governance problems, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange concluded that: 
 
Shareholding structure of Chinese companies is problematic. First, the 
institution for implementing state shareholder's rights is unsatisfactory. 
Either the government exerts too much influence on listed companies and 
the company's objective is affected by political considerations, or there is a 
lack of monitoring on the shareholders, resulting in insider control in the 
form of misuse of company assets and [pursuit] of private objectives. 
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There are several specific rules and guidelines on minority shareholders protection. In 
China’s company law, article 4 provides that the 'shareholders of a company shall, 
according to law, enjoy such rights of owners as benefiting from assets of the company, 
making major decisions and selecting managerial personnel'. Further, article 153 allows 
shareholders to bring group actions before a court where damage has been caused 'to the 
interests of any shareholders of the company by any illegal action by a director or senior 
officer of the company’ (Tomasic and Andrews 2007).  
 
In practice according to Tomasic and Andrews (2007), it is not clear how these 
provisions can work.  They argued that enforcements through the courts is problematic 
because of  ‘the short-term horizons of such shareholders… the low levels of expertise 
of Chinese courts in dealing with such cases (and) the problems of proof that need to be 
dealt with in bringing such civil cases’ (p.92).   
 
Tomasic and Andrews (2007) investigated the issue of minority shareholders protection 
by conducting interview with 108 informants in nine cities across China including 
senior officers from China's top 100 listed companies, independent directors, 
accountants and lawyers, and regulatory officials from the CSRC and the two Stock 
exchanges.  The main themes that emerge from their interviews were as follows:  
 
i. Governance effects of the State as dominant shareholder; 
ii. The dominance of the Chinese Communist Party; 
iii. Deferring to the majority shareholder before making major decisions; 
iv. Different types of interference by the State as owner; 
v. The “key-man” (a dominant shareholder or chairman) problem in Chinese 
corporate governance; 
vi. The problems of non-transferable State shares; 
vii. Lack of importance of corporate governance principal concerning minority 
shareholders; 
viii. Low record of success in protecting minority shareholders. 
2.3.7. Key issues of China’s corporate governance 
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Despite the detail regulations on corporate governance in the Companies Act, The Code 
and The Guidelines on Independent Directors, problems remain in the Chinese 
corporate governance system.  Key issues for China’s corporate governance have been 
highlighted by several researchers.   First is the issue of weak independence of the board 
of directors (Tam 2002; Tan and Wang 2004; Feinerman 2007; Wang 2007).   Most 
directors are insiders or executive directors, and few companies have many independent 
directors.  This results in insider control in most Chinese listed companies (Feinerman 
2007).  There are no restrictions on the power of the controlling shareholders to 
nominate independent directors.   
 
Second, is the issue that the Supervisory Board has a played a weak role in corporate 
governance (Lin 2004; Wang 2007; Shan and Taylor 2008).  It has only a loosely 
defined monitoring role over the board of directors and managers (Tam 2002).  Its 
composition tends to make it ineffective because it has members from a diverse set of 
groups, such as labour unions, party members, close friends and allies of major 
shareholder and representation from senior management (Tam 2002; Dahya et al. 2003; 
Lin 2004).   The supervisors are not involved in the selection of directors and managers 
and have no means of disciplining them (Lin 2004). Most supervisors are insiders in the 
sense of either working directly for the firm or having close connections with the firm.  
Hence, many supervisory boards in China are viewed as a ‘censored watchdog’, and 
usually do not make any adverse statements against the management, controlling 
shareholders or the government (Dahya et al. 2003; Shan and Taylor 2008).  
 
Third, there is an issue of high concentration of ownership structure in Chinese listed 
companies (Lin 2004; Liu and Sun 2006; Feinerman 2007; Shan and Taylor 2008).  
Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) provide evidence that the percentage of shares held on 
average by the largest shareholder is 42.8%, by State owners is 31.6% and by foreign 
investors is 3.8% in listed company in China.  Similarly, Choi, Lee and Williams (2011) 
reveal that ownership concentration in listed companies in China consist of: State 
ownership 34.1%; Institutional ownership 27.9%; Foreign ownership 4.1%.  On top of 
this minority shareholders exhibited highly speculative tendency with very short 
investment horizons (Tam 2002).  This is due to the high rate of saving and the very 
limited range of investment instruments available to the public in China.  Consequently, 
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the high ownership concentration and the speculative behaviours of minority 
shareholders create a principal-principal problem.   
 
Fourth, the opaque practice regarding related-party transactions is another key issue for 
corporate governance.  Related-party transactions between the controlling shareholders’ 
company and subsidiaries, directors’ businesses and other related-party are often 
detrimental to minority shareholders. These transactions can be opaque when processed 
through pyramidal structures and other indirect channels. While good board governance 
would expect both the corporate boards and supervisory board to strongly monitor and 
support related-party disclosures by the company, such disclosures can be sensitive to 
those board members who directly or indirectly enter business transactions and 
relationships with the company (Shan and Taylor 2008).   
 
Fifth, there is the general issue of enforcement of regulations.  According to Berkman et 
al. (2010), CSRC corporate regulations are not enforced or are enforced selectively, 
favouring companies with strong links to the government.  They found that firms with 
weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around 
announcements of new CSRC regulations aimed at reducing expropriation from 
minority shareholders by controlling blockholders than did firms with stronger 
governance.   Moreover, they found that firms with strong ties to the government did 
not benefit from the regulation. This, Berkman et al. (2010) suggest, means that 
minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where 
controlling shareholders have strong political connections. The inference is minority 
shareholders of firms with weak corporate governance benefited disproportionately 
from the new regulations in the form of higher abnormal returns.  
2.4. Summary 
China is in a transitional period of its economy, and for some historical, systemic and 
many other causes, a special institutional background exists in China (Xiao 2011). 
Various authors have characterised China as having poor legal protection of investors 
compared to common law country, highly concentrated ownership of listed companies 
compared to disperse equity structure of Britain and the USA, and the main agency 
problem of conflict of interest between ultimate controlling shareholders and outside 
investors.    
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As a background to the transitional period and particularly the principal-principal 
agency problem, this chapter provides a background to the relevant regulatory and 
structural reforms in China.  It gives emphasis to the contemporary history of 
accounting in China and specific details of disclosure requirements for related-party 
transactions. It also gives an understanding of the establishment of securities markets 
and their regulations with specific details on the classification of shares and the nature 
of the split share reform.  Finally, it is details the code of corporate governance and 
other board-related regulations with particular interest in minority shareholder 
protection.    
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review relevant bodies of literature in the following 
areas: 
i. corporate governance in developing countries,  
ii. agency theory’s application to ownership structure and minority shareholder 
protection,  
iii. the use of related-party transactions by controlling shareholders for Tunneling 
and propping,  
iv. rent-protection theory’s application to the controlling shareholders’ pursuit of 
Tunneling, 
v. market for ownership control theory’s application to the controlling 
shareholders’ pursuit of propping, and  
vi. market transition theory’s application to the enabling of Tunneling and propping 
phenomena. 
 
First, this chapter provides a review of the focal literature on corporate governance and 
its underpinning theories, emphasizing the principal-principal problem arising due to 
concentration in the ownership structure.  A large body of literature exists on corporate 
governance, but less on the issue of protection of minority shareholders’ rights. From 
the review of this corporate governance literature, this chapter then narrows the scope to 
a review of the empirical literature on the phenomena of controlling shareholders acting 
in their own interests by using related-party transactions for Tunneling and propping 
purposes. The chapter then broadens to consider other theories that could be invoked to 
model and explain Tunneling and propping behaviours by controlling shareholders. 
These are theories about what motivates and what enables controlling shareholders to 
act in their own interests to the disadvantage of minority shareholders and what enables 
corporate governance structures and behaviours and their effects.  
 
The chapter is structure in the following way. First, literature on corporate governance, 
with emphasis on controlling-minority shareholder relationships, is reviewed. This 
includes sub-sections concerning corporate governance in developing countries, agency 
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theory and ownership structure, board characteristics in China. Second, literature on the 
use of RPTs for Tunneling and propping is reviewed. This includes sub-sections on 
categories and measures for RPTs, the classification of prejudicial RPTs (i.e., Tunneling 
and propping phenonema), and empirical findings on the extent and determinants of 
Tunneling and propping. Third, literature is reviewed on theories that could help explain 
the motivators and enablers of prejudicial RPTs. This includes sub-sections on 
controlling owners’ rent-protection theory, the theory of market for ownership control, 
and market transition theory.    
3.2. Corporate Governance  
3.2.1. The nature of corporate governance and its diffusion 
 
Corporate governance is a research area that has grown rapidly in the past two decade, 
triggered by high-profile corporate collapses and scandals of the early 2000s such as 
Baring Bank in the UK, Enron in the USA, Royal Ahold and Parmalat in Europe, HIH 
in Australia and China Aviation Oil in Singapore.  Such collapses and scandals across 
various countries have generated corporate governance regulations or guidelines by 
securities regulators in many countries. They have also placed a sharp focus on 
corporate governance issues, particularly relating to transparency and disclosure, control 
and accountability, and monitoring and oversight (Mallin 2007).  This focus started in 
developed countries with well established capital market systems, widely-held company 
ownership and strong legal enforcement bodies. The issues underlying corporate 
governance reforms in this context were mainly centred on the principal-agent problem. 
When corporate governance reforms subsequently spread to developing countries, the 
context was different. Developing countries tended to have embrio or emerging capital 
market systems, high company ownership concentration and weak legal enforcement. A 
prominent issue that arises for corporate governance reforms in this context is the 
principal-principal problem.  
 
To explore the reasons why corporate governance has become so important, it is 
necessary to understand what corporate governance is and how it works to achieve the 
principles of transparency, accountability and fairness that are necessary for good 
corporate governance. 
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A broad definition for corporate governance is given by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD 2004, p.11): 
 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. 
 
The OECD definition shows that corporate governance is concerned with both external 
stakeholders of a company (with particular emphasis on shareholders), internal aspects 
of its operation, and internal control.  Thus, corporate governance may be seen as a set 
of mechanisms for a company to achieve its corporate objectives and monitor its 
corporate performance (Mallin 2007). 
 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) define corporate governance narrowly: 
 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. 
In this definition, the reference to ‘suppliers of finance’ does not draw out the issue of 
potential conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders, the 
ultimate controlling shareholder and other block holders, or the debtholders and 
shareholders. That is, suppliers of finance are not a homogeneous stakeholder group as 
suggested by this definition.    
The term corporate governance emerged in the terminology of the late 1990s, but the 
theories underlying its development can be traced back to the 1970s and are drawn from 
various disciplines such as accounting, economics, finance, law, manangment and 
organisational behaviour (Mallin 2007).  The theoretical perspectives underlying 
corporate governance regulations and practices have changed over time. The 
predominant perspective, called agency theory, is associated with seminal studies such 
as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1938b). Two other perspectives 
have received considerable attention in corporate governance debates. These are 
stakeholder theory, associated with studies such as Freeman (1984) and Freeman and 
Reed (1990), and stewardship theory,  associated with studies such as Donaldson (1990) 
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and Donaldson and Davis (1991). Table 3.1 summaries the theories associated with the 
development of corporate governance.   
 
Table 3.1. Summary of Theories for Corporate Governance Development 
Theory Key theoriest(s) Summary 
Agency  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) 
Agency theory identifies the agency relationship 
where the principal delegates work or 
management responsibility to the agent.  In the 
context of a corporation, the owners are the 
principal and the executive management are the 
agent. 
 
Stakeholder Freeman (1984)  
Freeman and Reed (1990) 
Stakeholder theory takes account of a wider 
group of constituents rather than focusing on 
shareholders.  Where there is an emphasis on 
stakeholders, then the governance structure of 
the corporation may provide for some direct 
representation on or through the board of the 
stakeholder groups. 
 
Stewardship Donaldson (1990) 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
Directors and executive management are 
regarded as the stewards of the corporation’s 
assets and will be predisposed to act in the best 
interest of the shareholders. 
 
Source: based on Mallin (2007, p.12) 
 
Agency theory and its behavioural assumptions have been conceived in a Western 
efficient capital markets context. The key idea of agency theory is the relationship 
between the principal and its agent, and how to deal with this relationship so as to 
achieve efficiency in organisational and risk-bearing costs. In the context of 
corporations, agency theory views corporate governance mechanisms as essential 
monitoring tools to ensure that agency problems caused by the principal-agent 
relationship are minimised.  In contrast, stewardship theory sees a manager pursuing the 
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objectives of the corporation and not their own self-interests. The manager, as steward, 
not only seeks to uphold the shareholders’ interests, but also those of other participants 
in the enterprise’s collective rewards and returns (Donaldson and Davis 1991). On the 
other hand, stakeholder theory has a historical lineage considerably longer and more 
substantial than agency theory (Clarke 2004).  This theoretical perspective argues that 
the agent of a corporation should take account of the interest of all stakeholders, such as 
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, government and social communities.  Figure 
3.1 illustrates how these three main theories have influenced the development of 
corporate governance regulations and practices. 
 
   
Source: revision based on Mallin (2007, p.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Main Theories Influencing the Development of Corporate Governance 
      Modern Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms 
Stewardship 
Theory 
Agency 
Theory 
Stakeholder 
Theory  
Principal-Agent   Principal-Principal 
        problem                     problem 
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A judgment is made in this thesis concerning the scope of theoretical perspectives 
adopted. For purposes of parsimony, the stakeholder theory notion of ‘salience’ 
developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) may have been useful in discussing several of the 
constructs that will be extruded from other theories in this thesis. Mitchell et al. (1997), 
in the development of their theory of stakeholder identification and salience, sought to 
explain to whom and to what managers and directors actually pay attention under which 
conditions. They assert that “stakeholder salience – the degree to which managers give 
priority to competing stakeholder claims – goes beyond the question of stakeholder 
identification, because the dynamics inherent in each relationship involve complex 
considerations that are not readily explained by the existing stakeholder framework” 
(p.854). The ‘salience’ accorded by the ultimate controlling shareholder to key 
stakeholder groups, including the non-ultimate controlling blockholders, the minority 
shareholders, the directors and senior executives and the regulatory authorities, could be 
a direction pursued in a future study of the factors affecting the ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s pursuit of Tunneling and propping.   
 
Returning to Figure 3.1, the two different views of the relationship between players in 
the agency problem are added to Mallin’s (2007) diagram in order to draw out the 
complexity of conflicting interests for the ‘principal(s)’ under agency theory.  In 
countries with developing capital markets, high ownership concentration by families or 
governments and weak enforcement of corporate governance guidelines/regulations, the 
corporate governance issue of fairness amongst controlling versus minority shareholders 
becomes prevalent. According to Mallin (2007), countries such as Australia, Canada, 
the UK and the USA adopt a common law system that tends to give greater protection 
of minority shareholder rights.  In contrast, countries such as France, Germany, Italy 
and Japan adopt a civil law system that tends to provide less effective protection for 
minority shareholder rights (Mallin 2007). 
 
Turning to the case of China, a broad perspective on the corporate governance issues in 
China is provided by Zhu & Ma (2009). They suggest that the institutional settings of 
China, the highly concentrated ownership structure coupled with non-tradable shares, 
and the multiple objectives of state-based controlling shareholders, lead to the potential 
for more severe principal-principal problems between controlling and minority 
shareholders. They conceptualise this problem in terms of the existence in China of 
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triple-level principal-agent relationships in listed firms. The first level is the principal-
agent relationship between minority shareholders and the board of directors. The board 
of directors is situated in an advantageous position against minority shareholders in this 
duplet because minority shareholders are unable to monitor the board directly due to 
excessively high costs. The second level is the principal-agent relationship between 
majority shareholders and the board of directors. Majority shareholders are situated in a 
better position in this duplet because the costs of access to and direct monitoring of the 
board, especially through their own appointed representatives on the board, are 
relatively low.  The third level is the principal-principal relationship between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders. Here majority shareholders are situated in a 
dominant position in this duplet because of their controlling and informational 
advantages over directors and executives. Thus minority shareholders are situated in the 
weakest position in the tripod (Zhu and Ma 2009).  
 
Publicly listed companies in China typically have a large controlling shareholder, who 
has the ability to appoint and monitor managers, but at the same time has the power to 
expropriate funds and assets that should rightfully be shared with minority investors. 
Thus, the ownership structure of listed companies in China tends to provide a context 
for the conflict of interests between majority and minority investors.  For example, 
Huyghebaert and Wang (2010a) find that, in China, a larger number of directors 
affiliated with the controlling shareholder are associated with an enlarged amount of 
related-party transactions, and a larger fraction of directors appointed by the 
government is associated with more excessive employment.  
 
3.2.2. The governance problem for developing countries 
 
In a review of corporate governance research, Denis and McConnell (2003) identify two 
major generations in this body of research. In the first research generation, the focus 
was on the internal governance mechanisms at the firm level. It sought to determine 
whether these internal mechanisms, such as the board of directors, executive 
compensation and ownership structure, affect firm performance.  In the second 
generation, more consideration has been given to the influence of external forces, such 
as securities markets, legal and regulatory institutions, on the structure and effectiveness 
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of corporate governance around the world. The work of La Porta et al. (1998) provided 
the catalyst for this second generation of corporate governance research.  Researchers 
now pay more attention to the relationship between the regulatory system and corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
In this second generation of research, corporate ownership in many countries, but 
especially in developing countries, is found to be more commonly in the hands of 
controlling shareholders or large block-holders rather than being held by diffuse 
ownership (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1999; Holderness 2009). This fact raises 
the issue that corporate governance needs to focus on the principal-principal problem as 
well as the principal-agent problem. The principal-principal problem is essentially 
concerned with protecting minority shareholders from prejudicial actions by an ultimate 
controlling shareholder or set of block-holders and the executive management team 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Johnson et al. 2000). In terms of equity market rules and 
enforcement mechanisms, it is found that firms in countries with better investor 
protection are more valuable than firms in countries with poorer investor protection 
(Berkman et al. 2010; La Porta et al. 2002). Hence, the primary concern of corporate 
governance has broadened from mitigating the agency conflicts between firm managers 
and diffuse shareholders (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976) to 
protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by the ultimate controlling 
shareholder and the management team (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Johnson et al. 2000).  
As Khanna and Palepu (2000) point out, business groups in developing countries tend to 
emulate the beneficial functions of market mechanisms that are present only in 
advanced economies.  When a country’s external capital market is poorly developed, 
the operation of an internal capital market within a business group can enable those 
firms with the best projects within the group to obtain resources. 
 
In Asia, corporate governance problems came under attention following the 1997 Asia 
financial crisis.  Johnson et al. (2000) pointed out that, during the Asian financial crisis, 
poor corporate governance had a significant effect on the extent of currency 
depreciations and stock market declines.  They found that countries with weak legal 
protection of shareholder rights and poor enforcement were more susceptible to a fall in 
asset values and a collapse of the exchange rate. Likewise, Eiteman et al. (2001) 
provided support for the belief that weak corporate governance in Asian countries was a 
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major cause of the 1997 financial crisis.  It resulted in greatest losses to creditors and 
minority shareholders. 
 
A comprehensive review of corporate governance practices in East Asia is given by 
Claesssens and Fan (2002). They confirm the limited protection of minority rights and 
high concentration of ownership in East Asia countries. They provide a picture of firms 
that are normally controlled by one or a single group of shareholders associated with a 
family or government body. For example, the largest ten families control half of the 
total value of listed corporate assets in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (Claessens 
et al. 2000).  Traditionally, some large Korean business groups (Chaebols), such as 
Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo, were also family based (Ehrlich and Kang 1999).  In 
China, listed corporations are normally controlled by State and financial institutions, 
and tradable A-shares accounts for only a small part of total shares outstanding (Li and 
Naughton 2007).  Another interesting phenomenon in Asian countries is a pyramid 
ownership structure, which is defined as owning a controlling holding of the stock of 
one corporation which in turn holds a controlling interest in another, a process that can 
be repeated a number of times (Claesssens et al. 2000). Hence, the separation of 
management from the controlling owners is not prevalent in East Asian countries. Li, 
Naughton and Hovey (2009) raise the question as to whether a close relationship 
between the controlling shareholder and management is beneficial to other shareholders. 
They note there are two sides of this argument. First, there is the argument that 
controlling ownership is attractive to shareholders when they can attain private benefits 
from controlling the firm, which will usually result in financial disadvantage to other 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  On the other hand, minority shareholders may 
feel confident that the firm are well protected through controlling family or government 
shareholdings, especially in countries without well-functioning investor protection laws 
or effective enforcement (La Porta et al. 1999). 
 
In China, corporate governance issues have come to the fore since the late 1970s, 
because the development of the corporate governance system was recognized as a vital 
component of the restructuring of State-owned Enterprises (Li et al. 2009). Before the 
economic reforms, Chinese industry was dominated by state ownership, and SOEs were 
the major economic contributors.  Managers in SOEs were required to fulfil the 
production plans specified by the government rather that maximize the investment 
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returns for the only investor – the State. The governance structure of SOEs, prior to 
their corporatization, was an integral part of the general government framework. After 
corporatization and listing of SOEs, prejudicial behaviour by the ultimate controlling 
State-based shareholder became an area of research interest. Apart from expropriation 
of minority shareholders' funds, another type of prejudicial behaviour by the State 
controlling shareholder in China has been the favours given to 'dependent' CEOs. For 
example, Yuan (2008) studied the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance in 
China. He found that CEO demotion is inversely related to firm performance in 
corporations whose ownership is controlled by a local government, and that CEO 
turnover is insensitive to firm performance in central government controlled 
corporations. 
3.2.3. Agency theory and ownership structure 
 
The original work of Berle and Means (1932) observed that the dispersion of equity 
ownership led to a transfer of corporate control from individual to professional 
managers in the joint-stock firm. They emphasised that when management control is 
distinct from ownership, those in management may deploy assets in ways that benefit 
themselves rather than the owners.  Based their argument, most of the subsequent 
literature on corporate governance has assumed there is widely dispersed ownership. It 
focuses on managing the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders that 
result from this sepration of ownership and management control.  Clarke (1998) 
contends that the wide dispersal of equity ownership of companies raises a number of 
governance issues: 
 
i. For firms to operate efficiently, managers must have the freedom to take risks, 
make strategic decisons and take advantage of opportunties as they arise and, 
although they should remain subject to effective monitoring mechanisms, they 
cannot submit every decision to a shareholder vote. 
ii. A group of shareholders with a large total share of the equity might be more 
effective at monitoring management, but their powers must also be restrained to 
prevent them taking advantage of other shareholders. 
iii. Many investors prefer the advantages of liquidity and diversity in their portfolios 
to limit the need for the time and resource commitment involved in monitoring. 
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iv. Investors require accurate accounting information, but performance measures can 
provide misleading information or distort incentives by encouraging managers to 
focus attention on inappropriate goals.  Further, releasing some kinds of 
information can weaken a firm's competitive position. 
 
The agency problem is an essential element of the so-called conractual view of the 
company (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983a,b).  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) further argue that the essence of the agency problem is the separation of 
ownership and management control.  They explain that this is because an owner or 
manager of an enterprise can raise funds from investors either to put in prodution or to 
cash out his/her holdings in the company. Finanaciers expect and require the managers 
to generate returns on their funds, but the managers usually need debtholders' funds 
because owners' funds are not enough to pursue investment oportunities or meet 
financial obligations of the company.  The agency problem has placed governance 
issues at the forefront of financiers' concerns. They seek corporate governance 
monitoring mechanisms that can provide assurance that their funds are not expropriated 
or wasted on unattractive projects.  Thus, the most important factor in shaping the 
corporate governance system is to detemine the type of ownership structure (Aoki 1995). 
The key aspects of corporate ownership are its concentration and composition within 
the corporate governance context.  The degree of concentration of a company's 
ownerhip determines the distribution of power.  Lannoo (1999) concludes that the 
structure and concentration of shareholdings are two elements that may limit the role of 
corporate control. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argue that as principals in the agency 
relationship, controlling shareholders fulfil an important role because of their dominant 
rights and risks associated with their investment.  Using data for large companies in 
twenty-seven developed economies, these authors identify the ultimate controlling 
shreholder of these firms.  Their findings present a different result for the ownership 
structure of a modern corporation as suggested by Berle and Means (1932). They 
conclude that large corporations have problems of sepration of ownership and control 
because these corporations are managed by controlling shareholders not by professional 
mangers.  Ideally, these controlling shareholders would take the role of ensuring 
monitor of senior management is carried out. However, in fact, senior management can 
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be part of the controlling shareholders and hold equity within the controlling 
shareholder's block.  Hence, the result of high ownerhip concentration can cause poor 
management protection for minority shareholders (Lin 2004). 
 
When ownership is dispersed, however, shareholder control tends to be weak because of 
poor shareholder monitoring incentives owing to the 'free-rider' problem.  That is, 
minority shareholders will bear a high cost of monitoring but will receive only a small 
amount of benefit proportionate to their portfolio of shares.  Moreover, minority 
shareholders have less to lose, and so are less likely to monitor the company's activities.  
Thus, power will rest with the incumbent management, unless other stakeholders or 
alternative mechanisms exist for monitoring the company's management (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
 
By contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders have incentives 
and resources to monitor management decisions and reduce agency costs when 
concentrated ownership exists.  Large shareholders are willing to exercise tight control 
and bear the cost of monitoring, since this affects the risk of and return on their 
invemstment.  This is particulary relevant to the family-based ownership that exercises 
corporate control through pyramidal ownership and high involvement of family 
members appointed to the board or management team. 
 
Several studies address the issue of ownership structure within the agency framework. 
A tabulated summary of these studies is presented in Table 3.2.   
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Table 3.2. Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effects of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Sample and Data Ownership Variable(s) Main Findings 
Holderness 
and 
Sheehan 
(1988) 
A sample of 101 majority held 
and 101 diffusely held US listed 
companies for the period 1979 to 
1984 
a. majority held  >95%, ownership by single 
individual or entity  >50.1% 
b. diffusely held <20% ownership by any 
shareholder 
They find no significant difference in 
performance between majority held and 
diffusely held. 
Morck, 
Shleifer 
and Vishny 
(1988) 
A sample of 371 large US 
companies in 1980 
a. Combined shareholding by all members of the 
board in ranges 0-5%, 5-25% and 25-100% 
b. Combined sharesholding by top two officers  
c. Dummy for presence of founder  
 
They find that profitability is significantly 
increased for board membership in the 0-5% 
range and significantly decreased in the 5-25% 
range and if founder is present on the board. 
McConnell 
and 
Servaes 
(1990) 
A sample of 1,173 US listed 
companies in 1976 and 1,093 US 
listed companies in 1986 
a. Insider stock ownership by managers and 
directors 
b. Institutional ownership 
c. Blockholders as combined ownership by non-
insiders who have more than 5% ownership 
d. Largest single blockholders 
e. Dummy for presence of blockholders 
f. Insider plus blockholders 
g. Insider ownership in ranges 0-5%, 5-25% and 
25-100% 
h. Insider plus all blockholders in ranges 0-5%, 5-
25% and 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They conclude that (a) there is a postive 
relationship between shareholdings of large 
investors and a company's performance' (b) 
institutional investors appear to be more 
effective in monitoring a company's 
performnance than individual shareholders. 
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Author(s) Sample and Data Ownership Variable(s) Main Findings 
Warfield, 
Wild and 
Wild 
(1995) 
Over 1,600 corporations in the 
USA and nearly 5,000 annual 
accounting reports for the period 
1988-1990 
a. The per cent of managerial ownership in the firm The results indicate that managerial ownership is 
(a) positively associated with stock returns; (b) 
negatively associated with the magnitude of 
discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. 
La Porta, 
Lopez-de-
Silanes and 
Shleifer 
(1999) 
A new database of ownership 
structures of companies from the 
27 richest economies in 1993 
a. Widely held – equals 1 if there is no controlling 
shareholder, 0 otherwise 
b. Family – equal 1 if a person is the controlling 
shareholder, 0 otherwise 
c. State- equals 1 if the (domestic or foreign) state is 
the controlling shareholder, 0 otherwise 
d. Control – minimum per cent of the book value of 
common equity required to control 20 per cent of 
the votes 
e. Cross-shareholdings – equals 1 if the firm both 
has a controlling shareholder and owns shares in a 
firm that belongs to the chain of control, 0 
otherwise 
Results show (a) large corporations have 
problems of separation of ownership and control.  
These controlling shareholders have the interest 
and power to expropriate the minority 
shareholders;  (b) when ownership is dispersed, 
shareholder control tends to be weak because of 
poor shareholder monitoring incentives due to 
the free-rider problem. 
Xu and 
Wang 
(1999) 
A sample of 311 listed Chinese 
companies in 1995 
a. Control – the proportion of shares held by the top 
10 shareholders 
b. State – fraction of state shares 
c. Legal person – fraction of legal person shares 
d. Tradable – fraction of tradable A-shares held by 
individuals 
Their empirical results show that (a) profitability 
is positvely associated with ownership 
concentration and the fraction of legal person 
shares; (b) labour productivity has an inverse 
direction to the proportion of state-owned shares. 
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Author(s) Sample and Data Ownership Variable(s) Main Findings 
Sun and 
Tong 
(2003) 
A sample of 634 SOEs listed on 
SHSE and SZSE over the period 
1994 to 1997 
a. State – fraction of firm shares owned by the 
government 
b. Legal person – fraction of firm shares owned by 
legal person 
c. Foreign – fraction of firm shares owned by 
foreigners 
They find that (a) share issue privatisation is 
effective in improving on SOE's earning ability, 
real sales, and employee productivity; (b) a 
significant negative influence of state ownership 
on performance of the company; (c) a significant 
positive influence of legal person ownership on 
company performance after share issue 
privatisation; (d) an inverted U-shape 
relationship between government ownership and 
company performance. 
Chirinko, 
Garretsen, 
Van Ees 
and 
Sterken  
(2004) 
A sample of 93 Dutch companies 
for the period 1992 to 1996 
a. Ownership stake of the largest shareholder stated 
as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity 
b. Largest shareholder 20%: 1 if OWN ≥0.20, 0 
otherwise 
c. Largest shareholder 40%: 1 if OWN ≥0.40, 0 
otherwise 
Their results show that concentration ownership 
decreases with anti-investor protections which 
means that large shareholders avoid or abandon 
firms with anti-investor protection potential. 
Xu, Zhu 
and Lin 
(2005) 
The data are drawn from a 
national survey of the ownership 
reform of industrial SOEs in 
China in 1998 by the National 
Statistical Bureau 
a. Share_individual – share of individual 
ownership in total outstanding shares in 1998 
b. Share_foreign - share of foreign ownership in 
total outstanding shares in 1998 
c. Share_other_ownership - share of legal-person 
and collective ownership in total outstanding 
shares in 1998 
 
They find that companies have better 
performance when (a) managers have flexibility 
in labour deployment; (b) corporate governance 
mechanisms lead to better alignment between 
ownership and control; (c) corporate governance 
is better when foreign ownerhip is higher; (d) 
dispersed individual ownership and autonomy 
lead to worse performance. 
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Author(s) Sample and Data Ownership Variable(s) Main Findings 
Wei, Xie 
and Zhang 
(2005) 
A sample of 5,284 firm years of 
China's partially privatised former 
SOEs from 1991-2001 
a. State – fraction of firm shares owned by the 
government 
b. Institutional – fraction of firm shares owned by 
legal person 
c. Foreign – fraction of firm shares owned by 
foreigners 
They find that (a) state and institutional shares 
are significantly negatively related to firm 
performance; (b) there are significant convex U-
shape relations between both state ownerhip and 
instituional ownership and firm performance; (c) 
foreign ownership in China's privatised firms is 
significantly positively related to firm value. 
Firth, Fung 
and Rui 
(2007) 
The sample is comprised of 5,139 
firm-year observations.  Data are 
collected from annual reports over 
a six-year period from 1998 to 
2003, using the CSMA and 
Corporate Governance databases 
by GTA 
a. Concentration – percentage of shares owned by 
the largest owners 
b. Foreign – presence of foreign shareholders 
c. Individual – percentage of tradable shares 
The emirical results show that (a) companies 
with highly concentrated share ownership have 
lower earings informativeness; (b) foreign 
shareholders and the percentage of tradable 
shares appear to enhance the earning-returns 
relation. 
Gunasekar
age, Hess 
and Hu 
(2007) 
1,034 listed Chinese companies 
on the SHSE and SZSE for the 
period 2000-2004 
a. State – fraction of shares owned by the state, 
measured as the number of shares held by the 
state divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding 
b. Legal person - fraction of shares owned by legal 
c. persons, measured as the number of shares held 
by the legal persons divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding 
d. Individual – fraction of shares owned by the 
individual investors, measured as the sum of 
tradable A and B shares held by individual 
investors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. 
They find that (a) firm performance is 
negatively influcenced by state ownership; (b) 
some weak indications of a negative effect of 
high ownership concentration. 
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Author(s) Sample and Data Ownership Variable(s) Main Findings 
Margaritis
and 
Psillaki, 
(2010) 
A sample of French 
manufacturing firms for the 
period 2002 to 2005, giving 6146 
year-firm observations. 
a. Ownership structure – percentage held by 'large' 
shareholders 
b. Ownership type – controlling ownership by 
family, by financial institutions or by others. 
They find that efficiency, profitability and 
leverage vary across family vs. non-family 
firms; and across firms with dispersed (<25%) 
vs. more concentrated (>25%) ownership. Also  
family firms are much more efficient and more 
profitable than non-family firms. 
Moradi, 
Aldin, 
Heyrani 
and 
Iranmahd 
(2012) 
A sample of 84 firms listed on 
Tehran Stock Exchange for a 
period of five years from 2007 to 
2011 was selected. 
a. Percentage of equity owned by all institutions 
investors  
The findings reveal that there is a direct positive 
relationship between institutional investors and 
firms' performances measured by ROI and 
Tobin’s Q.   
Kang, and 
Kim 
(2012) 
This study gathers 6,588 non-
financial firm-year observations 
listed on either the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange from 1994 to 
2002. 
 
Three dummy variables are used to refer to the 
ownership identity of a firm. These are: whether a 
firm is controlled by the government, by marketized 
state-owned enterprises (MSOEs), or by private 
shareholders. 
 
This study finds that firms controlled by MSOEs 
outperformed ones controlled by the 
government. Furthermore, changes in control 
rights from the government to MSOEs enhanced 
firm performance. 
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3.2.4. Board characteristics in China 
 
China has a two-tier board structure for corporations. The two separate boards are: a) 
the management (or main) board and b) the supervisory board. The main board 
generally includes shareholder representatives and executives. It focuses on major 
strategic and operational issues. The supervisory board is intended as an oversight of the 
management board. Supervisory boards are used as a way to represent various 
stakeholder groups, such as employees and their unions, and industry and government 
representatives. 
 
A firm’s party committee, headed by a party secretary of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) will also have some control over the main board and, thus, exerts actual 
corporate governance power.  It is commonly staffed with hand-picked executives, with 
the main purpose of seeking to channel state policy into corporate practice (Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung 2005). Most analyses of failure of governance in China's SOEs 
have focused on administrative interference by state institutions (Aharony et al. 2000; 
Sun and Tong 2003; Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007). The party secretary's responsibility is 
to make sure that the directives of the CPC are upheld within the firm.  The kind of 
influence is not always inherently favourable to shareholder interest, because the party 
is looking at the company's broader social and economic impact, rather than at 
maximizing shareholder value (Dean 2006).  
 
The supervisory board will require high professionalism from its members to effectively 
carry out its role of overseeing the performance of the main board and management, and 
protecting stakeholders’ (including minority shareholders’) rights and interests (Dahya, 
Karbhari and Xiao 2002).  Higher expertise would enable the supervisory board to 
identify and advocate what should not be transacted in the area of related-party 
transactions.  This expertise can prevent the supervisory board from becoming a 
“censored watchdog” in the words of Dahya et al. (2003) during a period when rapid 
corporate expansion and the dominance of the main board of directors has occurred.   
 
Corporate governance practice concerning the main board’s independence is likely 
affect the credibility of related-party transactions.  From an agency perspective, the 
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independent directors are considered as referees whose main objective is to ensure that 
the main board of directors protects the interests of all shareholders, when monitoring 
managerial decision-making (Fama 1980).  Admitting independent directors onto the 
board is regarded as essential to ensuring effective management control in the interests 
of the owners.  Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue that a board composed of a higher 
proportion of independent directors has stronger control over managerial decisions 
because it has incentives to exercise its decision control to maintain the reputations of 
the independent directors. 
 
Previous studies have not considered the extent to which the professional education and 
experience of the supervisory board members would make them more effective in 
monitoring the financial integrity of the main board and management in terms of 
prejudicial RPTs. Further, China’s corporate governance is characterised by weak 
independence of the main board in listed companies (Tan and Wang, 2004; Feinerman 
2007; Wang 2007). Many directors are insiders or executives directors, resulting in 
insider control in many Chinese listed companies (Feinerman 2007). Prior studies have 
not provided evidence on the effect of the main board independence problem on 
prejudicial RPTs. 
 
In practice, controlling shareholders tend to nominate new directors in most listed 
companies in China, with some nominations also coming from existing boards (Liu 
2005). Further, independent directors are normally nominated by the controlling 
shareholder.  Chinese boards are well dominated by insiders, such as senior managers 
and representatives of large shareholders. In former SOEs, more than half of directors 
were typically appointed by the Chinese state (Bai, Liu and Song 2004). Liu (2005) 
points out that although 90% of Chinese listed firms have at least two independent 
directors, companies superficially establish a system of independent directors to comply 
with regulation, rather than to protect the best interests of their minority investors. 
Consequently, main boards in China generally lack independence and tend to rubber-
stamp the decisions made by the management and controlling shareholders. The 
supervisory board in China tends to be more 'decorative' than functional. In practice, 
when the government is the largest owner, leaders of party committees tend to assume 
the positions of chairman and vice-chairman of the supervisory board. Even in private-
controlled listed firms, the published statements of the supervisory boards show that 
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they rarely contest decisions made by the main board of directors and company 
executives. Arguably, the supervisory board in China has little real ability to curb 
expropriation by dominant shareholders (Huyghebaert and Wang 2010a). 
 
3.2.5. Issues for the governance system in China 
 
Several key issues for the Chinese corporate governance system are well documented 
(Hovey, Li and Naughton 2003; Lin 2004; Allen, Qian and Qian 2005; Clarke 2006; 
Chen, Zhen and Lin 2011).  These issues have been summarized into four areas by Li et 
al. (2009). The first is the highly concentrated ownership structure.  Few companies in 
China have a widely dispersed ownership structure (Clarke 2006).  This ownership 
concentration is conducive to expropriation of funds by controlling shareholders. Hess, 
Gunasekarage and Hovey (2010), for example, confirms that expropriation of minority 
investors does exist in China.  Also the ownership concentration is in the hands of State-
based shareholders who have been granted non-tradable voting shares. This means 
securities market liquidity can be impeded because the state and legal person shares 
cannot be traded on the stock market because of trading restrictions. The result is only 
around 35% of total shares were freely tradable in 2008. Although this tradable 
percentage has subsequently increased, it remains a major obstacle to market efficiency.  
 
The second key issue is insider trading, self-dealings, collusion and market 
manipulation, although the Chinese government has policies against these activities 
(Tam 2002).  The major cause of these issues is the absence of effective monitoring of 
companies by their directors and supervisory boards and of the market by regulatory 
authorities (Li et al. 2009).  In the chain of monitors in China, it is contended by Clarke 
(2003) that there are no appropriate incentives because the ultimate owner of most listed 
firms is the state.  Moreover, there was a history of some poorly managed listed 
companies in China providing falsified financial information to the public in order to 
attract outside investment. Those companies severely damaged the reputation of the 
Chinese stock market in the late-1990s and early-2000s (China Economics Time 2001). 
 
The third issue is the dysfunction of the main board of directors, board of supervisors 
and other relevant committees (Schipani and Liu 2002; Tam 2002).  Large shareholders 
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have more power over directors’ appointments due to the one share one vote principle, 
and it is unlikely that directors will represent minority shareholders’ interests.  In China, 
politically-appointed and state-controlling appointees of owners sit on most boards and 
committees (Clarke 2006).  As a result, these boards and committees lack independence 
from the controlling shareholder.  Chen, Fan and Wong (2002) find that around 80 
precent of directors on boards of state-controlled firms are appointed to represent the 
controlling government shareholder and only a few are lawyers, accountants or finance 
experts. The likelihood of finding a director representing minority shareholders is very 
small.  Moreover, Clarke (2006) claims that supervisory boards lack the power to 
control directors and the management team, and have limited importance in corporate 
governance in China. 
 
The final key problem is the legal system (Tam 2002; SSE 2003).  La Porta et al. (2008) 
and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Zamarripa (2006) find that enforcement of laws is 
more effective than just having strong regulations.  Allen et al. (2005) argue that the 
inefficiencies in the Chinese market can be attributed to poor and ineffective regulation 
and enforcement.  Lin (2004) identifies four areas of weakness in the Chinese external 
governance structure: lack of information transparency and professional managers; 
weak legal enforcement; the absence of or weak monitoring by banks, professional 
organizations, and the media; and the insignificant roles played by individual 
shareholders and small institutional shareholders.  As a result, the Chinese stock market 
is characterized by a relatively short history, a high (but volatile) growth rate, high 
government intervention; low transparency and weak investor protection. 
 
3.3.  Related-Party Transactions and Evidence of Tunneling and 
Propping 
3.3.1. Minority shareholders and controlling shareholders 
 
In China, many provincial and city governments are the ultimate controlling shareholder 
in a listed company. They may, on top of economic considerations, have incentives to 
direct the management of a firm they control to pursue political goals, which can be to 
its own benefit but to the detriment of minority investors (Huyghebaert and Wang 
2010a). Likewise, national government agencies or institutions are the controlling 
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shareholder of many former state-owned enterprises. Through the company’s party 
committee, the State-based owner can direct the board to channel State policy into 
corporate practice which may not necessarily financially benefit all shareholders. 
Indirectly, the de facto control rights in these firms could be viewed as belonging to 
government bureaucrats.  The interests of bureaucrats do not necessarily coincide with 
those of minority investors and firm value maximization. They typically have goals that 
are dictated by their political interests (Qian 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For 
example, they may cross-subsidize other SOEs encountering financial difficulties 
through related-party transactions. Alternatively, they may care about reducing 
unemployment rather than about the value of firm assets, or they may ask a corporatized 
SOE to meet output growth targets that they can tout as their political achievement, 
even if the enterprise cannot sell all of its output at a profit. Hence, government 
bureaucrats and political representatives may have both the ability (substantial control 
rights) as well as the incentives (political goals other than the maximization of cash 
flows and firm value) to direct a corporatized SOE to achieve political objectives that 
may come at the expense of minority investors (Huyghebaert and Wang 2010a). 
 
The notion of undermining minority shareholders’ rights in the legal literature is 
referred to as shareholder oppression. This occurs when the majority shareholders in a 
corporation take action that “unfairly prejudices” the minority. The majority 
shareholders may harm the economic interests of the minority in various ways. An 
important concept in common law countries pertaining to shareholder oppression is the 
"reasonable expectations" of the minority shareholder (Matheson and Maler 2007). The 
"fair dealing" standard is also sometimes used by courts (Chernichaw 1994). Company 
law in Anglo-American countries typically does not allow a minority shareholder (i.e., 
those with 49% or less shareholding) to be "unfairly prejudiced”. 
 
If the listed company has been spun off from a SOE, then there is a risk of the listed 
company becoming a puppet to be manipulated by the state-owned parent company, 
with related party transactions being used to transfer resources from the listed company 
to the parent company, to the detriment of the listed company (Chen et al. 2009).  
Empirical results indicate that a larger fraction of shares held by the controlling 
shareholder is associated with more extensive related-party transactions (Huyghebaert 
and Wang 2010b). 
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3.3.2. Definitions and measures of related-party transactions 
 
Related-party transactions (RPTs) are defined as transactions between a company and 
its management, board members, principal owners, or members of the immediate 
families of any of these groups. Additionally, RPTs include transactions between a 
company and its affiliates, where affiliates are defined as entities with any of the 
following relationships: they control the company; they are controlled by the company 
or they are controlled by another entity which also controls the company. For example, 
raising capital, acquiring production inputs, selling firm outputs, hiring employees, 
leasing assets, purchasing and divesting assets and signing franchising agreements are 
commonly referred to as related-party transactions. RPTs are usually made through 
complicated transactions between the company and its managers, directors, subsidiaries 
and major shareholders. It is hard for outsiders to discover questionable or fraudulent 
transactions (Huang and Liu 2010). 
 
In the accounting and finance literature there is no direct measurement of the extent of 
unfair prejudice (actual or potential) towards minority shareholders, but several proxy 
measures have been developed at the country level and the company level.   
 
For country level analysis, there are three established proxy measures of prejudice to 
minority shareholders’ rights. First, there is an ‘anti-director rights index’ developed by 
La Porta et al. (1998). Second, there is an ‘anti-self-dealing index’ designed by 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). Third, there is  LaPorta’s 
(2006) ‘prospectus disclosure and liability index’, developed to measure potential 
minority shareholders’ rights in the case of initial public offerings.   
 
For company level analysis, measures of prejudice of minority shareholders’ rights fall 
into two categories: RPT based measures and non-RPT based measures. There is a 
substantial body of research that is based on RPTs as a proxy for economic prejudice of 
minority shareholders rights in a company. Currently researchers mostly use total RPTs 
as a proxy for Tunneling (Riyanto and Toolsema 2008, Peng et al. 2011). Some 
researchers also use selected RPTs or some derivatives of RPTs for the proxy measure 
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of minority shareholders right. For example, Gao and Kling (2008) use the difference 
between accounts receivables and payables related to RPTs divided by total assets. 
Berkman, Cole and Fu (2009) use loan guarantee to controlling shareholders as a proxy 
for Tunneling out minority shareholders resources. Williams and Taylor (2013) use 
abnormal operating revenue in RPTs as a proxy measure for propping. Alternatively, 
non-RPT based proxy measures include the use a Herfindahl index of shareholder 
concentration and market share (Santiago-Castro and Brown 2007). Another approach is 
to simply view the dividend payout ratio as a proxy for prejudicing minority 
shareholders’ rights (Faccio, Lang and Young 2001; Chen et al. 2009).  
 
3.3.3. Classifications of Tunneling and propping phenomena 
 
Turning to classifiactions of prejudicial RPTs, these classifications begins with the 
forms of Tunneling or propping. Cheung et al. (2009a) suggest that both these forms of 
RPTs occur in China and, on balance, there seems to be more Tunneling than propping 
up. They also find that firms undertaking propping are larger and have higher State 
ownership than firms subject to Tunneling. Propped up firms are more likely to have 
foreign shareholders and to be cross-listed abroad compared to firms that are subject to 
Tunneling. Propped up firms also tend to have worse operating performance in the 
fiscal year preceding the announcement of the related party transaction (Cheung, Qi, Lu, 
Rau and Stouraitis 2009b).  
 
Cheung et al.(2009b) classify their data on RPTs into seven categories, including both 
Tunneling and propping up: (1) acquisitions of assets by the listed company from 
related parties; (2) sales of assets by the listed company to related parties; (3) asset 
swaps between the listed company and its controlling shareholder; (4) trade of goods 
and services between the listed company and its controlling shareholder; (5) direct cash 
payments, loans, or loan guarantees provided by the listed company to its controlling 
shareholder; (6) direct cash payments, loans, or loan guarantees provided by the related 
party to the listed company; and (7) transactions between the listed company and its 
non-listed majority-controlled subsidiaries. 
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This classification scheme of Cheung et al. (2009b) sought to distinguish Tunneling 
from propping transactions. They classified RPTs into ex-ante potential Tunneling 
transactions and ex-ante potential propping transactions. The problem with Cheung et 
al.’s (2009b) classification scheme is that it is intuitive and the types of RPTs are not all 
mutually exclusive.  
 
To overcome these problems in Cheung et al.’s (2009b) classification scheme, this 
study develops a revised scheme as shown in Table 3.3. Since prejudicial RPTs are 
typically concerned with transferring cash or funds from/to the company for the private 
benefit of the controlling shareholders, the classification of RPTs in Table 3.3 is initially 
based on the cash flow statement’s categories of operating, investing and financing 
transactions.  Within these three categories, the nature of transactions with related 
parties, as adapted from Cheung et al. (2006), are given. Then the direction of pricing of 
these transactions is given to distinguish whether they represent a Tunneling or 
propping phenomenon.  
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Table 3.3. Classification of RPTs into Tunneling and Propping Transactions. 
 
RPT Type Nature of Transaction Tunneling Propping 
Operating Purchase of goods or services 
by company (buyer) 
Sales of goods or services by 
company (seller) 
Price above fair 
value  
Price below fair 
value  
Price below 
fair value 
Price above 
fair value  
 
Investing Acquisition of assets by 
company (buyer) 
Sales of assets by company 
(seller) 
Private offering by company 
of shares or securities 
convertible into shares to 
‘insiders’ (i.e., related parties) 
(seller) 
 
Price above fair 
value  
Price below fair 
value  
Price below fair 
value  
 
Price below 
fair value 
Price above 
fair value  
Price above 
fair value 
Financing Loans, loan guarantees, 
donations by company 
(lender) (seller) 
 
Borrowing, leasing by 
company (borrower, lessee) 
(buyer) 
 
Interest below 
market rate 
 
Interest or terms 
above market rate 
 
Interest above 
market rate 
 
Interest or 
terms below 
market rate 
 
 
In Table 3.3, the direction of the differences between RPT price/interest and fair 
value/market rate reveals a consistent pattern. Tunneling activities require the RPT 
price/interest on purchases, asset acquisitions and lending to be set above the fair 
value/market rate, while the price/interest of sales, equity offerings and lending are set 
below fair value/market rate. The consequence is that the amount of total RPTs would 
be reduced (i.e., diminished) due to Tunneling activities. In contrast, for propping 
activities, the pattern of price/interest setting on all these types of RPTs is in the 
opposite direction. This means that the amount of total RPTs would be increased (i.e., 
inflated) due to propping activities. Hence, to develop a proposed model to predict the 
extent to which RPTs contain prejudice against minority shareholders (i.e., contain both 
Tunneling and propping within the transactions), the total RPTs could be specified as 
the dependent variable.  
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However, as well as modelling the amount of total RPTs as the dependent variable, 
specific relevant categories of RPTs could be chosen. An issue addressed in the 
literature is whether prejudicial transactions are undertaken in practice across all 
categories or types of RPTs, or whether they would predominantly be found within 
selected categories of RPTs. Potentially, Tunneling or propping can occur across all 
these types of RPTs shown in Table 3.3. However, selected types of transactions within 
RPTs have been used in prior research as a proxy measure for Tunneling or propping. 
For example, Berkman et al. (2009) use total loan guarantee to related parties as a proxy 
measure for Tunneling; Gao and Kling (2008) use the difference between accounts 
receivable and payable to related parties, Jiang and Wong (2010) use ‘other receivables’ 
scaled by total assets; Cheung et al. (2006) use sale or purchase of goods and services 
with related party as the types of selected transactions through which Tunneling is most 
likely to occur; alternatively financing and investing transactions with related-parties 
are most likely to take the form of propping.  
 
In this study, specific categories of RPTs will be chosen as the dependent variable in the 
respective models of Tunneling alone and propping alone. First, in relation to 
Tunneling, it is argued that Tunneling activities are more likely to be executed through 
on-going price manipulation of operating sales to, and purchases from, related-parties. 
The reason is that the ultimate controlling shareholder will usually have an on-going 
motivational condition of voting control greater than cash-flow rights. Therefore, a 
model to predict Tunneling activities only could be based on RPT total operating sales 
and RPT total operating expenses, respectively. 
 
Second, in relation to propping, it is argued that propping activities are most likely to be 
one-off occurrences involving an injection of cash or earnings into the controlled 
company to avoid the imminent emergence of a market for ownership control. 
Therefore, a model to predict propping activities only could be based on RPT investing 
seller transactions and RPT financing buyer transactions, respectively. 
3.3.4. Empirical studies on Tunneling and propping 
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A body of empirical studies has been building up on the extent of and explanations for 
the phenomena of Tunneling and propping. A considerable proportion of these studies 
have been based in China. Controlling shareholders of firms in countries where there is 
concentrated ownership such as China tend to have the power to expropriate minority 
shareholders but can also use their private wealth to prop up firms in distress.  
Tunneling and propping has received special attention in developing countries.  Several 
studies find evidence of Tunneling and propping in countries with weak legal protection 
of investors (Bae, Kang, and Kim 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002; 
Friedman et al. 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa 2003; Baek, Kang and 
Lee 2006).   Most studies have focused on Tunneling alone, but a few have investigated 
propping alone and a few more have provided comparative evidence on both Tunneling 
and propping.  
 
Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau and Stouraitis (2009a) compare the incidence of both Tunneling 
and propping in China. They find that minority shareholders seem to be subject to 
expropriation through Tunneling but also gain frompropping up. On balance, there 
seems to be more tunneling than propping. Firms engaged in this Tunneling and 
propping activity are found to have larger State ownership compared to the rest of the 
Chinese market. However, they also find firms that are propped up are larger and have 
higher State ownership than firms subject to Tunneling. Propped up firms are more 
likely to have foreign shareholders and to be cross-listed abroad compared to firms that 
are subject to tunneling. Propped up firms also tend to have worse operating 
performance in the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the related party 
transaction.  
 
Before further reviewing this evidence on the prejudicial use of RPTs through 
Tunneling and propping activities, it should be noted that RPTs may also have a 
significantly positive impact on business performance. This is due to exchanges with 
related-parties fulfilling economic needs of the parent firm. In particular, transactions 
within a group of companies can provide sound economic benefits through vertical 
integration of related companies that allows greater certainty of supply and demand 
(Huang and Liu 2010). 
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Some studies have focused on various RPT practices and their harmful impacts in the 
share market and on firm financial performance. Cheung et al. (2009a) investigate RPT 
practices and impacts in China. They find that RPTs used for expropriation to 
controlling shareholders in China have a significant negative impact on business 
performance. They conclude that companies with higher RPTs tend to work against the 
interests of outside shareholders.  RPTs are generally associated with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms and lower market returns (Gordon, Henry and Palia, 2004).  
Chinese firms that grant low-interest or interest-free loans to related parties have lower 
firm values (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010).  Chinese companies whose volume of RPTs is 
higher are found to have lower firm value (Jian and Wong 2010).  Further, firms listed 
in Hong Kong experience negative stock market returns when they announce that they 
are undertaking RPTs (Cheung et al. 2006).   
 
In considering the negative impacts of RPTs, two possible interpretations of these 
impacts have been made. The first interpretation is that RPTs can produce potential 
conflicts of interest illustrative of the principal-agency conflicts and thus economically 
harmful to the company.  Accounting scandals have also raised considerable concern 
about management’s use of RPTs.  Enron’s, Adelphia’s and Parmalat’s investigations 
revealed that RPTs were used as a powerful instrument for financial frauds (Huang and 
Liu 2010). Enron engaged in a number of large purchases and sales with related parties 
that created earnings that would otherwise not be recognized (Swartz and Watkins 
2003).  Loans to related parties of management also featured in the demise of Adelphia. 
Thus, RPTs represent the potential for expropriation of the firm's resources for personal 
consumption, similar to perquisites by the insiders (McTague 2004). The second 
interpretation, which is the focus of this study, is that RPTs are harmful to minority 
shareholders.  
 
In relation to the harmful impact on minority shareholders due to Tunneling by 
controlling shareholders, Johnson et al. (2000) found that in the US, RPTs are likely to 
cause wealth transfers out of a company for the benefit of shareholders with a 
controlling interest. Other studies identify various ways that RPTs are used for 
Tunneling purposes. Examples include extending loan guarantees to related parties 
(Berkman et al. 2009), private securities offerings only to related-parties of the 
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controlling shareholder (Baek et al. 2006), and rescue mergers for subsidiaries owned 
by the ultimate controlling shareholder of the parent company (Bae et al. 2002). 
 
There is also evidence from Chen et al. (2009) concerning Tunneling activities that 
listed companies enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to 
similar arms’ length deals. That is, the listed entity’s products might be sold to the 
parent company (the controlling shareholder) at unreasonably low prices, thereby 
Tunneling cash and earnings to the related party. Firms acquire assets from related 
parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, 
when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ 
length deals. As regards the impact on operational performance of RPTs where the 
listed company is the controlled party, the results showed a significant negative 
relationship between sales, loans, guarantees and mortgages, and lease transactions and 
market performance. Chen et al. (2009) further find describe the incidence of a listed 
companies raising capital through seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and bank loans, and 
then re-lending the funds to its parent company as a means of Tunneling funds to the 
controlling shareholder (i.e., the parent company). 
 
Moreover, Chen et al. (2009) contend that as a result of the widespread use of 
fraudulent or unfair RPTs for earnings management purposes or to siphon off the assets 
of listed companies (and in doing so sacrificing the rights of small shareholders), then 
the higher the level of total RPTs, the worse the operational performance of the listed 
company . They find this to be substantiated in the case of RPTs that involve sales, 
loans, guarantees, mortgages and leases.  
 
Huyghebaert and Wang (2010b) find a strong negative market reactions to the trading 
activities between the listed company and its related parties, suggesting that related 
sales and purchases of goods and services are value-destroying transactions, especially 
for minority investors in listed companies. The argument is that dominant shareholders 
find it easier to expropriate minority investors through the sales/purchases of goods and 
services to/from their related parties, as these recurring transactions belong to the 
normal operations of the firm and hence manipulation of these deals is hard to detect. 
There is also evidence on the facilitating effect of management entenchment on the 
practices of Tunneling and propping. Management entrenchment is a concept regarding 
73 
 
the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of 
corporate governance and control mechanisms, including monitoring by the board, the 
threat of dismissal or takeover. Under these conditions, controlling shareholders are able 
to use their power to simply divert corporate resources to themselves rather than sharing 
it with outside shareholders (Berger, Ofek, and yermack 1997).  Forms of such self-
dealing transactions include executive perquisites, and self serving financial 
transactions such as directed equity issuance or personal loans to insiders. In some 
instances, controlling shareholders can increase their shares in the firm without 
transferring any assets.  Such transactions may take the form of diversion of corporate 
opportunities from the firm, creeping acquisitions, and other financial transactionas 
against minorities (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
 
Continuing with the prior literature on Tunneling, both general and specific means of 
expropriating from minority shareholders, have been identified. First, and more 
generally, the firm's free cash flow is believed to be the source of one of the most severe 
agency conflicts between controlling shareholers and non-controlling shareholders 
(Jensen 1986).  Controlling shareholders are able to deploy internally generated cash 
flow in a way that does not maximize non-controlling shareholders wealth, such as 
financing value destroying investments instead of returning funds to those investors 
through dividends (Jensen 1986).  
 
Second, is the specific means of managing the dividend payout ratio by the controlling 
shareholder as a way of expropriating from minority shareholders (Faccio et al. 2001). 
Controlling shareholders keep the dividend payout ratio low to retain profit within the 
company. The controlling shareholders then tunnel out the retained profit for private 
benefit. Multiple controlling shareholders in East Asian firms intensify conflicts of 
interest between insiders and outsiders because the controlling shareholders tend to 
collude in expropriating outside shareholders' wealth by paying lower dividend (Faccio 
et al. 2001).  The dividend payouts decrease in Germany as the control stake of the 
largest shareholder increases (Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003).  Managers voluntarily pay 
dividends in order to avert challenges for control (Zwiebel 1996).   
 
Third is the management of earnings and cash flows within business groups to ensure 
companies in the group that have higher ownership by the ultimate controlling 
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shareholder will also have higher earnings and cash flows. For example, tunneling 
activities have been examined within Indian business groups by Bertrand et al. (2002). 
They trace the propagation of earnings within a group from those group firms in which 
the controlling shareholders have few cash flow rights, to those in which they hold 
greater cash flow rights. They find that firms in which fewer funds are tunnelled away 
trade at higher market-to-book ratios (Bertrand et al. 2002). Similar findings are 
provided by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002). They find that market-to-book 
ratios are positively related to the cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders, but 
are negatively related to the divergence between cash flow and control rights.  
 
The relationship between Tunneling and the complexity of business groups has also 
been investigated.  Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) argue that business groups in 
developing countries mimic the beneficial functions of market mechanisms that are 
present only in advanced economies. When the external capital market is not well 
developed and has severe imperfections, an internal capital market within business 
groups can provide benefits in allocating capital more efficiently (Stein 1997) and 
decrease information asymmetry problems between managers and outside investors. 
Supporting this view Khanna and Palepu (2000) show that the profitability of Indian 
firms belonging to industrial groups is higher than that of independent firms Shin and 
Park (1999) also show that because of their internal capital markets, Korean firms 
belonging to the top thirty business groups are subject to fewer financing constraints 
than other independent firms. Business groups, however, also perform an adverse 
function, especially in developing countries with weak shareholder protection. As La 
Porta et al. (1999) argue, in most business groups, ownership is highly concentrated, 
and controlling shareholders have power over firms that exceeds their cash flow rights. 
This concentrated ownership provides controlling shareholders with an opportunity for 
wealth transfer from the member firm for their own benefit (Johnson et al. 2000; Bae et 
al. 2002; Bertrand et al. 2002; Baek et al. 2006).  Self-serving controlling shareholders 
who want to increase their own wealth have incentives to transfer resources from firms 
where they have low cash flow rights to those where they have high cash flow rights. As 
their cash flow rights in firms decrease, they are better off Tunneling resources out of 
the firms rather than receiving their share of profits. Since moving resources from high-
to-low-cash-flow-right firms within the business group leads to a wealth loss for the 
controlling shareholder, they have few incentives to move resources in that direction.  
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Thus, “Tunneling” within business groups takes place in a unilateral direction, from 
low-to-high-cash-flow-right firms.      
 
Turning to studies on propping, Friedman et al. (2003) provided the initial analysis of 
the phenomenon of propping.  They state that propping is providing capital to firms 
experiencing a liquidity shortfall, so long as the firms belonged to the same industrial 
group.  They designed models which establish that firms in developing countries with 
weaker corporate governance also have a higher ratio of debt to total assets.  The direct 
effect of debt is to increase the potential for propping.  The possibility of propping 
makes issuing debt attractive to entrepreneurs and investors when courts cannot enforce 
contracts.   They point to the evidence from the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 
which is broadly supportive of the idea that propping exists, particularly, in firms with 
pyramid structures.  Friedman et al. (2003) develop a model where controlling 
shareholders of firms take on debt as a pledge to prop up the firm (negative Tunneling) 
in adverse economic conditions in their model, propping concerns a transfer of resource 
to lower-level firms to bail out the receiving firm from bankruptcy. They model the use 
of firm A first-period cash flow to prop up firm B when firm B is in financial distress.   
In other models of Tunneling, Cheung et al. (2009a) have modelled Tunneling as a 
diversion of company cash flows or retained earnings to the controlling shareholder’s 
pockets. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) develop a model in which entrepreneurs set up 
companies in an environment with limited legal protection of outside investors where 
Tunneling is possible.  They expect a positive relation between the fraction of shares 
held by the controlling shareholder and the amount of related-party transactions, all else 
constant. The controlling shareholder may pursue their own interests, which need not 
coincide with those of other investors in the firm.  The government as controlling 
shareholder is associated with political costs, due to its interests in political goals such 
as safeguarding employment.  In the process of using control rights to maximize their 
own welfare or to realize political objectives, the controlling shareholder could 
expropriate the wealth of others. This goal becomes easier to achieve once the stake of 
the controlling shareholder in the firm increases. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) 
therefore expect a positive relation between the fraction of shares held by the 
controlling shareholder and the amount of related-party transactions.   
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In terms of propping occurring in business groups, the controlling shareholders in 
business groups inject private funds into firms that have minority shareholders in order 
to preserve their options to expropriate profits of these firms in the future (Friedman et 
al. 2003).  The controlling shareholders sacrifice their current wealth in order to prop-up 
the cash or earnings of poorly performing firms in the group.  This benefits minority 
shareholders of the propped up firm (i.e., negative Tunneling). However, in the long 
run, propping can also provide the controlling shareholders with an opportunity for 
wealth increase if their future private benefits obtained from bailing out the affiliates 
with financial difficulties outweigh their current losses associated with propping (Bae, 
Cheon and Kang 2008).   
 
Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) focus on propping through a transfer of resources from a 
higher-level firm to a lower level firm in a pyramidal chain.  Propping up of distressed 
firms has resulted in a misallocation of resources by the capital market by supporting 
firms that would otherwise become insolvent, according to Dow and McGuire (2009).  
The strongly affiliated firm will propped up weaker members to preserve future 
Tunneling opportunities for those weaker members. Gonenc and Hermes (2008) find 
that propping can be achieved through raising new equity capital. Cash rights issues of 
distressed affiliated firms will be higher than those of distressed non-affiliated firms.  
Also the pattern in the use of offering a cash rights share issues is found to be related to 
controlling shareholders propping up funds in firms.   
 
Propping up transactions include direct cash payments, loans or loan guarantees 
provided by the related party to the listed company, and transactions between the listed 
company and its subsidiaries. Propped up firms are more likely to have foreign 
shareholders (B-shares available to foreign investors in the Chinese stock markets), and 
to be cross-listed abroad (H-shares available to Hong Kong investors, and American 
Depository Receipts available to U.S. investors) compared to firms that are subject to 
Tunneling. Moreover, propped up firms tend to have worse operating performance in 
the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the related party transaction (Cheung et 
al. 2009b). 
 
A final aspect of propping is pointed out by Friedman et al. (2003).  They suggested that 
the financial resources to prop up a troubled firm need not come only from the 
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controlling shareholders’ private funds. The resources of other, healthier affiliates may 
also be used. For instance, the controlling shareholders who want to preserve their 
options to expropriate the future profits of the financially troubled affiliates might be 
willing to transfer funds from the healthier firms to the financially distressed firms.  For 
propping (negative Tunneling) purposes, funds are expected to be transferred from high 
cash-flow-right firms to low-cash-flow-right firms in business groups.  In a broad sense, 
propping implies capital reallocation within affiliated firms to save a financially troubled 
affiliate. Friedman et al. (2003), however, use the term “propping” to denote “negative 
Tunneling” in which controlling shareholders use their private cash to temporarily “prop 
up” troubled group affiliates. 
3.4.  Theories Applicable to Factors Driving Tunneling and Propping 
3.4.1. Rent protection theory 
 
Initial studies identified different circumstances that are associated with the practice of 
controlling shareholders expropriate corporate resources at the expense of non-
controlling shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1988) identified corporate share 
structures with dual class shares in which controlling shareholders held shares with 
higher voting rights than other shareholders. This gave controlling shareholders in dual 
class firms the power to expropriate corporate resources to their own private benefit. 
Further, Zingales (1995) reasoned that an entrepreneur going public in an environment 
with poor legal protection of outside shareholders, has an opportunity to divert some of 
the profits of the firm once they materialize. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) articulated the 
idea that the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights gives controlling 
shareholders both the incentive and opportunity to expropriate value from minority 
shareholders. 
 
Drawing on these studies, Bebchuk (1999) develops a rent-protection theory of 
corporate ownership structure. Essentially, this theory posits that shareholders holding 
control of a firm as a result of the level of their direct and indirect voting rights will 
want to protect the ‘rent’ or private benefits they perceive as attaching to their level of 
voting rights (or power). If they are not satisfied with the level of cash flows or other 
firm resources they receive through ‘legitimate’ channels (especially through cash 
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dividends), then they would seek to obtain their due ‘rent’ through means of 
expropriation. 
 
Bebchuk (1999) uses his theory to explain the choice between concentrated and 
dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. His study analyses the decision of a 
company’s initial owner whether to maintain a ‘lock on control’ when the company 
goes public. This decision is shown to be very much influenced by the size that private 
benefits of control are expected to have. He states that: 
Most importantly, when private benefits of control are large - and when 
control is thus valuable enough - leaving control up for grabs would attract 
attempts by rivals to grab control and thereby capture these private 
benefits; in such circumstances, to preclude a control grab, the initial owner 
might elect to maintain a lock on control. Furthermore, when private 
benefits of control are large, maintaining a lock on control would enable 
the company’s initial shareholders to capture a larger fraction of the surplus 
from value-producing transfers of control. Both results suggest that, in 
countries in which private benefits of control are large, publicly traded 
companies will tend to have a controlling shareholder. It is also shown that 
separation of cash flow rights and voting rights will tend to be used in 
conjunction with a controlling shareholder structure but not with a 
dispersed ownership structure (Bebchuk 1999, p. 1).  
 
In developing a model of choice between a controlling shareholder structure and a 
dispersed ownership structure, Bebchuk (1999) establishes that this choice of structure 
would be affected by the future cash flows to shareholders and the private benefits of 
control. A prior model by Grossman and Hart (1988) focused on the possibility of 
separating voting rights from cash flow rights through dual-class shares.  It is shown 
that separation of cash flow rights will generally not be used in conjunction with a 
dispersed ownership structure.  While their model focuses on the situation of two 
classes of shares with dispersed ownership, this situation is indeed quite rare according 
to Nenova (2003).  Nenova (2003) shown that, as is consistent with the evidence, 
separation of cash flow rights from votes is mostly used in conjunction with controlling 
shareholder structures.  When the size of control benefits makes it desirable to maintain 
a lock on control, separating votes from cash flow rights might enable the owner to 
maintain such a lock without incurring large risk-bearing costs or liquidity costs 
(Nenova 2003). In such cases, controlling ownership structures with separation of votes 
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and cash flows is likely to be used despite some significant market efficiency 
drawbacks. 
 
Other studies reveal that the identified connection between corporate ownership 
structures and the size of private control benefits can explain the different routes 
pursued by founders and initial owners of companies in different countries (Barclay and 
Holderness 1989).  In the United States, founders of companies that take them public 
commonly choose a one-share, one-vote structure, avoid using pyramids or cross-
holdings, and pursue a route that relinquishes, at least over time, their grip on control 
(Bukspan 1995).  According to Bebchuk (1999), the reason why founding shareholders 
act in this way under the proposed rent-protection theory is that, in the United States, 
private benefits of control are relatively small.  Consequently, when a dispersed 
ownership structure is more efficient, the fear of leaving control up for grabs will 
generally not deter a US founder from choosing such a structure.  In contrast, in many 
other countries in which private benefit of control are large, company founders elect to 
lock control in their hands when going public. This is the case in Italy according to 
Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques (1997). As Bebnuck (1999) contends, controlling 
shareholders in many other countries where private benefits of control are large, will set 
up structures that enable them to maintain a grip on control. This is done even if the 
structures needed to maintain this lock on control involve substantial costs due to 
reduced incentives or increased tax payments. 
 
In the case of China, Xiao (2011) states that there is still little known how control-cash 
flow divergence affects the choice of controlling shareholder structure and how 
government intervention affects this relationship. Xiao (2011) tests how ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ control-cash flow rights divergence and government 
intervention affect choice of ownership structure and how this is affected by 
government intervention based on the institutional background of China. Xiao (2011) 
portrays this institutional background in China as poor legal protection of investors, 
corporate ownership highly concentrated in the hands of state-owned shareholders and 
weak external governance mechanisms. First, in terms of the relationship between 
ownership-control and cash flow rights divergence and ownership structure, Xiao 
(2011) argues that the unique circumstances in China allow: 
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… related companies to unite to provide the ultimate controlling 
shareholder with connected transactions, credit guarantees, funds 
occupancy, issuance of new shares as well as seasoned issuance. Ultimate 
controlling shareholders regard listed companies as a tool of expropriation. 
When there is a lack of great opportunities for investment, listed companies 
may also carry out equity financing (such as issuance of new shares and 
seasoned issuance, etc.) by reason of the motivation of expropriation, 
which results in the phenomenon of over equity financing or financial 
conservatism in many listed companies (Xiao 2011, p.307).  
Xiao’s (2011) result shows that the degree of separation of control-cash rights is 
negatively correlated with debt-to-equity, inferring that ultimate controlling 
shareholders have a preference for equity financing that allows greater opportunity for 
expropriation from minority shareholders.  
 
Second, in terms of the degree of government intervention, Xiao (2011) measures the 
incidence of government intervention to help companies obtain loans, especially long-
term loans, from banks or other state-owned financial institutions. She finds a 
significant positive correlation between this degree of government intervention and the 
debt-to-equity ratio of listed companies. She contends that such government 
intervention in China can be used as an alternative mechanism for weak protection of 
property rights.  She concludes that this government intervention weakens the negative 
relationship between control-cash rights of controlling shareholders and the preference 
for equity financing over debt financing.  
 
While Xiao (2011) does not invoke Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory, this theory 
could be applied to interpret Xiao’s (2011) findings.  It could be argued that the higher 
the divergence of control rights above cash-flow rights, the greater will be the ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ motivation to extract ‘rent’ for their high control rights.  This 
high need for ‘rent’ could, in turn, motivate ultimate controlling shareholders to prefer 
equity financing in order to facilitate larger amounts of expropriation from minority 
investors. Alternatively, greater debt financing would limit the opportunity for 
expropriation when debt capital providers, especially banks and other state-controlled 
financial institutions are affected. 
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3.4.2. Theory of the market for corporate control 
 
Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) theoretical perspective referred to as the market for 
ownership control can provide a rationale for propping action by a controlling 
shareholder.  That is, the propping of earnings by a listed company through RPTs can be 
due to the potential emergence of a market for control of that company. If a company’s 
performance has declined due to poor management, then that company can become a 
takeover target.  That is, bidding market for control of the company could emerge. The 
existing controlling shareholder(s) would wish to seek ways to prevent or limit the 
potential of a market for corporate control emerging.  
 
According to Jensen and Ruback (1983), corporate control is frequently used to describe 
many phenomena ranging from the general forces that influence the use of corporate 
resources (such as legal and regulatory systems) to the control of a majority of seats on 
a corporation’s board of directors.  They define corporate control as the rights to 
determine the management of corporate resources - that is, the rights to hire, fire and set 
the compensation of top-level managers.  Under their definition of control, when a 
bidding firm acquires a target firm, the control rights to the target firm are transferred to 
the board of directors of the acquiring firm. While corporate boards always retain the 
top-level control rights, they normally delegate the rights to manage corporate resources 
to internal managers. In this way the top management of the acquiring firm acquires the 
rights to manage the resources of the target firm.    
 
Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) managerial competition view of the market for corporate 
control perceives the takeover market as an arena in which alternative management 
teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.  Prior studies on the 
reaction of stock prices to various management control related events has increased the 
understanding of the market for corporate control in developed countries with dispersed 
shareholder ownership.  However, this managerial competition view of the market for 
corporate control is not applicable to developing countries with concentrated 
shareholder ownership.   
 
In China, ownership and managerial control in the corporate sector has only recently 
begun to depart from patterns typical in the socialist past (Walder 2011).   Walder 
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(2011) suggests that these changes potentially will create a new corporate elite with 
greater compensation, personal wealth, and independence from government agencies 
than ever before.  In the meantime however, there are features within the existing 
securities regulations in China that can impact on the emergence of a market for 
corporate control which are critical to ultimate controlling shareholders. Ultimate 
controlling shareholders in listed companies in China, especially state based 
shareholders, will have high private benefits to protect.  Hence they will have an 
incentive to engage in the practice of propping up the firm’s earnings and cash flows in 
order to avoid the market for corporate control emerging.  
 
One important feature of the securities system in China is the split share structure.  This 
structure affects the market for corporate control in two important ways. First, non-
tradable shares held by  state or legal-person founding shareholders of listed companies 
(carved off from formed government enterprises) will neither benefit nor suffer from the 
stock price change.  Even if share prices are low due to poor management, the 
controlling shareholders will hold non-tradable shares that provide a shield against a 
competitor for corporate control.   The split share system in China has created a form of 
dual class shares in firms.  Normally, dual class ownership structures are created by 
insiders in order to prevent the dilution of control while gaining access to capital 
markets and to provide effective defense against hostile takeovers.  By holding  non-
tradable shares with voting rights attached,  insiders can have significant voting control 
over the firm, while having an effective form of anti-takeover protection (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Matrick 2010). 
 
Another important feature of the securities system in China is the “special treatment” 
securities regulation.  This regulation can trigger bidding for control of a firm whose 
management and current controlling shareholders have produced weak financial 
performance. Since 2001, the financial abnormalities that can cause a listed firm to be 
given ‘special treatment’ status are that a loss is recorded for the past two years or there 
have been serious auditing problems.  When there are signs that ‘special treatment’ 
status could become a likelihood then the controlling shareholder will have an incentive 
to prop up earnings.  Hence, in the context of China, Jensen and Ruback's (1983) 
managerial competition view of the market for corporate control is not applicable.  
Rather a controlling shareholder competiton view should be applied.  
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3.4.3. Market transition theory 
 
Economic sociological literature has debated the phenomenon of market reforms or 
transitions in socialist states. The framework of this debate on transitional economies 
has been depicted by Parish and Michelson (1996) stressed that market outcomes are 
determined in large part by the path dependence established by the ruins of the old order 
and the early decisions in the reform process.  
 
Nee’s (1989) theory of market transition posits that in reforming socialist economies, 
the transition from redistributive to market coordination shifts sources of power and 
privilege to favour direct producers relative to redistributors. Nee’s (1989) theory 
questions the argument that the former political elite no longer have absolute control 
over resources and can become “losers in the transformation process” in terms of their 
privilege and income.  
 
Nee’s theory of market transition is translated to the level of the firm by Nee and Opper 
(2009). They state that “the firm, as the ultimate generator of income, provides the most 
direct approach to analyse the interplay between market power, political capital and 
economic outcome” (p.4).  Nee’s (1989) theory has specified general mechanisms to 
explain a change in the balance of power between political and economic actors in 
transition economies. These mechanisms drive the construction of informal institutions 
of a market society.  Nee and Opper (2009) extend the theory's original focus on 
dynamic power shifts between redistributors and producers to a firm-level analysis.  By 
“contrasting firm-level transactions across institutional (corporate) domains” this 
represents “various levels of marketization and state control.” (p,4).  If observed 
political benefits are manifest predominantly in state-controlled corporations, this would 
support Nee’s market transition theory.   
 
China’s economic reforms embraced the western mantras of maximizing profitability, 
improving efficiency, and increasing manager’s decision making powers and autonomy.  
At the same time, China has wanted to maintain ultimate control of the economy.  These 
aims combine to create what the authorities call a socialist-market economy (Lin 2009). 
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Nee’s (1989) theory of transitional markets refers to the ability of the network of cadres 
from the former regime to remain a strong force after their government agency becomes 
corporatized. As prominent decision-makers in the State-based ‘bureaucracies’ that 
have ownership control of a corporatized and listed company, they seek to retain their 
power over management and workers of that company. This is achieved by making 
managers and workers ‘path dependent’ on the controlling shareholder through fringe 
benefits such as company housing, education and health support for the families of 
managers and workers of the company. This tends to make management deferential to 
the controlling State-based shareholder(s) and their appointed Board of Directors.   
From an agency theory perspective, this phenomenon of the State-based controlling 
shareholder keeping managers, especially the CEO, ‘path dependent’, is related to the 
concept of bonding. Under agency theory, the CEO and executive management may 
negotiate aspects of employment contracts that bond them to the interests of 
shareholders. This could include profit-based performance pay or share options in the 
company (Jensen and Smith 1985). Under Nee’s theory of transitional markets, the 
phenomenon of State-based controlling shareholders perpetuating ‘path dependency’ on 
them from the CEO and executive management is equivalent to bonding.  Note that 
bonding can inherently be a two way action. 
Nee (1989) concludes that the shift from government administered redistributive 
economies to market mechanisms improves incentives for direct producers, and 
provides for entrepreneurs an alternative path for socioeconomic mobility.  He argues 
that current party members simply convert political capital to economic advantage.  
Therefore current party members who have become substantial shareholders are likely 
to be aligned to the controlling State based shareholders. 
 
The managers of China’s firms have been subject to party control since the founding the 
PRC.  In late 1978, the country’s leadership under Deng XiaoPing introduced a number 
of economic reforms and started the ongoing efforts to transfer firms’ decision making 
power from local party committees and state bureaucrats to managers. (Hay, Morris, Liu 
and Yao 1994)  
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The CPC plays two central roles in the corporate governance of SOEs.  First, it remains 
the political centre of these enterprises and, as such handles all political affairs, 
including managing cadre appointments, enforcing commitment to ideological 
principles, and ensuring that corporate decisions take national policies into account.  
The CPC selects party and non-party cadres according to the principle that they should 
possess political integrity, implement the party’s policies, and also have some 
professional competence.  The ranks of the cadres usually determine the level of 
managerial positions they can hold. Second, the party may become involved in all of the 
major corporate decisions of SOEs by placing party cadres in the most important 
leadership positions, including those of the CEO and the general manager (McNally 
2002).  
 
The transition from redistribution to markets involves a transfer of power favouring 
direct producers relative to redistributors.   According to Nee (1989), market reform has 
resulted in reducing of hierarchies. Vertical segmentation characteristic of socialist 
economies is reduced as horizontal market relationships establish new social networks 
between private buyers and sellers. The majority of entrepreneurs come from direct 
producers.  In the market transit economic, political elitists aspire to becoming rich 
quick.  McNally (2002) suggests that most current and former cadres seem to have 
gained no significant returns on their cadre status; however cadre entrepreneurs are 
excelling and seem to have advantages over other entrepreneurs. This observation infers 
that political power has utility for entrepreneurs.  
 
In a developed market economy, securities and law reforms have to reflect the 
developed position of that market economy.  The emergence of minority investors will 
demand legal reforms to areas such as corporate governance and shareholders 
protection. In socialist economies, cadres (political elites) control the distribution of 
products.  The emergence of individual entrepreneurs means goods can be sold on the 
open market.   During the transition cadres themselves become entrepreneurs and 
control public listed company in China. When there is transition to a market economic, 
cadre entrepreneurs obtain more power relatively to the official cadre bureaucrat 
responsible for conducting the re-distribution system (Nee 1989).   
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The prevalence of connected transactions within business groups is also a feature in 
China.  Hundreds of listed firms have been restructured from existing enterprises 
through a “carve-out“ under which part of business group is carved out and set up as a 
to-be-listed firm, and the original business group remains the parent firm (Peng and 
Delios 2006;  Jiang, Lee and Yue 2005).  In 2000, 93.2% of the connected transactions 
were conducted between the controlling shareholders and their listed firms (Peng and 
Delios 2006).   
 
3.5.  Summary 
This chapter has first reviewed relevant bodies of literature on the features of corporate 
governance in developing countries with focus on the structures and institutions that 
create the principal-principal agency problem.  It has then reviewed three theories that 
provide explanations for the maintenance of ownership control, management 
dependencies and prejudice towards minority shareholders.   
 
The literature on governance in developing countries gives much attention to China.  It 
highlights the institutional settings, the highly concentrated ownership structure, and the 
multiple objectives of state-based controlling shareholders which lead to the potential 
for more severe principal-principal problems between controlling and minority 
shareholders.  China’s two-tier board structure for corporations and the influence of a 
party secretary is purported to impact on main board’s independence and the credibility 
of related-party transactions.  Also, the empirical studies on the effects of ownership 
structure on firm performance in developing countries have been summarized. 
 
A review of the accounting and finance literature on RPTs has revealed there is no 
direct measurement of the extent of unfair prejudice (actual or potential) towards 
minority shareholders, but several proxy measures have been developed at the country 
level and the company level.  In terms of the classification of prejudicial RPTs, in the 
forms of Tunneling or propping, there is inconsistency in the literature.  This study 
develops a revised classification scheme.  
 
This chapter then reviews the body of empirical research on the phenomena of 
Tunneling and propping.  It identifies various general and specific means of 
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expropriating or Tunneling from minority shareholders.  It also provides evidence on 
the means used for propping, particularly through business groups.   
 
Theories that provide explanations for ownership control, management dependencies 
and prejudicial RPTs are then reviewed.  First, Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory 
of corporate ownership structure and its application to the controlling shareholders’ 
pursuit of Tunneling is considered.  Second, Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) theory of the 
market for ownership control as a rationale for propping action by a controlling 
shareholder is reviewed.  Finally, Nee’s (1989) theory of market transition is adapted to 
the firm level and applied as an explanation for the emergence of cadre entrepreneurs 
and management dependencies.  The notion of management dependencies on the 
controlling shareholder has a parallel to the agency theory notion of (reverse) bonding. 
This theory of market transition is conceptualised as an enabler of Tunneling and 
propping phenomena.  These three theories are further discussed as part of the 
development of hypothesis in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1.  Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to design theory-based models and 
provide evidence that addresses the following research questions: (1) what regulatory 
and market conditions motivate the ultimate controlling shareholder to pursue 
prejudicial RPTs? (2) what governance practices enable or restrict the ultimate 
controlling shareholder in pursuing prejudicial RPTs? To address these two broad 
research questions in a more specific way, testable hypotheses need to be developed. 
These hypotheses will be concerned with the extent to which motivating and enabling 
factors can explain or predict Tunneling and propping phenomena. The focal literature, 
reviewed in Chapter 3, and the background information on institutions and regulations 
in China, reviewed in Chapter 2, are drawn upon in order to generate the hypotheses in 
this chapter. Once the hypotheses are generated, then the conceptual framework, 
empirical models and methods to be used in this study will be constructed in the next 
chapter. 
 
The body of this chapter is divided into four sections.  The first section concerns 
motivations for prejudicial RPTs using two separate theoretical perspectives:  the rent-
protection theory of ownership control that is deemed to motivate Tunneling practices; 
the theory of market for ownership control that is deemed to motivate propping 
practices.  The remaining sections concern factors or mechanisms that can enable or 
restrict prejudicial RPTs. The second section relates to the corporate governance 
principal-agent structural factor of independence between directors, supervisors, 
executives and shareholders in China. The third section draws on the theory of market 
transition to explain the emergence of ‘cadre entrepreneurs’ and the perpetuation of 
‘path dependent management’, both of which can facilitate the controlling shareholder’s 
pursuit of Tunneling and propping. The fourth section considers the role of non-ultimate 
blockholders as a limiting influence on the ultimate controlling shareholder’s Tunneling 
and propping pursuits.  
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4.2.  Motivations for Prejudicial Related-Party Transactions  
The previous chapter reviewed literature related to theoretical perspectives on what 
might motivate controlling shareholders to pursue Tunneling and propping, 
respectively, through their company’s RPTs.  Two separate theories concerned with 
the motivation of the controlling shareholder – one regarding the maintenance of a 
‘lock’ on ownership control and the other regarding the extraction of a desired ‘rent’ 
from ownership control – were invoked. These theories are used to generate 
hypotheses in the next two sub-sections. 
4.2.1. Motivation for Tunneling – rent-protection theory of ownership control  
 
Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure is adopted as 
a motivator for Tunneling. This theory infers that controlling shareholders will 
continuously assess the size of expected private benefits potentially accessible to them 
from their control, and will be able to extract those private benefits (through Tunneling 
if necessary) as long as they are able to maintain a ‘lock on control’. In terms of the 
conditions that create an incentive for extraction of private benefits through Tunneling, 
Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) argue that firms providing controlling 
shareholders with low cash flow rights relative to their voting rights (extent of power) 
will have an incentive to tunnel out cash flow or other resources. The level of dividend 
per share, dividend cover and free cash flow to equity would be indicators of prevailing 
annual conditions regarding the satisfying of cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders. The lower the legitimate (non-prejudicial) cash flows distributed as 
dividends, or the lower the potential cash flows available for legitimate distribution to 
all shareholders as reflected in dividend cover or free cash flows to equity, then the 
stronger would be the condition for Tunneling in that particular year.  
 
Tang, Xie and Zhang (2007) provide an alternative argument about the Tunneling 
effects of cash dividends. They argue that when the ultimate controlling shareholder has 
absolute control over the company and the cash dividend distributed by the company, 
then that controlling shareholder has a special preference for the Tunneling effect 
resulting from the concept of “the same shares with the same voting rights but different 
prices”. Although the cash dividend would not be the most beneficial choice for the 
ultimate controlling shareholder, it can be made beneficial if these dividends are 
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distributed from the listed company to its subsidiaries at a high rate and the ultimate 
controlling shareholder has high ownership in these subsidiaries. This option is 
attractive to the ultimate controlling shareholder when other alternatives are under 
increasingly strict market regulations and governmental supervision, according to Tang 
et al. (2007).  
 
These arguments by Bebchuk et al. (2000) based on rent-protection theory, and Tang et 
al. (2007) based on differential dividend yields, leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Dividend per share is inversely related to the proportion of Tunneling in RPTs. 
 
H1b: Dividend cover is positively related to the proportion of Tunneling in RPTs. 
 
H1c: Free cash flow for equity is inversely related to the proportion of Tunneling in 
RPTs. 
 
However, the most potent overall indicator of prevailing annual conditions for 
Tunneling, under Bebchuk (1999) rent-protection theory, is the discrepancy between 
direct and indirect voting rights and direct and indirect cash flow rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder (Bebchuk et al. 2000). Indirect voting and cash flow rights of 
the ultimate controlling shareholder will arise from pyramidal and cross-holding 
corporate group structures.  This leads to the fourth hypothesis concerning the 
motivation for Tunneling: 
 
H1d: Direct and indirect voting rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder that are 
higher than cash flow rights will be positively related to the proportion of Tunneling in 
RPTs. 
 
It is further noted that the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholders could also be a 
factor affecting the extent of Tunneling.  As mentioned, the higher the proportion of 
direct ownership of voting shares, the stronger would be the condition of ‘lock on 
control’ by the ultimate controlling shareholder in the event of a competitor seeking to 
bid for direct ownership control. The ‘lock on control’ through the proportion of direct 
ownership is likely to be more powerful for State-based shareholders than non-State-
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based (i.e., private) shareholders in China because the former own a combination of 
trading and non-tradable voting shares in their company. Also direct political links by 
State-based controlling shareholders could give them a more secure ‘lock on control’ 
than private controlling shareholders. Such political security and the holding of non-
tradable voting shares, suggest that the ability to maintain control of a company would 
be stronger for State-based controlling shareholders than private controlling 
shareholders. This stronger ability to maintain a ‘lock on control’ as a protection for the 
cash flow ‘rent’ they can extract from the company, is likely to make the State-based 
controlling shareholders more ready to engage in Tunneling practices than private 
controlling shareholders.  
4.2.2. Motivation for propping – theory of market for ownership control  
 
Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) ‘market for ownership control’ theory is invoked as a 
motivator for propping by the controlling shareholder. This theory infers that propping 
of a company’s earnings or cash flows by a controlling shareholder is due to the 
potential emergence of a market for control of shares of that company. In China, the 
prospect of a firm not meeting specific financial performance criteria set by the CSRC 
can trigger this market. One criterion is the reporting of a net loss for two consecutive 
years, placing the company under the restrictions of ‘special treatment’ status.  Another 
criterion is achieving an ROE of 8% in order to be permitted to make a new share issue. 
Firms in danger of failing to meet these earnings-based criteria are likely to become 
vulnerable to the emergence of a market for ownership control. Hence, to avoid this 
consequence, the controlling shareholder will have an incentive to prop up earnings. In 
particular, firms that report a net loss in the prior year would have an incentive to prop 
up earnings in the current year to avoid reporting two consecutive losses. Also if 
management and controlling shareholders anticipate a poor earnings per share result in 
the current year and a poor outlook for earnings in the subsequent year, then there 
would again be an incentive to prop up the current year’s earnings to avoid the prospect 
of reporting a loss over two consecutive years. Additionally, the firm may be concerned 
about achieving the threshold ROE of 8% if it is planning to raise new funds through a 
rights issue. Firms that have fallen below 8% have probably decided against any new 
share issue in the short-term and have given up any propping strategy in the current year. 
However, those reporting an ROE of 8% or slightly above may well have engaged in 
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propping practice to achieve it.  There “special treatment” regulatory requirements that 
can potentially trigger a market for ownership control can be a motivation to the 
controlling shareholders to undertake propping action.  Hence, the following hypotheses 
are generated: 
 
H2a: Reporting a net loss in the prior year is positively related to the proportion of 
propping in RPTs. 
 
H2b: The level of ROE is inversely related to the proportion of propping in RPTs. 
 
H2c: Reporting an ROE on or slightly above the 8% threshold is positively related to 
the proportion of propping in RPTs. 
 
The other aspect of China’s regulatory system that can create an effect on propping 
practices is the holding of non-tradable shares by State-based controlling shareholders. 
These shares provide voting and dividend rights, but they are unavailable to outside 
prospective shareholders. Hence, holding a relatively high proportion of non-tradable 
shares would provide a shield for the state controlling shareholder against the 
emergence of a market for ownership control. So there would be less incentive for 
propping.  This leads to the additional hypotheses concerning the need for propping by 
State-based controlling shareholders to avoid the emergence of a market for ownership 
control:  
 
H2d: The proportion of total shares held in non-tradable shares is inversely related to 
the proportion of propping in RPTs. 
 
More generally, the extent of direct and indirect voting power of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders (whether State or Non-state) will provide a stronger shield 
against the emergence of a market for internal control.  When the direct and indirect 
voting power of the ultimate controlling shareholder is high, the resources required by a 
competitor shareholder to take over ultimate control will be greater.  Hence, the final 
hypothesis regarding the motivation to undertake propping is as follows: 
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H2e: Ultimate controlling shareholder’s direct ownership (percentage direct vote) is 
inversely related to the proportion of propping in RPTs. 
4.3.  Dependence and Independence in Governance Structures in 
China 
 
In terms of the ability of the controlling shareholder to carry out prejudicial RPTs, this 
study focuses on the directors’ and executives’ dependency on, or independency from, 
the controlling shareholder(s). In China, it is well documented that the extent of 
directors’, supervisors’ and executives’ dependence or independence differs in practice 
from the relevant corporate governance regulations.  
 
The transition from state to private ownership has caused the potential for agency 
problems.  The separation of ownership by principals and decision control by hired 
managers creates the classic agency relationship, which has long been thought to 
materially influence the welfare of principals (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In a 
centrally-planned economy, most state owned firms pursue goals other than wealth 
maximization. The agency relationship and its costs are neglected in such situations as 
enterprises essentially act as subsidiaries of the only market player, the state (Liu et al. 
2011).  In a market economy, government ownership may be less desirable to private 
ownership in competitive markets for reasons including: 
 
i. The government’s preference for social and political goals as opposed to 
value maximisation;  
ii. Its influence on the appointment of political allies rather than experienced 
staff to management positions; and 
iii. Higher transaction costs (Hess et al. 2010).   
The second dot-point indicates that appointments of political allies to senior posts in 
State-controlled companies will make these directors and executives dependent on the 
controlling shareholder for their personal position of management power, and will 
willingly serve the interests of the controlling shareholder. 
 
Under the CSRC’s published Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China, a two-tier board structure is required for all listed companies consisting of a 
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board of directors and a supervisory board. The recommended composition of the 
board of directors is 5 to 19 directors, with a minimum of one-third of members 
appointed as independent directors. The board of directors is made accountable to 
shareholders, is to treat all shareholders equally including the protection of the 
interests of minority shareholders, and is also to be concerned with the interests of the 
firm’s various stakeholders. In practice, controlling shareholders tend to nominate 
new directors in most listed companies, with some nominations also coming from 
existing board members (Liu 2003). Independent directors are very often nominated 
by the controlling shareholder. Generally, although boards of directors are elected 
during the shareholders' general meeting, in practice over half of the directors are 
appointed by the controlling shareholder (Cheung et al. 2009b). Hence, Chinese 
boards tend to be well dominated by insiders, such as senior managers and 
representatives of controlling shareholder and large blockholders. Likewise, Bai et al. 
(2004) estimates that in former SOEs in China, more than half of directors are 
typically appointed by the state. Liu (2003) points out that although 90% of Chinese 
listed firms have at least two independent directors, companies superficially establish 
a system of independent directors to comply with regulation, rather than to protect the 
best interests of their minority investors. Consequently, boards in China generally 
lack independence and tend to rubber-stamp the decisions made by the management 
and controlling shareholders. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H3a: The emoluments of top 5 executives is positively related to the proportion of 
both Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
 
H3b: The emolument of directors is positively related to the proportion of both 
Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
 
H3c: The percentage of share held by main board directors is positively related to 
the proportion of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
 
H3d: The percentage of independent directors on main board is inversely related to 
the proportion of both of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
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In relation to H3d, the perspectives of resource dependence theory and institutional 
theories lead to contradictory conclusions about the effect that independent directors 
have on corporate performance (Peng 2004). Specifically, resource dependence 
theory suggests that firms may appoint outsiders to the board in order to tap into 
resources and best practice ideas these outsiders may bring (Pfeffer 1972). On the 
other hand, institutional theory argues that appointing outsiders to the board may 
merely represent firms’ attempts to comply with institutional pressures, and. therefore, 
may not necessarily result in better firm performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
 
The supervisory board in China is still more decorative than functional. In practice, 
when the government is the largest owner, leaders of party committees tend to 
assume the positions of chairman and vice-chairman. Even in privately controlled 
listed firms, the published statements of the supervisory boards show that they rarely 
contest decisions made by the board of directors and company executives. Arguably, 
the supervisory board in China has little real ability to curb expropriation by 
dominant shareholders (Huyghebaert and Wang 2010a). Because the supervisory 
board is seen to not stand in the way of actions sought by the controlling shareholder, 
the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
H3e: The percentage shares held by the supervisory board is positively related to 
the proportion of both of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
4.4.  Cadre Entrepreneurs and ‘Path Dependent’ Management – 
Market Transition Theory 
 
There is an alternative theoretical perspective on the enabling of prejudicial RPTs by 
privileged and powerful persons in China. It is Nee’s (1989) theory of market 
transition. As explained by Nee (1989) the transition of economies from centrally-
planned to market-oriented economies entails a transition from a redistribution 
system to a market forces system. In the transition process power shifts away from 
the redistributors towards the direct producers. Market reform in China, according to 
Nee (1989), has resulted in the bypassing of hierarchies; the extent of vertical 
segmentation characteristic of socialist economies is reduced as horizontal market 
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relationships. These market relationships establish new social networks between 
private buyers and sellers.  
 
Nee (1989) finds that overwhelmingly, the majority of entrepreneurs come from direct 
producers, as predicted by his theory of market transition. While state socialist 
redistributive economies were characterized by the allocation and distribution of goods 
through central planning, in the current market transit economic in China, there is 
admiration for political elitists who got rich quick.  Current and former cadres seem to 
have gained no significant returns on their cadre status. On the other hand, cadre 
entrepreneurs are doing well and seem to have advantages over other entrepreneurs. 
This finding indicates that political power has utility for entrepreneurs (Nee 1989). 
While CPC policies and mechanisms have a direct effect of the corporate governance of 
listed SOEs, the forces of the market economy also have an influence according to 
Nee’s theory of market transition. Securities and corporate law reforms need to reflect 
the transition to the market economic. The emergence of non-state investors tends to 
demand legal reforms to areas of corporate governance and shareholder protection. In a 
socialist economy, cadre (political elites) control the distribution of products.  However, 
in a market economy, the emergence of individual entrepreneurs means goods can be 
sold on the open market. The cadres themselves have become entrepreneurs and control 
public listed company in China. When there is transition to a market economy, 
entrepreneurs obtain more power relatively to the cadre responsible for conducting the 
re-distribution system (Nee 1989; Nee & Opper 2009). It strengthens the ability of cadre 
entrepreneurs to pursue prejudicial RPTs.  The cadre entrepreneur group could be 
identified by the companies whose controlling shareholder is an individual Chinese 
Citizen and whose chairperson is over 57 years.  Born in 1953, he or she would be age 
25 at the opening up of China in 1978.  This leads to the hypothesis about cadre 
entrepreneurs as follows: 
 
H4a: The cadre entrepreneur as the ultimate controlling shareholder has a positive 
effect on the proportion of both Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
 
The history of China’s market transition has retained the important political feature 
that management of China’s corporatized SOE are subject to CPC control.  In late 
1978, the country’s leadership under Deng XiaoPing introduced a number of 
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economic reforms and started the ongoing efforts to transfer firms’ decision making 
power from local party committees and state bureaucrats to corporate managers (You, 
1998). Today the CPC plays two central roles in the corporate governance of SOEs.  
First, it remains the political centre of these enterprises and, as such handles all 
political affairs, including managing cadre appointments, enforcing commitment to 
ideological principles, and ensuring that coroporate decisions take national policies 
into account.  The CPC organisations select party and non-party cadres according to 
the principle that they should possess political integrity, implement the party’s 
policies, and also have some professional competence.  The ranks of the cadres 
usually determine the level of managerial positions they can hold. Second, the party 
may become involved in all of the major corporate decisions of SOEs by placing 
party cadres in the most important leadership positions, including those of the CEO 
and general managers (McNally 2002). 
 
At a firm’s director and executive level, it is to be noted that each listed SOE has a 
party committee to represent the CPC. This party committee of the firm has control 
over approval of appointments to the board of directors and, thus, exerts actual 
corporate governance power.  It is commonly staffed with hand-picked executives, 
and its role is to channel state policy into corporate practice (Morck et al. 2005; 
Yeung 2005). There has been considerable research on the effect on corporate 
governance in China's SOEs of the administrative interference by state institutions 
(Aharony et al. 2000; Sun and Tong 2003; Fan et al. 2007). The party secretary's 
responsibility is to channel state policy into corporate practice and to make sure that 
the directives of the CPC are upheld within the firm.  The literature suggests that this 
kind of influence is not always inherently favourable to shareholders’ own economic 
interests, because the party is looking at the company's broader social and economic 
impact, rather than at maximizing shareholder value (Liu and Sun 2006).       
 
The “party supervises the cadre” rule refers to the party’s right to recommend and 
approve all appointments for managerial positions (i.e., board of directors and top 
executives) in the economic bureaucracy of government and in state enterprises.  
Internal management appointments, career advancements, and disciplinary actions 
have all been strictly controlled by party agencies (Qian 1996).  In 2004, just before 
the listing of the SOE, Netcom, the Chinese government suddenly swapped the top 
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executives at China’s big four telecom companies.  The boards were presented with a 
fait accompli, as the decision had been made by party committees comprised of a 
handful of senior executives (Liu and Sun 2006).    
 
H4b: The path dependence of the CEO is positively related to the proportion of 
both of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
 
H4c: The path dependence of the chair is positively related to the proportion of 
both of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
 
4.5.  The Influence of Non-Controlling Blockholders  
Agency theory suggests that firm performance is positively related to the presence of 
large shareholders, i.e. blockholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Empirical research in 
developed economies such as the United States (Hill and Snell 1988) and emerging 
economies such as China (Xu and Wang 1999; Qi, Wu, and Zhang 2000), Czech 
Republic (Claessens and Djankov 1999), India (Ramaswamy, Li, and Veliyath 2002), 
and Russia (Buck, Filatotchev, Wright and Zhukov 1999) largely confirms this 
proposition. Deng and Wang (2006) believe it is plausible that at the board level outside 
directors representing large shareholders, especially those non-affiliated outside 
directors, may more likely be concerned with performance in order to maximize their 
investment. Similarly, resource dependence theory argues that outside directors are 
likely to bring useful resources from other organizations (Pfeffer 1972). It is further 
suggested by Tang et al. (2007) that the influence of company laws on corporate 
governance will trail off in capital markets with concentrated ownership structure, 
especially when a pyramid shareholding or cross-shareholding structure is prevalent. 
They contend that in such circumstances, blockholders (beyond the first blockholder) 
will have enough motivation and ability to control the company in order to achieve 
particular goals of their own.  These arguments generate the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: The percentage shares held by blockholders (top 2 to 10 shareholders) is inversely 
related to the proportion of both Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
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4.6.  Summary 
This chapter has generated several sets of hypotheses. The first set concerns the 
relationship between the extent of Tunneling and actual or potential cash flows to the 
controlling shareholder through legitimate means (i.e., dividends per share, dividend 
cover and the company’s free cash flow to equity). It also concerns the difference 
between cash flow rights through legitimate means and the voting power, direct and 
indirect, of the ultimate controlling shareholder. When voting rights are greater than 
legitimate cash flow rights, then the ultimate controlling shareholder will be inclined to 
seek additional cash flows through the illegitimate means of Tunneling. This argument 
is based on Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory.  
 
The second set of hypotheses concerns the relationship between the extent of propping 
and the company’s financial conditions that could trigger what Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) call a ‘market for ownership control’. These financial conditions are specific to 
the CSRC’s ‘special treatment’ criteria and include both a reported net loss in the prior 
year and the threshold level of the ROE. Offsetting the threat to the ultimate controlling 
shareholder of a market for ownership control is the extent to which the company holds 
non-tradable shares which cannot be acquired by a prospective rival shareholder.  
 
The third set of hypotheses developed in this chapter considers the relationship between 
the corporate governance elements of ‘independence’ and the extent of tunneling and 
propping (i.e., prejudicial RPTs). These corporate governance elements that could 
enable or constrain tunneling and propping by the ultimate controlling shareholder 
include emoluments and shareholdings of the top executives, supervisors and directors 
as well as the proportion of directors meeting ‘independence’ criteria. 
 
The fourth set of hypotheses is also concerned with conditions that could enable or 
constrain tunneling and propping by the ultimate controlling shareholder. Nee’s (1989) 
theory of market transition is applied at the firm level in China to hypothesise 
historically-generated conditions that can facilitate Tunneling and propping. These 
conditions include CEO and Chair ‘path dependency’ on the State-based controlling 
shareholder, or the emergence of cadre entrepreneurs as controlling shareholders.  
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Finally, a discussion of the potential constraining effect of non-ultimate controlling 
block-holders on Tunneling and propping by the ultimate controlling shareholder has 
been considered in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides details of the research design and methods used in this study. 
Research design refers to “the glue that holds the research project together. A design is 
used to structure the research, to show how all of the major parts of the research work 
together to try to address the central research questions.” (Troohim 2006, p.6).  
Research methods, on the other hand, refer to the “ways or techniques in which the 
research design is applied or deployed.” (Clarke 2005, p.23).  
 
The next section of this chapter indicates the philosophical stance taken by the 
researcher in this study. This is followed by a section that develops the conceptual 
framework.  The fourth section provides justifications for the use of quantitative 
methods and secondary data. The fifth section describes and justifies the specification of 
models and definitions of variables contained in these models. These sections are the 
key aspects of the research design for this study. The remaining sections present 
elements of the research methods for this study. The sixth section explains the sources 
of data. The seventh section sets out the sample selection procedure. The eighth section 
sets out the quantitative methods of analysis that will be used in the next chapter and 
assumptions to be met by the data. The ninth section provides results and discussion 
concerning the cleaning and transforming of the data in terms of dealing with outliers 
and missing data, and normalizing the data for some variables. Finally a summary is 
provided. 
 
5.2. Conceptual Framework  
Figure 1 depicts four boxes impacting on the existence of prejudicial RPTs. These four 
boxes represent the factors expected to determine the extent to which prejudicial RPTs 
will be undertaken. They are conceived from two perspectives: (i) conditions motivating 
the ultimate controlling shareholder and (ii) mechanisms enabling the controlling 
shareholder. The motivating conditions are differentiated between conditions that 
motivate ‘Tunneling’ (based on rent-protection theory) and conditions that motivate 
‘propping’ (based on the market for ownership control theory). The enabling 
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mechanisms are also conceived from two perspectives: (i) corporate governance 
mechanisms regarding independence in the agency monitoring process, and (ii) the 
perpetuation of personal privileges and power (based on the theory of market 
transition). These enabling mechanisms are applicable to the facilitation of both 
Tunneling and propping transactions. 
 
The conceptual framework in Figure 5.1 can be assembled into two models to provide 
explanations or predictions of the extent of Tunneling and propping, respectively, 
within RPTs. These two models, in conceptual form, are as follows: 
 
Operating RPTs = f(Tunneling Motives, Enabling Mechanisms, Control 
Variables) + ɛ          … (1) (Tunneling explanatory model) 
 
Investing and Financing RPTs = f(Propping Motives, Enabling 
Mechanisms, Control Variables) + ɛ    … (2) (propping explanatory 
model) 
 
These two models can also be conceptualised as a combined model for the explanation 
or prediction of overall prejudicial RPTs as follows: 
 
Total RPTs = f(Tunneling Motives, Propping Motives, Enabling 
Mechanisms, Control Variables) + ɛ   … (3) (combined explanatory 
model) 
 
These models are suitable for explaining or predicting the extent to which listed 
companies in China undertake both Tunneling and propping transactions, Tunneling 
only, or propping only, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Motivating Conditions for Controlling Shareholder’s Prejudicial RPTs  
(H1 & H2) 
Theory of rent-protection for corporate 
owner to predict ‘tunneling’ 
 Dividend per share;  
 Dividend cover;  
 Free cash flow from equity;  
 Discrepancy between voting and 
cash flow rights   
Theory of market for ownership control 
to predict ‘propping’ 
 Direct ownership 
 Return on equity 
 ROE  Threshold 
 Non-tradable shares 
 Net loss in prior year  
 
Existence of Prejudicial RPTs (Dependent Variables) 
 both tunneling and propping 
 tunneling only 
 propping only 
Corporate governance ‘independence’ 
characteristics 
 Total emoluments of the top three 
executives 
 Total emoluments of all main board 
directors 
 Main Board independence 
 Main Board members’ shareholding 
 Supervisory Board members’ 
shareholding  
Theory of Market Transition 
 CEO Path Dependency 
 Chair Path Dependency 
 Main Board Directors from old 
regime 
 Cadre Entrepreneur as ultimate 
shareholder 
 Block holders (top 2-10)  
Enabling Mechanisms for Controlling Shareholder’s Prejudicial RPTs 
(H3, 4 & 5) 
Figure 5.1. Conceptual Framework 
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5.3. Specification of Models and Definitions of Variables 
 
In order to operationalize the above conceptual framework and models, a set of 
equations and related variables need to be specified and defined. They will mirror the 
conceptual models (1), (2) and (3) above. 
 
The Tunneling explanatory model and definitions of its variables is specified as follows: 
RPTTUN = α + β1DIVPS + β2DIVCOV + β3FCFE + β4VOTECASHDIFF + 
β5EMOLEXEC + β6EMOLDIR + β7BRDSHOLD + β8BRDINDEP + 
β9SUPSHOLD + β10CADREENTRPR + β11CEOPATHDEP + 
β12CHAIRPATHDEP + β13BLOCKHOLD + β14STATEDUMMY 
+β15ASSETSLN + β16BKTOMKT + ɛ      ... (4) 
 
Where  
RPTTUN is defined as two separate measures as follows: 
 RPTOPERSELL comprises the related-party transactions in the operating sell 
category (per Table 3.3) scaled by company operating revenue. That is, 
RPTOPERSELL = Total Operating Sales / Total Operating Revenue. 
 RPTOPERBUY comprises the related-party transactions in the operating purchases 
category (per Table 3.3) scaled by company operating revenue. That is, 
RPTOPERBUY = Total Operating Purchases / Total Operating Revenue. 
 
DIVPS is the dividend per ordinary A-share. 
DIVCOV is the dividend cover. It is earnings per share divided by dividend per share. 
FCFE is the free cash flow for equity for the 2010 year scaled by company operating 
revenue. It is computed as follows: ((net profit + non-cash charges) – working capital – 
capital expenditure – borrowing costs + debt raised) / operating revenue. 
VOTECASHDIFF is the difference between direct and indirect (through subsidiaries) 
voting rights and direct and indirect cash rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
EMOLEXEC comprises the total emoluments of the top three company executives 
EMOLDIR comprises the total emoluments of all main board directors 
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BRDSHOLD is the percentage of A-shares of the company held in aggregate by all 
main board directors 
BRDINDEP comprises the number of directors specified as meeting independence 
criteria of the CSRC as a percentage of total directors 
SUPSHOLD is the percentage of A-shares of the company held in aggregate by all 
members of the supervisory board 
CEOPATHDEP is an index of the potential path dependence of the CEO on the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. It is computed as follows: 
 
CEO’s Path Dependency Factors: High Low 
 
CEO’s term of appointment 5 years or more Less than 5 years 
 
CEO’s source of progression to position Internal  External 
 
CEO’s age Over 57 57 and Under 
 
Scoring: 1 points for each High; 0 points for 
each Low 
Max: 3 points Min: 0 points 
 
CHAIRPATHDEP is an index of the potential path dependence of the Chair of the 
Board on the ultimate controlling shareholder. It is computed as follows: 
 
Chair’s Path Dependency Factors: High Low 
Chair’s term of appointment 3 years or more 
 
Less than 3 years 
Chair’s source of progression to position Internal  
 
External 
Chair’s age Over 57 57 and Under 
 
 
Scoring: 1 points for each High; 0 points for 
each Low 
 
Max: 3 points 
 
Min: 0 points 
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Note: further explanation and justification of the items contained in the 
indexes for CEOPATHDEP and CHAIRPATHDEP is given in the next 
chapter on pp.146-147. 
 
CADREENTRPR is an ultimate controlling shareholder who is a Chinese citizen and is 
a current and/or former cadre in the CPC. 
BLOCKHOLD is the percentage shares held in aggregate by the top 2 to10 shareholders 
in the company. It represents the extent of blockholder concentration beyond the 
ultimate controlling shareholder.  
STATEDUMMY is scored as 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a State-based 
enterprise or legal person or a State-based non-enterprise bureaucratic institution (e.g, 
ministry, bureau or other government bureaucracy); 0 if the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is a non-State 
ASSETSLN is the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm. It is a proxy measure of 
firm size. 
BKTOMKT is the ratio of book value of total assets at year-end to the share-market 
capitalisation of the company at year-end. It is a proxy measure of firm growth outlook. 
 
The propping explanatory model and definitions of its variables is specified as follows: 
RPTPROP = α + β1PRIORLOSS + β2ROE + β3ROETHRESH + 
β4NONTRADESH + β5OWNDIRECT + β6EMOLEXEC + β7EMOLDIR 
+ β8BRDSHOLD + β9BRDINDEP + β10SUPSHOLD + 
β11CADREENTRPR +β12CEOPATHDEP + β13CHAIRPATHDEP + 
β14BLOCKHOLD + β15STATEDUMMY +β16ASSETSLN + 
β17BKTOMKT + ɛ         ... (5) 
 
Where  
RPTPROP is defined as two separate measures as follows: 
 RPTINVSELL comprises the related-party transactions in the investing seller 
category (per Table 3.3) scaled by company operating revenue.  That is, 
RPTINVSELL = Total Sales of Investment Assets to Related-Parties / Total 
Operating Revenue.   
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 RPTFINBUY comprises the related-party transactions in the financing buyer 
category (per Table 3.3) scaled by company operating revenue.  That is, 
RPTFINBUY = Total Loans and Guarantees given to Related-Parties / Total 
Operating Revenue.   
 
OWNDIRECT is the percentage of total voting rights (i.e., control) held directly by the 
ultimate shareholder in the issued A-shares of the company. 
ROE is the diluted return of equity (i.e., net profit to average annual total shareholders’ 
funds, adjusted for options and convertible preference shares) 
ROETHRESH is a measure of diluted return on equity dichotomized into those close to 
but above the CSRC’s threshold trigger of 8% (ie. 8% to 11%), and all  other ratios.  
PRIORLOSS is the dichotomization of net income into net profit and net loss prior year. 
NONTRADESH is the proportion of non-tradable A-shares held by the State-based 
shareholders to total issues A-shares. 
All other variables in model (5) were previously defined in model (4). 
 
Finally, the combined explanatory model for all prejudicial RPTs is specified as 
follows: 
 
TOTALRPT = α + β1DIVPS + β2DIVCOV + β3FCFE + β4VOTECASHDIFF + 
β5PRIORLOSS + β6ROE + β7ROETHRESH + β8NONTRADESH + β9OWNDIRECT + 
β10EMOLEXEC + β11EMOLDIR + β12BRDSHOLD + β13BRDINDEP + 
β14SUPSHOLD + β15CADREENTRPR + β16CEOPATHDEP + β17CHAIRPATHDEP + 
β18BLOCKHOLD + β19STATEDUMMY +β20ASSETSLN + β21BOOKTOMKT + ɛ                   
... (6) 
 
Where  
TOTALRPT comprises all RPTs in which the controlled company is the seller plus all 
RPTs in which the controlling company is the buyer (as listed in Table 3.3 under 
operating, investing and financial categories).  
All other variables are previously defined in models (4) and (5). 
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5.4. Use of quantitative Methods and Secondary Data 
The research approach in this study will involve the use of quantitative methods based 
on cross-sectional analysis mainly through multiple regression models using secondary 
data. This quantitative analysis is applied to model (4), (5) and (6) above, which test the 
hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. Each hypothesis is worded in terms of 
quantifiable relationships that can be observed for the sample of companies when 
analysed as a whole. The reliance on secondary data in this study is justified because the 
reported corporate accounting numbers and corporate governance statistics, as well as 
stock market statistics, are subject to corporate reporting standards and stock market 
requirements in China that follow international norms (Liu et al. 2009). This study does 
not rely on other secondary data that companies disclose on a voluntary basis because 
voluntary disclosures tend to be minimal in Chinese listed companies and could be less 
reliable than data from regulated reporting.  
 
Further in-depth understanding of practices and decision-processes at the firm level 
using qualitative methods such as case-based interviews and observations has not been 
feasible for this study. The topics of expropriation of minority shareholders rights, the 
motives of the ultimate shareholder for propping-up of earnings or cash flows and the 
lack of independence of directors or executives from the controlling shareholders are 
highly sensitive matters. This makes it highly problematic for the researcher to obtain 
access to potential participants from the board, executive management or a 
spokesperson of the state controlling shareholder of listed companies. Such inability to 
obtain interviews on the sensitive topic of prejudicial related-party transactions is 
reflected in prior studies. Prior empirical studies undertaken in China and other 
countries on Tunneling and propping activities have been limited to secondary data and 
quantitative analysis only. As commented by Chen, Firth, Xin and Xu (2008), 
researchers can only rely on published accounting numbers and stock returns when 
investigating controlling shareholders’ transfers in China because it is too difficult to 
obtain access to powerful state shareholders and their representatives on the board and 
to internal company documents for the purpose of conducting qualitative research on 
this topic. Therefore, in this thesis it has been decided that attempts to gain approval for 
access to directors, supervisors or top executives of a few large listed companies in 
China would most likely be unsuccessful due to the sensitive nature of the research 
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topic. Even if interviews could be achieved, the probability of obtaining limited and 
biased information would be high. 
 
It is notable that secondary data analysis is used widely in corporate governance 
research. Nevertheless, both advantages and disadvantages of using secondary data for 
quantitative analysis have been identified. Some of the major advantages are outlined.  
First, concerning larger sample size, Devine (2003) argues that availability of secondary 
data can provide access to larger sample size as compared to primary data. Further, 
Devine (2003) contends that statistical analysis is much more straightforward in larger 
samples as compared to smaller samples collected by primary data collection.  Second, 
regarding economical collection process, Boslaugh (2007) identifies economy as one of 
the major advantages of using secondary data for statistical analysis since the data is 
publicly available in electronic format. Third in relation to the scope for new research, 
Devine (2003) recognises intellectual advancement as one of the major advantages of 
secondary data analysis. She argues that since the researcher has not collected data for 
any specific purpose, analysing data from different perspectives can discover new 
relationships between variables and help in creating new knowledge.  Finally secondary 
data allows greater breadth of analysis.  It is useful in conducting cross cultural and time 
series analysis research because of easier availability of data (Devine 2003). 
 
Disadvantages of secondary data analysis relate to purpose, data quality and sampling 
error probability.  First, Boslaugh (2007) argues that existing secondary data sources do 
not usually collect data to answer specific research questions. Moreover, unavailability 
of specific items of secondary data may force the researcher to cut out part of his or her 
research model or objectives. Second, unreliable secondary data sources may provide 
wrong, incomplete, obsolete information which may reduce the credibility of research 
findings. Third, sampling error probability. The probability of selecting an 
unrepresentative sample for secondary data analysis can cause sampling error. The 
sampling error issue is equally problematic in primary data collection as well. 
 
To mitigate the impacts of drawbacks mentioned above, thorough care has been taken in 
selecting from an internationally accepted data source and making sure that the sample 
is highly representative of the population, as explained in the next sections. 
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5.5. Data Source  
For this study, secondary data is drawn from the China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database of companies listed on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges. This database contains 24 datasets on Chinese stock market, 
corporation and financial information data. It claims to conduct rigorous verification 
tests to ensure the accuracy of data and applies data design techniques compatible with 
international standards. It is subscribed to globally by more than 600 institutions 
including leading universities in many countries, such as Harvard University and Yale 
University.  
 
The CSMAR database contains data on all listed A-share companies publicly disclosed 
since 1999. Data beyond the year 2010 was found to be incomplete in the CSMAR 
database as at the end of 2012 when data extraction was largely finalised for this study. 
In 2010, the CSMAR database contained a full census of 2,215 listed companies across 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. The CSMAR facility is divided into eight 
separate databases. These databases are titled as follows: 
 
i. China Listed Firm’s Dividends (Cash and Stock) Research Database 
ii. China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance Research Database 
iii. China Stock Market Financial Ratios Database 
iv. China Stock Market Financial Statements Database 
v. China Stock Market Equity Division Reform 
vi. China Listed Firm’s Shareholders Research Database 
vii. China Stock Special Treatment and Particular Transfer Research Database 
viii. China Listed Firm’s Related-Party Translations (RPT) Research Database. 
 
In this study, all eight above databases are accessed to different degrees. The first 
database contains dividend distribution data, from which the dividend payout ratio and 
dividend cover is extracted. The second database contains corporate governance 
information on directors, supervisors and management and changes of directors and 
general managers. It also contains the annual emoluments and number of shares held by 
directors, supervisors and top executives. It further gives data on independence of 
directors. Most of this corporate governance data is extracted for this study. The third 
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database provides a wide range of financial ratios calculated from financial statement 
and market data. This study extracts ROE, EPS, book-to-market and free cash flow 
ratios. The fourth database contains data from companies’ financial statements divided 
into the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows. This study 
extracts data on total assets, total liabilities, total equity, accounts receivable and 
payable, net profit, operating revenue, and operating expenses. The fifth database 
contains financial, distribution and shareholders’ equity data before and after equity 
division reforms. This study extracts data on the proportion of non-negotiable (or 
restricted) A-shares, and the percentage ownership by state institutions and state legal 
persons. The sixth database relates to shareholders’ profiles, capital structure and equity 
chains. This study uses data on the profile of type of controlling shareholders, 
percentage ownership of direct controlling shareholders, the ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s percentage control and voting-to-cash-flow-rights, and ownership 
percentage of the top-10 blockholders. The seventh database comprises information on 
the profile of companies, the change in capital structure and their change in trading 
status. This study did not need to use this database because relevant data items were 
repeated amongst the other databases. Finally, CSMAR contains an eighth database 
devoted to RPT-related information on transactions, related companies and capital 
transfers. In this study a considerable number of items are extracted, including RPT 
sales, RPT expenses, total RPTs receivable and payable, total capital RPTs, and the 
coded transaction types of RPTs. 
 
Apart from the CSMAR suite of databases, the only other source of data in this study is 
the CSRC’s Industry Classification Code. This industry classification system for public 
listed companies is referenced in this study for the purpose of distinguish between 
companies in financial and non-financial industries. 
 
 
5.6. Sampling  
Data is sampled from the CSMAR database for all companies in the year 2010. The 
single year of 2010 is chosen because it is the most current year of complete data and 
2010 is a relatively normal year in securities markets in China following the more 
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volatile years of the Global financial crisis (GFC). The years 2008-2009 are recognised 
as the period of the GFC. During these years, the central government and local 
governments in China intervened to inject stimulus funding that boosted many business 
corporations. As explained by McKissack and Xu (2011), an RMB 4 trillion stimulus 
package was announced by the central government in China in November 2008. On 
these IMF estimates, China's stimulus was the third largest package implemented by 
any country. In China's centrally planned, investment-orientated economy, investment 
was seen as the most direct and effective method of stimulating business activity. The 
central government directly funded around 30 per cent of the stimulus package. The 
remainder of the fiscal stimulus was funded through borrowing by local governments. 
While local governments are prevented by central government legislation from 
borrowing directly, they were able to set up local government financing vehicles 
(LGFVs). LGFVs are local government-owned entities that are typically provided with 
land as an asset. Using the land as collateral, LGFVs obtain loans from banks to finance 
infrastructure projects. This mechanism is estimated to have funded the majority of the 
RMB 2.8 trillion local government part of the stimulus package (McKissack and Xu 
2011). Since local governments and other State-based entities related to local 
governments make up a significant proportion of the ultimate shareholders of listed 
companies in China, this stimulus funding would have been a major mitigating factor in 
Tunneling or propping activities during 2008-2009. Therefore it was decided to exclude 
these two years from data collection and to not proceed with a panel data analysis study. 
Instead, a cross-sectional data analysis was chosen, using the year 2010, a year in which 
this stimulus package was much less evident.  
 
As mentioned, the CSMAR database contained 2,215 listed companies across the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 2010. A full census of companies is used 
for the sampling frame, with the following exclusions: 
 
i. Cross-listed companies are excluded because these companies’ access 
international financial markets. They are therefore subject to different legal 
and stock market rules compared with the firms listed only on Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges.  45 companies with shares listed in overseas 
ie.H shares were subsequently removed from the sample.  
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ii. Industry type is considered using CSRC’s industry website. Companies 
categorized as belonging to banking, securities and futures, financial trust, 
and insurance industries, totalling 38 companies, are excluded from the 
sample.  For these companies, the cash flows to financial service cannot be 
easy to predicted, and the way the company should be capitalized is under 
different regulations than other companies.  
iii. Companies that did not report any related-party transactions are excluded. 
These companies have not activated any process to facilitate Tunneling or 
propping activities, so are not relevant to this study. A total of 165 
companies have reported no RPT data at all.  
After taking account of these three categories of excluded companies, the final sample 
is 1,967.  
 
5.7. Scope of Equity Capital of Companies Considered in the Sample 
In terms of the nature of equity capital issued by companies in the sample, every 
company has tradable A-shares.   In addition some companies issue other classes of 
shares including B- shares and H-shares.  This means that there are different recognised 
sets of shareholders in listed companies in China. This study only extracts equity data 
for A-shares and B-shares. Tradable A-shares are traded by mainland residence only, 
and B-shares are traded by foreign investors including investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao, Taiwan and abroad.  
 
Historically the corporatized State-owned enterprises were established as listed 
companies with non-tradable A-shares. This would make some of the conditions for the 
emergence of a market for ownership control more restrictive for larger listed 
companies than smaller (non-State-owner) companies. As shown in Table 4.1, various 
share ownership types were created in the Chinese share ownership reform in 2006.   
Amongst them, State-owned shares and State legal person shares have a commonality of 
State-based ownership and A-share.  Hence, State shares and State-owned legal person 
shares are combined into one category, the so-called “State-owned shares”.  
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Table 5.1. Capital Structure of Sampled Companies 
 
Field Name Explanation 
Type of shareholder 
State-owned shares  Shares held by governmental agencies or institutions, 
which are authorized to invest on behalf of the state, 
including state shares and state-owned legal person 
shares. 
Legal Person Shares Shares held by companies or organizations that invest as 
legal person. 
Domestic Promoter’s legal 
person shares 
Shares held by Chinese promoters who converted capital 
invested in their own company to shares during the 
company’s initial public offering. 
Foreign Promoter’s Legal 
Person Shares 
Shares held by promoters to who laws governing foreign 
investment is applicable (eg. Foreign investors, investors 
from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan). 
Raised Legal Person 
Shares 
Shares issued by companies raising funds from targeted 
sources before the implementation of the “Corporate 
Law”, which are formed from the external capital 
investment by other social enterprises. 
Employee Shares Shares purchased by individual staff members of a 
company with their own legitimate personal fund.  These 
are shares issued before the promulgation of the 
“Corporate Laws’. 
Type of issued share 
 
A-share Ordinary shares freely traded in (Chinese Yuan) CNY in 
the Chinese stock markets, available for purchase and 
sale by the mainland residents. 
B-share Foreign investment shares listed at the Chinese stock 
markets.  The face value of such shares is in CNY, but 
subscription and trade are conducted in foreign 
currencies.  These shares are especially offered to 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and abroad. 
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H-share Shares issued by companies registered in China but listed 
and traded at the stock exchange in Hong Kong.  Such 
companies, under approval, list their shares in Hong 
Kong to raise capital from specific or non-specific 
investors. 
Other Overseas Negotiable 
Shares 
Other shares traded overseas (except Hong Kong), 
referring to those issued to specific or non-specific 
overseas investors by listed company under approval.  
Other Promoters’ Shares The promoters’ shares other than state-owned shares and 
legal person promoters’ shares. 
 
Source: CSMAR Database User Guide ‘GTA_HLD-2012’, Section ‘Capital Structure’, 
pp.26-28.  
 
This categorisation of capital structure in Table 5.1 is relevant to this study because, as 
found by Chen et al. (2011), the characteristics of ownership structure affect the 
corporate governance of firms in China. 
 
5.8. Data Checking, Dealing with Missing Data and Normalisation 
The final sample of 1,967 companies in the CSMAR database was found to have 
missing data for several variables, especially amongst smaller listed companies. There is 
also evidence of extreme values which could be regarded as outliers. Therefore, “data 
cleaning” has been undertaken to find and treat missing data and outliers in order to 
prepare the data for analysis. First, the treatment of missing data is addressed. The most 
common approach to missing data is to simply omit those cases with missing data and 
to run the analyses on what remains. However, such list-wise deletion would result in a 
substantial decrease in the sample size available for analysis – for example, as much as 
45% in this study due to missing data for the variable ‘supervisory board members’ 
emoluments’. It is argued that missing data should be replaced if its proportion to the 
total is significant (say 5%), otherwise it should be left as omitted data (Allison 2001). 
Replacement of missing data is commonly undertaken by the mean of that item.  In this 
study, where a variable had between 5% and 15% of its data missing, the data has been 
replaced for that variable with the mean of that variable for 10 cases either side of the 
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company (after sorting the sample according to company size in ASSETLN). There 
were three variables where this missing data has been replaced: main board directors’ 
age, free cash flow to equity and dividend per share. A weakness of this approach is it 
tends to keep the mean the same which can lead to an underestimation of error (Allison 
2001). Where a data item had more than 15% of its data missing, effort was made to 
obtain missing data by hand from published annual reports. However, after this attempt, 
missing data remained above 15% and the variable was omitted from the models in this 
study in respect of supervisory board members’ independence, supervisory board 
members’ emoluments and shareholding of institutional shareholders. 
 
Second, outliers have been identified using box-and-wiskers-plots. Where extreme 
outliers have been found for each non-dichotomous variable, the data is eliminated 
(treated as missing data).    
 
Third, after missing data are replaced and outliers removed a heteroskedasticity test has 
been conducted.   Heteroskedasticity implies that the variances (i.e. the dispersion 
around the expected mean of zero) of the residuals are not constant, but that they are 
different for different observations.  The test involves using a scatter plot of the 
residuals for each model.   The models are distinguished by the dependent variables 
used.   
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Figure 5.2. Scatterplot of Dependent Variable:  TOTALRPT 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 is the plot for the standardized predicted variable and the standardized 
residuals.  If there is a strong pattern in this plot, it would indicate the presence of 
misspecification and/or heteroskedasticity.  Since no discernible pattern is evident in 
Figure 5.2, heteroskedasticity is not presented in the model that used the dependent 
variable TOTALRPT.  Similar result for scatterplots were obtained for the residuals of 
the models when RPTOPERSELL, RPTOPERBUY, RPTFINBUY and RPTINVSELL 
are used.  Hence, heteroskedasticity is not a problem in this study.  
 
Fourth, the model’s residual, together with each non-dichotomous variable’s data need 
to be tested for normality.  In relation to the residuals of the models, normality is tested 
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using a P-P plot and an idealised normal curve plotted over a histogram.  The results of 
normality test for the residuals are presented in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.   
 
Figure 5.3. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for TOTALRPT 
model 
 
 
  
TOTALRPTLN 
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The result in Figure 5.3 shows that P-P plot closely follows the trend line, indicating 
strong normality in the model’s residuals.   Further support is given in Figure 5.4.   
 
Figure 5.4. Histogram of Residuals TOTALRPT (transformed by its natural 
logarithm) Model 
 
 
 
The histogram of residuals shown in Figure 5.4 roughly follows the idealised normal 
curve’s shape.  Therefore, normality of the residuals is confirmed.  This exercise is 
repeated for each of the other models where the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of RPTOPERSELL, RPTOPERBUY, RPTFINBUY and RPTINVSELL 
respectively.  Normality of the residuals was established for each model.   
 
Fifth, each dependent and non-dichotomous independent variable’s data needs to be 
tested for normality.  The results of a histogram and idealised normal curve are 
presented in Figure 5.5 for the data (after conversion by natural log) for the primary 
dependent variables TOTALRPT.  Figure 5.5 is shown there is a spike in the bracket 
near the mean, indicating the likelihood of kurtosis.  However, this variable is found to 
have kurtosis = 2.205 which can be viewed as being sufficiently normal.   Balanda and 
MacGillivray (1988) provided the rule-of-thumb that kurtosis should not exceed 3.  
TOTALRPTLN 
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Also skewness = -0.871 which is in the acceptable range 1 to -1.  Further normality tests 
were conducted for distribution of data for TOTALRPT when the sample is split.  
Results showing the histograms are given in Figure 5.6.  Kurtosis and skewness 
statistics reveal that each of the four sub-samples shown in Figure 5.6 falls within the 
acceptable normality range (Balanda and MacGillivray 1988). 
 
Figure 5.5. Histogram of the Variable, TOTALRPT, for Whole Sample 
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Figure 5.6. Histograms of TOTALRPT for Split Sample by Company Size and 
Controlling Ownership Type 
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Similar normality tests were conducted on each of other dependent and independent 
variables.   The raw measures of RPTOPERSELL, RPTOPERBUY, RPTFINBUY, 
RPTINVSELL, ASSETSLN, FCFE and VOTECASHDIFF are all found to have a P-P 
plot that deviates a long way from the trend line.  Data transformation is undertaken to 
convert each of these five dependent variables and three independent variables to their 
natural logarithm.   P-P plots are again run on these converted measures.  All variables 
were found to pass the normality test based on a visually inspection of the P-P plots.  
Further tests using kurtosis and skewness revealed that all variables fell within the 
acceptable normality range for these statistics.    
 
5.9.  Method of Analysis 
This section explains the main method of data analysis that will be used in the next 
chapter, together with important statistical assumptions underlying this analysis.  The 
primary method of analysis for testing the models that have been specified in this 
chapter and that will be used to present the results in Chapter 5 will be ordinary least-
squares (OLS) regression. 
 
Regression assumptions clarify the conditions under which multiple-regression works 
well in terms of providing unbiased and efficient estimates.  The most frequently cited 
assumptions are considered, namely, normality, linearity and error independence. First, 
in terms of normality, the shape of the distribution of each of the continuous variables in 
the multiple-regression is assumed to correspond to a normal distribution. Additionally, 
normality is also expected for the error term, ɛ, in the regression equation. However, if 
the sample is randomly selected and sufficiently large the error term will be normal. A 
variable that violates the assumption of normality due to extreme skewness or kurtosis 
will warrant a transformation of the variable. As explained in section 5.9, normality 
testing was conducted and data transformations were made for three variables. 
 
Second is the linearity assumption which expects that the dependent variable is a linear 
function of the independent variables and random disturbance or error term (ɛ). That is, 
it is assumed that the independent variables in the analysis are related to the dependent 
variable in a linear manner. The best fitting function (as seen in a scatterplot) would 
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resemble a straight line. Scatter plots were run and based on observation of these scatter 
plots, non-linearity was not apparent. 
 
Third is the error independence assumption. This requires that the independent variables 
are unrelated to the random disturbance or error term, ɛ. Violation of this assumption 
can occur when independent variables explicitly measured and put in the model are 
considered to be part of the ɛ term because they are correlated with omitted variables. 
This requires a consideration of any possible omitted variables which could have a 
confounding effect on the regression result obtained for a measured independent 
variable. In order to identify any possible omitted variables that may have a 
confounding effect, the specification of variables used in prior studies on Tunneling and 
propping is surveyed. Obvious possible variables not specified in the models in this 
study which could have a confounding effect, within the scope of theories invoked in 
this study, were not identified in prior studies. 
 
Finally, the issue of multicollinearity (i.e., high correlation between independent 
variables) is more of a ‘condition’ than an assumption.  Tests for the presence of 
multicollinearity in the regression analysis are undertaken in the next chapter.  
 
5.10. Summary 
This chapter has presented the research design and research methods for the study. The 
conceptual framework has depicted the motivating and enabling factors expected to 
determine the extent of prejudicial RPTs. This framework is assembled into two models 
– a Tunneling explanatory model and a propping explanatory model. Variables in each 
of these models have then been defined in detail. Discussion has been given on the 
choice of quantitative methods based on secondary data drawn from the CSMAR 
database of listed companies in China. Census sampling for the year 2010 only has also 
been discussed and justified. The sample size is 1,967 after various exclusions. 
Explanations have been given of the way missing data have been treated. Tests for 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals of the models find that heteroskedasticity is at a 
sufficiently low level. Further, tests of normality of the models’ residuals, as well as 
tests of normality of each of the dependent and non-dichotomous independent variables 
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have been presented. For those variables where normality has not been met, data has 
been transformed using their natural logarithm. 
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1.  Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of descriptive, univariate and multivatiate analysis of 
the data collected on RPTs, as proxies for the phenomena of Tunneling and propping, 
and their determinants. The first section of the chapter gives descriptive statistics as a 
profile of the companies in the sample and their various types of transactions with 
related-parties. Then the chapter proceeds to the main purpose of the data analysis, 
which is to provide tests of the hypotheses as specified in Chapter 4. The bi-variate 
correlation analysis provides preliminary assessment of hypothesised relationships 
between dependent and independent variables. It also provides preliminary assessment 
of the existence of multicollinearity between the independent variables. The regression 
analysis provides the main results of hypotheses tests. It is presented as separate 
regression models for Tunneling alone, propping alone and the combination of both. 
This regression analysis is conducted on the whole sample, as well as split samples that 
test larger versus smaller firms and State-controlled versus non-State controlled firms. 
The regression results are presented in three parts to align them with the sets of 
hypotheses, as follows: (a) results of motivating conditions for Tunneling, (b) results of 
motivating conditions for propping and (c) results of enabling conditions for both 
Tunneling and propping. Further analysis is provided in the last part of the chapter on 
the robustness of the RPT measures of Tunneling and propping, respectively.     
6.2.  Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Companies 
A profile of the companies contained in the sample is given in Table 6.1, Panel A and 
Panel B. In terms of company size, Panel A in Table 6.1 shows a wide range of 
companies is contained in the sample, from a minimum of RMB0.5m to a maximum of 
RMB13,458b in book value of total assets. The average amount of annual total RPTs 
across 1,530 company that reported total RPTs is quite substantial (mean = 
RMB15.21b), although the standard deviation is large (SD = 125.32). A breakdown of 
categories of RPTs shows substantial means in each category: operating transactions 
(mainly sales and purchases of goods and services to and from related parties) averaged 
RMB232.29b (= RMB138.99b + RMB93.30b); investing transactions (i.e., sales of 
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assets and offerings of equity to related parties) averaged RMB60.08b; financing 
transactions (i.e., borrowing and leasing from related parties) averaged RMB23.28b).  
 
Other notable features in Panel A are:  
i. Dividend Cover (i.e., EPS/DPS) of listed companies in China is quite high 
with a mean of 27.09% 
ii. Free Cash Flow to Equity (i.e., cash from operations and investments less 
working capital, capital expenditure and borrowing costs) is a negative 
figure on average (mean = -RMB118.98b), suggesting the existence of many 
high growth firms. 
iii. ROE of listed companies in China averages 13%. 
iv. Voting rights (direct and indirect) of the ultimate controlling shareholder are 
6.5% higher, on average, that cash flow rights.  
v. The proportion of direct voting shares in the company held by the ultimate 
controlling shareholder is 38.92% on average, ranging from 3.5% to 100%. 
vi. The shareholding in the company held by main board members is higher, on 
average, than those held by supervisory board members (1,650 shares 
compared to only 6 shares). 
vii. The average age and term of appointment of the Chair of main board (50 
years and 8.31 years) are greater than the CEO (47 years and 5.13 years). 
Turning to Panel B in Table 1, the features are: 
i. 17.4% of companies reported an ROE in the range at or a bit above the 8% 
threshold of CSRC’s permission to have a rights issue. Also, 11.6% of 
companies reported a net loss in the prior year and would be subjected to the 
CSRC’s ‘special treatment’ designation if the net loss continues. These are 
the most probable groups of companies that would engage in ‘earnings 
management’ or propping. 
ii. A State-based ultimate controlling shareholder exists for 49.4% of listed 
companies in China. 
iii. An entrepreneur (natural person), who is likely to have been a former party 
cadre in a State-owner Enterprise prior to the market reforms in China of the 
1980’s, is the ultimate controlling shareholder in 7% of listed companies in 
China. 
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Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables and Dichotomous Variables 
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Models 
Variable Name Acronym N 
Unit of 
Measure 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Total Assets at book value  ASSETS 1967 RMB Billions 43.81 503.63 0.0005 13458.62 
Book value of total assets to 
market capitalisation 
BKTOMKT 1967 % 0.56 0.25 0.0028 1.32 
Absolute amount of all related-
party transactions 
TOTALRPTS 1530 RMB Billions 15.21 125.32 6.03 361.10 
Operating sell related-party 
transactions 
Total RPT 
Operating Sales 
1948 RMB Billions 138.99 31.74 1.19 231.63 
Operating buy related-party 
transactions 
Total RPT 
Operating 
Purchases 
1954 RMB Billions 93.30 12.37 1.04 475.66 
Investing sell related-party 
transactions 
Sales of investment 
Assets to Related-
parties  
1903 RMB Billions 60.08 14.29 0.0001 444.03 
Financing buy related-party 
transactions 
Loans and 
Guarantees given 
to Related-parties 
1885 RMB Billions 23.28 31.64 0.0051 880.09 
Dividend per share DIVPS 1967 cents 0.16 0.09 0.0000 1.20 
Dividend cover DIVCOV 1967 % 27.09 990.17 1334.75 43634.2 
Free cash flow to equity FCFE 1967 RMB Billions -118.98 147.41 -583.08 161.39 
Difference between control rights 
and cash rights 
VOTECASHDIFF 1967 % 6.50 10.93 0.0000 86.36 
Proportion of direct voting shares 
held by the ultimate shareholder 
OWNDIRECT 1960 % 38.92 18.51 3.50 100.00 
Return on equity ROE 1965 % 0.13 3.25 -43.97 135.33 
Non tradable shares NONTRADESH 1965 No.of shares 
(million) 
0.40 6.72 0.0000 291.98 
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Variable Name Acronym N 
Unit of 
Measure 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Emoluments of the top three 
company executives 
EXECEMOL 1967 RMB 
Billions 
0.015 17.21 0.0000 0.027 
Emoluments of the all main board 
directors 
DIREMOL 1967 RMB Billions 0.013 17.19 0.0000 0.027 
Shares held by main board 
directors 
BRDSHOLD 1967 No.of shares 
(thousand) 
1.65 61.95 0.0000 2.07 
 
 
Proportion of independent directors 
on main Board 
BRDINDEPEN 1967 % 0.33 0.28 0.0000 0.67 
Shares held by the supervisory 
board directors 
SUPSHOLD 1967 No.of shares 
(thousand) 
0.006 0.37 0.0000 0.009 
Age of CEO CEOAGE 1047 Years 47 8.27 26 73 
Term of appointment of CEO CEOTERM 1967 Years 5.13 1.70 0.001 15.34 
Age of Chair of the main Board CHAIRAGE 1032 Years 50 8.40 26 84 
Term of appointment of Chair of 
main Board 
CHAIRTERM 1967 Years 8.31 2.05 .001 15.34 
Proportion of shares held by top 2 
to 10 shareholders 
BLOCKHOLD 1965 % 12.80 13.18 5.35 69.83 
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Panel B - Dichotomous Variables 
Variable name Acronym Frequency 
 
 
0 1 
N % N % 
Return on equity in the range of 
8% to 11% (a bit above CSRC’s 
threshold trigger) = 1; otherwise 0.  
ROETHRESH 1624 82.6 343 17.4 
Net loss in prior year = 1; 
otherwise 0 
PRIORLOSS 1465 88.4 192 11.6 
State ultimate controlling 
shareholder = 1; otherwise 0 
STATEDUMMY 995 50.6 972 49.4 
Cadre entrepreneur as ultimate 
shareholder- natural person over 
age 57 = 1; otherwise 0 
CADRENTRPR 1830 93.0 137 7.0 
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Since the sample in this study is a census of listed companies on the SHSE and SZSE, the 
industry profile given in Table 6.2 is a reflection of the frequency of listed companies within 
industry categories in China. For the purposes of this study, firms are aggregated into five 
industries. By far the highest number of companies is in the engineering, construction and 
manufacturing industry sector (61.5% of the total companies). Industry type is not treated as 
a control variable in this study because of the uneven representation of industry groups in 
the sample. 
 
Table 6.2. Frequencies of Companies in Industry Types 
 
Industry Type Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
Banking, Finance, Insurance  37 1.9 1.9 
Energy, Petroleum and Utilities 133 6.8 8.6 
Engineering, Construction and Manufacturing 1210 61.5 70.2 
Retail, Wholesale and Services 553 28.1 98.3 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 34 1.7 100.0 
Total 1967 100.0  
 
 
Whether State-controlled companies are significantly different than non-State-controlled 
companies in terms of their use of RPTs, their shareholders’ control-cash rights, and their 
governance features, is considered in Table 6.3.  Results in Table 6.3 show a comparison of 
means between companies grouped according to whether the ultimate controlling shareholder 
is a State entity or a Non-State entity or person. The proportionate use of RPTs is 
significantly different for the following variables: 
 
i. RPTOPERSELL is significantly higher on average in State-controlled companies 
compared to non-State-controlled companies. This result suggests that State-
controlled companies have policies and rules that give priority to selling their 
goods and services to related State-controlled companies and/or they have a 
higher propensity for Tunneling. 
ii. VOTECASHDIFF is significantly higher on average in State-controlled 
companies compared to non-State-controlled companies.  This result indicates that 
State-controlled companies obtain greater voting rights through shares they hold 
directly and indirectly in the group economic entity, but receive less cash 
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dividends through these direct and indirect holdings.  Greater voting rights could 
be due to the fact that dual class shares and pyramidal company structures exited 
in State-controlled companies in China until corporate governance reforms in 
2005.  This practice has continued after 2005 (Watanabe 2010). 
iii. BLOCKHOLD is significantly higher on average in non-State-controlled 
companies compared to State-controlled companies.  This result suggests that 
where the ultimate controlling shareholder is a local private company or person or 
a foreign company, there is a greater willingness to accept shareholders with large 
block-holdings. As explained by Du and Xiu (2009, p.49), “private companies do 
not bear policy burdens, assume less historical liability and are subject to less … 
government intervention. Hence, this … will not have a significant influence on 
their choice of (block-holder) ownership concentration.” 
 
Table 6.3 also shows several non-significant results. These include types of RPTs 
(RPTOPERBUY, RPTINVSELL, RPTFINBUY), aspect of cash-control rights (DIVPS, 
DIVCOV), and governance features (BRDINDEP, OWNDIRECT). Hence, there are a lot 
of similarities between State-controlled companies and non- State-controlled companies. 
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Table 6.3. Comparison of Means between State and Non-State Controlled Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statebased 
ultimate 
controlling 
shareholder  
Non-State-
based 
ultimate 
controlling 
shareholder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Acronym Mean Mean t-stat p-value  
(2 tailed) 
 
Types of Related-Party Transactions: 
  
Operating Sell RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTOPERSELL 30.014 17.108 2.650 .008 
Operating Buy RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTOPERBUY 40.312 46.225 -1.106 .269 
Investing Sell RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTINVSELL 6.380 9.918 -1.011 .312 
Financing Buy RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTFINBUY 8.466 12.585 -.310 .757 
Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights:  
  
Dividend Per Share (Cents) DIVPS .158 .161 -.760 .447 
Dividend Cover (times) DIVCOV 4.932 3.846 .759 .448 
Control-Cash Rights Difference (%) VOTECASHDIFF 8.458 4.498 8.191 .000 
Governance Features:   
  
Independent  Directors /Total Directors 
(%) 
BRDINDEP 36.572 36.724 -.894 .371 
Shares held by 2-10 Top Blockholders 
/Total Shares (%) 
BLOCKHOLD 14.357 19.708 -8.360 .000 
Shares held by Ultimate Controlling 
Shareholder/Total Shares (%) 
OWNDIRECT 39.204 39.136 .750 .940 
 
Turning to differences between larger and smaller listed companies, the results in Table 6.4 
show a comparison of means between companies grouped according to the top 20% and the 
bottom 80% on the basis of total assets. Table 6.4 reveals three variables where larger and 
smaller companies are significantly different.  These are: 
i. RPTINVSELL is significantly higher on average for the smaller companies 
compared to larger companies. The inference is that, in order to achieve propping, 
smaller companies rely on selling investment assets to, rather than obtaining loans 
from, related-parties.    
ii. VOTECASHDIFF is significantly higher on average for the larger companies.  
This would be the consequence of larger companies having more complex group 
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structures. These structures can give rise to more divergent paths between the 
ultimate controlling shareholder’s voting rights versus cash rights. 
iii. DIVPS is significantly higher in larger companies. Perhaps this is due to smaller 
companies having higher growth on average and, therefore, retaining more 
earnings rather than distributing dividends. 
iv. OWNDIRECT is significantly higher in larger companies.  The inference is that a 
competitor would need to raise more funding to launch a takeover bid against a 
larger company where the existing ultimate shareholder has high direct ownership.  
This may suggest that the emergence of a market for ownership control would be 
more restrained for larger companies than smaller companies due to higher 
OWNDIRECT.   
v. BRDINDEP is weakly significantly higher for larger companies. This would be 
expected because larger listed companies are likely to face greater scrutiny from 
the CSRC and investors in being seen to meet corporate governance guidelines on 
board composition.   
 
Table 6.4 also shows several non-significant results. These include types of RPTs 
(RPTOPERSELL, RPTOPERBUY, RPTFINBUY), aspect of cash-control rights 
(DIVCOV), and governance features (BLOCKHOLD). Hence, there are several 
similarities between larger companies and smaller companies. 
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Table 6.4. Comparison of Mean between Larger and Smaller Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Larger  
(Top 20% of  
companies) 
Smaller  
(Bottom 80% 
of companies) 
  
 
 
 
Variables Acronym Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Types of Related-Party Transactions:     
Operating Sell RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTOPERSELL 23.700 10.825 .115 .908 
Operating Buy RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTOPERBUY 42.774 56.624 -.569 .569 
Investing Sell RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTINVSELL 2.945 6.635 -1.940 .052 
Financing Buy RPTs /Total RPT (%) RPTFINBUY 8.890 14.606 -1.378 .168 
Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights:     
Dividend per share (Cents) DIVPS .167 .157 1.913 .056 
Dividend cover (%) DIVCOV 3.770 4.518 -.222 .824 
Control-cash rights difference (%) VOTECASHDIFF 6.843 5.232 2.966 .003 
Governance Features:     
Independent directors/Total directors (%) BRDINDEP 37.045 36.471 1.718 .086 
Shares held by 2-10 top blockholders/Total shares (%) BLOCKHOLD 16.364 17.249 -1.110 .267 
Shares held by ultimate controlling shareholder/Total shares (%) OWNDIRECT 42.140 38.369 3.331 .001 
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6.3. Correlation Analysis 
A total of 23 dependent and independent variables is modelled in this study. In order to 
provide clarity to the presentation of bi-variate correlation results between all these 
variables, this section is separated into three sub-sections. Thus, results and discussion 
are given separately for Pearson correlations between the dependent variables, between 
the dependent and independent variables and between the independent variables.  
 
6.3.1. Correlations between dependent variables 
The dependent variables are selected measures of RPTs, as different proxies for the 
extent of Tunneling and propping practiced by firms.  Correlations between these 
dependent variables can reveal whether the concepts and practices purported to be 
represented by these measures are different or similar. The results are given in Table 6.5.  
Table 6.5 first reveals that the highest correlations are between TOTRPT and each of 
the components of TOTRPT. These correlations are all positive and significant which, 
by definition, is expected. The highest correlations with TOTRPT are RPTOPERSELL 
(r = .438**) and RPTOPERBUY (r = .398**). This indicates that operating transactions 
(i.e. sales and purchases of goods and services) between the firm and related parties 
vary more closely with TOTRPTs than investing or financing types of RPTs. Since 
operating RPTs are deemed to be conducive to Tunneling practices, the inference is that 
as a firm’s TOTRPTs get larger, the opportunity for Tunneling increases.     
 
Table 6.5. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Dependent Variables 
  
TOTRPT 
 
RPTOPER-
SELL  
RPTOPER-
BUY  
RPTINV-
SELL  
RPTFIN-
BUY  
TOTRPT r 1     
RPTOPERSELL 
r .438
**
 1    
sig .000     
RPTOPERBUY 
r .398
**
 .080
**
 1   
sig .000 .000    
RPTINVSELL 
r .190
**
 .001 .000 1  
sig .000 .957 .987   
RPTFINBUY 
r .371
**
 .002 .029 .074
**
 1 
sig .000 .934 .203 .002  
 N 1965 1946 1952 1901 1883 
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Second, Table 6.5 reveals that correlations between the separate RPT components are 
either not significant or, if significant, have a relatively low correlation coefficient. The 
only correlations that have significance are: (a) between the Tunneling proxies of 
RPTOPERSELL and RPTOPERBUY (r = .08**) and (b) between the propping proxies 
of RPTINVSEL and RPTFINBUY (r = .074**). The inference is that the separate 
proxies for Tunneling (i.e., RPTOPERSELL and RPTOPERBUY) are not related to the 
separate proxies for propping (i.e., RPTFINBUY and RPTINVSELL). This is a desired 
result because it suggests that the measures of the concept of Tunneling are distinct 
from the measures of the concept of propping. 
6.3.2. Correlations between dependent and independent variables 
 
As a preliminary indication of the hypothesised relationships between the dependent 
variables of Tunneling and propping (as proxied by measures of RPTs) and the various 
independent variables, Pearson correlations are computed and presented in Table 6.6.  
 
Highlights of significant results in Table 6.6 are given under the following sets of 
hypotheses: 
 
(1) Preliminary tests of motivators of Tunneling 
i. DIVPS is significantly negatively correlated to operating RPTs (i.e., the 
Tunneling variables), as well as to TOTRPTs. This result provides preliminary 
support to H1a that when DIVPS is higher, Tunneling will be lower. 
ii. VOTECASHDIFF is significantly positively correlated to operating RPTs (i.e., 
the Tunneling variables), as well as to TOTRPTs. Preliminary support is 
provided to H1d that when VOTECASHDIFF is larger, Tunneling will be higher. 
iii. DIVCOV and FCFE are not significantly correlated to any of the categories of 
RPTs, indicating lack of support for H1b and H1c. 
 
(2) Preliminary tests of motivators of propping 
i. PRIORLOSS is significantly positively correlated to RPTFINBUY (i.e., a 
propping variable), as well as to TOTRPTs. Preliminary support is given to 
H2a that when PRIORLOSS occurs, propping will be higher. 
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ii.  OWNDIRECT is significantly negatively correlated with RPTFINBUY (a 
propping variable) and with TOTALRPTs. This result suggests that when 
direct ownership by the ultimate controlling shareholder is higher, there is 
less incentive for that shareholder to provide low-interest loans or loan 
guarantees to the company in order to prop up its cash assets or earnings. 
High direct ownership acts as a barrier to the potential emergence of a 
market for ownership control, indicating support for H2e. 
iii. ROETHRESH is significantly negatively correlated to TOTRPTs while 
NONTRADESH is significantly positively correlated to TOTRPTs. While 
these correlations are in the expected direction, they are not supportive of 
H2c and H2d because they are not significantly correlated with the propping 
variables RPTINVSELL or RPTFINBUY.  Additionally, ROE is clearly 
uncorrelated with all categories of RPTs, indicating no support for H2b. 
 
(3) Preliminary tests of the enablers of Tunneling and propping 
i. EMOLEXEC is significantly positively correlated to RPTFINBUY (a propping 
variable) and to TOTRPTs. The inference is that executives who are 
remunerated more handsomely will be more motivated to prevent the emergence 
of a market for ownership control for the company.  They would want to 
preserve their current privileges acquired under the existing controlling 
shareholder. Hence, H3a is supported in respect of propping but not Tunneling. 
ii. EMOLDIR is significantly positively correlated to RPTINVSELL (a propping 
variable) and to TOTRPTs. Hence, H3b is supported in respect of propping but 
not Tunneling. This result parallels the result for EMOLEXEC, indicating that 
directors are motivated in a similar way to executives. They will seek to 
preserve their privileges by enabling the practice of propping.  Interestingly, 
directors favour the sale of investment assets to related-parties to achieve 
propping, whereas executives favour borrowing from related-parties to achieve 
propping. 
iii. CADREENTRPR is significantly positively correlated to RPTOPERSELL (a 
Tunneling variable) and to RPTOPERBUY (also a Tunneling variable). This 
result indicates that individuals who held positions of privilege and influence in 
the pre-market transition regime and are now ultimate shareholders, have 
maintained their ability to extract privilege and wealth through the Tunneling of 
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cash to related-parties as part of the company’s operating sales and purchased. 
H4a is supported. 
iv. CEOPATHDEP is significantly positively correlated to RPTFINBUY (a 
propping variable) and to TOTRPTs. This result infers that CEOs who have a 
history of career path dependency on the controlling shareholder will facilitate 
the raising of finance in the form of loans and loan guarantees from related-
parties to achieve propping. They presumably tend to want the company to avoid 
poor liquidity or earnings results which might reflect negatively on the CEO’s 
performance, and so will be supportive of the controlling shareholder’s 
suggestion of loans on favourable terms from related-parties. H4b is supported. 
v. CHAIRPATHDEP is significantly positively correlated to RPTOPERSELL (a 
Tunneling variable), RPTOPERBUY (also a Tunneling variable) and to 
TOTRPTs. This finding suggests that Board Chairs who have a history of career 
path dependency on the controlling shareholder will facilitate Tunneling through 
both operating sales and operating purchases to related-parties. This result is in 
contrast to CEOPATHDEP where propping is found to be facilitated. Perhaps 
path-dependent Board Chairs identify more closely with serving the on-going 
personal interests of the controlling shareholder by ensuring that arrangements 
are put in place to expropriate funds through regular operating transactions 
between the company and its related-parties. H4c is supported.  
vi. BRDSHOLD, SUPSHOLD, BRDINDEPEN and BLOCKHOLD are not 
significantly correlated to any of the categories of RPTs, indicating lack of 
support for H3c, H3d, H3e and H5.  
 
It is restated that only preliminary tests of hypotheses are drawn from these bi-variate 
correlation results. These correlations do not account for the joint effects of the 
independent variables. Multivariate analysis, using regression analysis, can provide a 
much more rigorous method for testing the hypotheses in this study. 
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Table 6.6. Pearson Correlations between Independent and Dependent Variables 
   
T
O
T
R
P
T
 
 
R
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E
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L
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R
P
T
O
P
E
R
-B
U
Y
  
R
P
T
IN
V
S
E
L
L
 
R
P
T
F
IN
B
U
Y
  
DIVPS 
r -.049
*
 -.046
*
 -.038
*
 -.026 -.035 
sig .031 .042 .021 .255 .127 
DIVCOV 
r -.003 -.007 .023 .014 -.012 
sig .884 .758 .317 .549 .596 
FCFE 
r -.005 -.003 -.004 -.006 -.005 
sig .846 .900 .875 .807 .844 
VOTECASHDIFF 
r .078
**
 .052
*
 .070
**
 .020 .025 
sig .000 .012 .000 .376 .281 
PRIORLOSS 
r .060
**
 .015 .019 .014 .049
**
 
sig .002 .109 .450 .563 .000 
ROE 
r .001 .000 .000 .004 .001 
sig .971 .994 .998 .850 .956 
ROETHRESH 
r -.059
**
 .033 .038 .034 .022 
sig .009 .149 .091 .135 .338 
NONTRADESH 
r .050
*
 -.002 .033 -.003 .002 
sig .031 .939 .131 .906 .930 
OWNDIRECT 
r -.052
*
 .016 .078
**
 -.046
*
 -.132
**
 
sig .022 .480 .001 .044 .000 
BRDINDEPEN 
r -.013 .001 -.024 .001 -.001 
sig .308 .962 .286 .970 .971 
EMOLEXEC 
r .086
**
 .022 .039 .039 .194
**
 
sig .000 .331 .083 .095 .000 
EMOLDIR 
r .050
*
 .018 .021 .166
**
 .020 
sig .027 .421 .349 .000 .389 
BRDSHOLD 
r .025 .011 .019 .010 .015 
sig .267 .634 .405 .662 .507 
SUPSHOLD 
r -.016 -.007 -.012 -.007 -.011 
sig .471 .755 .602 .747 .646 
CADREENTRPR 
r .036 .091
**
 -.052* .004 .018 
sig .169 .000 .024 .868 .451 
CEOPATHDEP 
r .081
**
 .016 .031 -.022 .118
**
 
sig .010 .487 .173 .343 .000 
CHAIRPATHDEP 
r .053
*
 .071
**
 .076
**
 .039 .001 
sig .018 .002 .001 .087 .975 
BLOCKHOLD 
r -.028 .020 -.017 .001 -.001 
sig .331 .388 .453 .980 .954 
 N 1965 1946 1952 1901 1883 
 
**. Correlation (r) is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation (r) is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.3.3. Correlations between independent variables 
 
Finally, correlations between the independent variables are given in Table 6.7. This 
table shows that only one correlation coefficient exceeds the suggested rule-of-thumb 
cut-off of 0.7 (Pallant 2007). The correlation between the two independence variables, 
EMOLEXEC and EMOLDIR is 0.897 (0.000).  In this particular case, a possible 
problem of multicollinearity could exist. All other correlations in Table 6.7 are below 
0.07, indicating that a multicollinearity problem in subsequent regression analysis is 
unlikely.  This is a preliminary indication of the extent of multicollinearity in the 
models developed in this study.   
 
Amongst the independent variables that represent motivating conditions for Tunneling, 
VOTECASHDIFF has the highest number for significant correlation.  Alternatively the 
PRIORLOSS is the independent variable that has the most significant correlation with 
other variables representing motivating conditions for propping.  In relation to the 
independent variables that represent enabling mechanisms for both Tunneling and 
propping, there are a large number of significant correlations. Of the nine independent 
variables in this category, CADREENTRPR and CHAIRPATHDEP have six significant 
correlations whereas SUPSHOLD, BRDSHOLD, BRDINDEPEN and BLOCKHOLD 
have five significant correlations.  However, as mentioned, the only high correlation is 
between EMOLEXEC and EMOLDIR.    
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Table 6.7. Pearson Correlations between All Independent Variables. 
  
DIVPS DIVCO
V 
FCFE VOTEC
ASHDI
FF  
PRIOR
LOSS 
ROE ROETH
RESH 
NONT
RADES
H 
OWND
IRECT 
BRDIN
DEPEN 
EMOL
EXEC 
EMOL
DIR  
BRDSH
OLD 
SUPSH
OLD  
CADRE
ENTRPR 
CEOPAT
HDEP 
CHAIRP
ATHDEP 
BLOCK
HOLD 
Motivati
ng 
Conditio
ns for 
Tunneli
ng 
DIVPS 1                                
                                 
DIVCOV .199** 1                              
(.000)                                
FCFE .058* .033 1                
(.010) (.139)                 
VOTECA
SH-DIFF 
-.207 -.069** -.059* 1                           
(.000) (.002) (.036)                             
Motivati
ng 
Conditio
ns for 
Proppin
g 
PRIORLO
SS 
.177** .040 .105** .006 1              
(.000) (.104) (.000) (.799)               
ROE -.013 .000 -.052* -.002 .047 1                        
(.564) (.988) (.022) (.921) (.056)                          
ROETHR
ESH 
.139** .085** .020 .033 -.126** .053* 1                      
(.000) (.000) (.370) (.144) (.000) (.018)                        
NONTRA
DESH 
.020 .088** .005 .008 .019 .000 .031 1                    
(.377) (.000) (.818) (.711) (.445) (.989) (.165)                      
OWNDIR
ECT 
-.033 .185** .048* .344** .098** -.027 .118** -.014 1                  
(.149) (.000) (.035) (.000) (.000) (.236) (.000) (.549)                    
Enabling 
Mechanis
ms for 
Tunnelin
g & 
Propping 
BRDINDE
PEN 
-.075 -.092** -.039 .051* -.054* .016 -.032 -.043 -.011 1                
(.001) (.000) (.086) (.025) (.028) (.469) (.151) (.056) (.634)                  
EMOLEX
EC 
.132** .102** .042 -.039 .123** .000 .279** .073** -.084** -.010 1              
(.000) (.000) (.063) (.081) (.000) (.997) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.643)                
EMOLDI
R 
.149** .109** .039 -.035 .110** .002 .270** .169** -.085** -.099** .897** 1            
(.000) (.000) (.081) (.124) (.000) (.931) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)              
BRDSHO
LD 
.051* .083** .016 -.033 .046 .000 .070** .046* .070** -.186** .018 .067** 1          
(.025) (.000) (.466) (.143) (.063) (.997) (.002) (.039) (.002) (.000) (.436) (.003)            
SUPSHOL
D 
.054* .087** .008 -.036 .043 -.001 .061** .052* .017 -.092** -.001 .027 .249** 1        
(.016) (.000) (.720) (.107) (.081) (.964) (.006) (.022) (.458) (.000) (.961) (.229) (.000)          
CADREE
NTRPR 
.051* .019 -.014 .123** .035 .024 .014 -.032 .101** -.223** -.123** -.047* .198** .114** 1    
(.025) (.398) (.546) (.000) (.161) (.294) (.552) (.165) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.040) (.000) (.000)     
CEOPAT
HDEP  
.019 -.129** .006 .007 -.036 -.024 -.035 -.033 -.115** .051* .019 .023 -.036 -.062** -.094** 1     
(.412) (.000) (.776) (.756) (.140) (.286) (.120) (.144) (.000) (.023) (.411) (.300) (.114) (.006) (.000)       
CHAIRPA
THDEP 
.004 -.086** .011 .027 -.007 -.016 -.003 -.030 -.110
** .044 .054* .022 -.087** -.048* -.073** .344
** 1   
(.870) (.000) (.640) (.237) (.776) (.487) (.886) (.182) (.000) (.052) (.017) (.320) (.000) (.033) (.001) (.000)     
BLOCKH
OLD  
.123** .091** -.001 -.207** .037 -.022 .082** .023 -.264** -.082** .032 .041 .085** .110** .145 -.088** -.051* 1 
(.000) (.000) (.954) (.000) (.129) (.331) (.000) (.305) (.000) (.000) (.158) (.067) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.024)   
 N 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1963 1963 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 
Note: Figures show the correlation coefficient and significance in parenthesis. **Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6.8 provides multicollinearity tests for the combined model.  It shows that the 
variable inflation factor (VIF) and the tolerance are within acceptable levels. As a rule 
of thumb, if any of the VIF are greater than 10 (greater than 5 to be very conservative) 
there is a multicollinearity problem (Ethington 2012).  In Table 6.8, all the VIF results 
are below 10, but two results are above 5. These are EMOLEXEC and EMOLDIR 
which were anticipate in the previous sections because they are highly correlated with 
each other.  VIF results for the separate Tunneling and propping models (not shown 
here) are all found below 5.  Therefore multicollinearity is unlikely to have an effect on 
the regression results. 
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Table 6.8. Collinearity Diagnostics Test for the Independent Variables Based on 
the TOTRPT Model 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
DIVPS 1.128 .886 
DIVCOV 1.009 .991 
FCFE 1.005 .995 
VOTERCASHDIFF 1.098 .911 
PRIOR LOSS 1.097 .912 
ROE 1.013 .987 
ROETHRESH 1.224 .817 
NONTRADESH 1.083 .924 
OWNDIRECT 1.143 .875 
EMOLEXEC 5.933 .169 
EMOLDIR 6.028 .166 
BRDSHOLD 1.061 .942 
BRDINDEPEN 1.078 .928 
SUPSHOLD 1.069 .936 
CADREENTRPR .687 1.455 
CEOPATHDEP 1.093 .915 
CHAIRPATHDEP 1.094 .914 
BLOCKHOLD 1.064 .940 
Mean VIF 1.606 0.870 
144 
 
6.4. Regression Results for Determinants of Prejudicial RPTs  
 
The results of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions are presented in Tables 6.9 to 
6.11 in this section. Each table contains five regressions as tests of the determinants of 
Tunneling only (two regressions on operating RPTs), propping only (a regression on 
investing RPTs and a regression on financing RPTs) and Tunneling and propping 
combined (a regression on total RPTs). Table 6.9 presents results for the whole sample. 
Table 6.10 presents split sample results for companies with a State versus Non-State 
based ultimate controlling shareholder, whereas Table 6.11 presents split sample results 
for larger companies versus smaller companies.  
 
6.4.1.  Whole of sample results - Tunneling, propping and combined models 
  
Table 6.9 shows that the explanatory power of the combined Tunneling and propping 
model for the whole sample is Adjusted R
2
 = .129. This suggests that approximately 
12.9% of total RPTs of listed companies, on average, in China in 2010 were prejudicial 
in nature towards minority shareholders. The model in Table 6.9 with the strongest 
explanatory power is the Tunneling model based on ‘operating buy’ RPT transactions; it 
has an adjusted R
2
 = .285. In contrast, the model in Table 6.9 with the weakest 
explanatory power is the propping model based on ‘investing sell’ RPT transactions (R2 
= .070).  
 
Significant relationships in these five regressions in Table 6.9 are now highlighted and 
discussed, in turn, in respect of Tunneling motivators, propping motivators and enabling 
mechanisms. 
 
First, the significant motivating condition for Tunneling is revealed as 
VOTECASHDIFF (i.e., the extent to which the ultimate controlling shareholders direct 
and indirect voting rights is greater than cash flow rights from the company) – sig. 
= .011). This result provides clear evidence in support of Bebchuk’s rent protection 
theory of ownership control. Further evidence in support of this rent protection theory, 
as well as Tang et al.’s (2007) differential dividend yields argument, is show in the 
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significant inverse relationship of DIVPS (i.e., dividends per share) to Tunneling as 
reflected in both ‘operating sell’ (sig. = .042) and ‘operating buy’ (sig. = .006) RPTs. 
That is, the lower the cash flow received through legitimate means (i.e., dividends), the 
greater is the motive of the ultimate controlling shareholder to engage in Tunneling. 
H1a and H1d are supported. The inference is that the ultimate controlling shareholder is 
motivated to achieve Tunneling of cash out of the company to related parties when that 
controlling shareholder’s voting power is greater than its legitimate cash flows. 
Legitimate cash flows are seen to be predominantly provided by way of dividends, 
because DIVPS is found to be significantly related to operating RPTs.  
 
Other measures of cash flow conditions that could be motivators for Tunneling, namely 
DIVCOV and FCFE, are found in Table 6.9 to be non-significant. Hence, H1b and H1c 
are rejected. Interestingly, these two measures are less direct and specific measures of 
the voting power and/or cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder, as 
postulated under Bebchuk’s rent-protection theory. The inference is that only direct and 
specific measures of voting and cash flow rights trigger the ultimate controlling 
shareholder to pursue Tunneling.  
 
Second, the significant positive motivating condition for propping is found in Table 6.9 
to be PRIORLOSS (i.e., the reporting of a net loss in 2009), sig. = .043 for the combine 
model and sig. = .016 for RPTFINBUY in the propping model. H2a is supported. Hence, 
the avoidance of the CSRC’s ‘special status’ penalty if a net loss is reported in two 
consecutive years, is found to be the primary motivator for propping. This ‘special 
status’ designation imposed on a company would provide a signal to the market that 
could lead to the emergence of a market for ownership control for that company. This 
significant positive result PRIORLOSS, therefore, provides support for Jensen and 
Ruback’s (1983) theory.  
 
Among the other conditions that motivate propping are the offsetting effects of 
NONTRADESH (i.e., non-tradable shares held) and OWNDIRECT (i.e., the proportion 
of shares directly held by the ultimate controlling shareholder). Both these conditions 
are found to be weakly significantly inversely related to total RPTs – NONTRADESH 
sig. = .101 and OWNDIRECT sig. = .074. These results suggest that the emergence of a 
market for ownership control is less of a threat when the ultimate controlling 
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shareholder has a higher buffer by holding non-tradable voting shares, as well as 
holding a higher proportion of direct ownership in the company. H2d and H2e are 
supported. 
 
In terms of ROE and ROETHRESH, two further conditions that are hypothesised as 
motivators for propping, it is found in Table 6.9 that they have no significant 
relationship to RPTs. Hence, H2b and H2c are rejected. The CSRC’s requirement that 
firms must report an ROE above 8% in the prior year in order to get permission to make 
a new rights issue, may well be important to the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
However, the practice of ultimate controlling shareholders using their own funds or 
those of other related parties to prop up earnings is found to be non-significant, at least 
during a year of relatively ‘normal’ economic conditions. It is speculated that firms in 
China would initially engage in ‘earnings management’ (i.e., using accounting accrual 
methods to inflate reported earnings in a particular year) to prop up their reported ROE 
in the year of making a new rights issue. 
 
Third, the results for eight hypothesised enabling mechanisms for Tunneling and 
propping are shown in Table 6.9. Of these, only two mechanisms are found to be 
significantly related to total RPTs, namely CEOPATHDEP (sig. = .079) and 
CHAIRPATHDEP (sig. = .042). Hence, H4b and H4c are supported. That is, the 
potential path dependence of the CEO and the Chair on the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is found to positively relate to total RPTs. However, Table 6.9 also reveals 
that CEOPATHDEP is a significant enabler of propping only (i.e., financing RPTs show 
sig. = .045) whereas CHAIRPATHDEP is a significant enabler of Tunneling only (i.e., 
operating RPTs for sell shows sig. = .052 and buy shows sig. = .033). This evidence 
supports the aspect of Nee’s (1989) theory of market transition which refers to the 
perpetuation of personal networks, privileges and dependencies among cadres from the 
former centrally planned State enterprises to the current market-driven companies. 
Where the ultimate controlling shareholder is a State-based entity, the company it 
controls is likely to have been historically carved out from that State-based entity. Its 
Chair and CEO are likely to have been cadres in a career path that originated from the 
former State-based entity if they have been internally appointed, are over 57 years old, 
and hold a longer term of appointment.  
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Another aspect of Nee’s theory of market transition is when the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is a CADRENTRPR (i.e., natural person and citizen of China aged over 57). 
These are cadres who were responsible for conducting the re-distribution system and 
have now become entrepreneurs and control a public listed company in China. The 
result in Table 6.9 shows CADRENTRPR is not significantly related to total RPTs, but 
is significantly related to operating RPTs (i.e., RPTOPERSELL has sig. = .064 and 
RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .087). Therefore, H4a is partially supported. 
 
The other mechanisms that could make executives and directors dependent on the 
ultimate controlling shareholder and, thereby, be good be enablers of Tunneling and 
propping, are found to be non-significant. These non-significant mechanisms are the 
level of emoluments of top executives and directors (EMOLEXEC and EMOLDIR), 
and the number of company shares held by directors and supervisors (BRDSHOLD and 
SUPSHOLD). H3a, H3b, H3c and H3e are all rejected.  
 
A final mechanism hypothesised as a restraint on enabling the ultimate controlling 
shareholder to achieve Tunneling and propping transactions is the other blockholders 
(i.e., the largest 2 to 10 shareholders). The result shows no significant effect of the 
BLOCKHOLD on RPTs. Hence, H5 is rejected. 
 
The models in Table 6.9 include some control variables. The result shows that 
STATEDUMMY (i.e., whether or not the ultimate controlling shareholder is a State-
based entity) has a significant effect on elements of Tunneling-oriented RPTs (i.e., 
RPTOPERBUY sig. = .056) and propping-oriented RPTs (i.e., RPTFINBUY sig. 
= .076). This result, together with Nee’s theory that suggests prejudicial RPTs are more 
readily enabled when there is a State-based ultimate controlling shareholder, point to the 
need for a comparison between samples of State and non-State controlling shareholders.  
The final significant control variable in Table 6.9 is ASSETSLN (i.e., a measure of 
company size). It shows that size has a significant effect on Tunneling-oriented RPTs 
(i.e., RPTOPERSELL sig. = .104 and RPTOPERBUY sig. = .003) and an element of 
propping-oriented RPTs (i.e., RPTFINBUY sig. = .004). ASSETSLN also is significant 
in the combine model (sig. = .058). This result suggests the need for a comparison 
between samples of larger and smaller listed companies. 
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Table 6.9. Summary of Results – Whole Sample 
 RPT Categories for Dependent Variables 
Predictor variables Tunneling only Propping only Tunneling & Propping combined 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL RPTFINBUY TOTALRPT 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Tunneling: 
Hypoth-
esis(+/-)* 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
Hypoth-
esis(+/-)* 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
  Sig. 
Hypoth-
esis(+/-)* 
     
     Beta 
     
    Sig. 
DIVPS H1a -   -.054          .042**                            -.065 .006**      H1a - -.048       .067* 
DIVCOV H1b +    .023                .319  .001 .925      H1b +  .003            .909 
 FCFE H1c -    .031                .117 -.024 .131      H1c -  .005            .841 
VOTECASHDIFF     H1d +    .059            .091*  .176 .000***          H1d +      .075        .011*** 
Motivating Conditions for 
Propping: 
 
    
 
    
 
  
PRIORLOSS          H2a +   .034 .175 .062 .016**     H2a +   .054             .043** 
ROE      H2b +   .029              .240 .008 .789 H2b +   .009          .731 
ROETHRESH         H2c -  -.039                .201 .033 .179    H2c -  -.025            .112 
NONTRADESH      H2d +   .038           .184 .043 .126 H2d +   .029        .101* 
OWNDIRECT      H2e - -.017          .554 -.112 .048** H2e -  -.051       .074* 
Enabling Mechanisms 
forTunneling & 
Propping: 
 
    
 
    
 
  
EMOLEXEC H3a +    .042    .231  .032 .359 H3a +   .008 .887 .074 .036** H3a +    .035        .234 
EMOLDIR     H3b +    .077 .129  -.019  .563     H3b+    .022            .698     .036     .520     H3b+ .022              .699 
BRDSHOLD H3c +    .019               .426  .010 .523 H3c +  -.002             .951 .002 .952 H3c +    .010              .715 
BRDINDEPEN H3d - -.007              .801 .000 .989 H3d -   -.005              .836 -.009 .748 H3d -    .046           .126 
SUPSHOLD H3e -   -.005               -.847 -.004 .800 H3e-   .000               .997 .001 .964 H3e -   -.012              .630 
CADREENTRPR H4a +    .085               .064*  .048 .087* H4a+   .043               .160 .011 .720 H4a +    .044               .148 
CEOPATHDEP H4b +    .030          .213  .034 .166 H4b+   .015         .555 .082 .045** H4b +    .050         .079* 
CHAIRPATHDEP H4c +    .071          .052**  .089 .033** H4c+   .011            .672 .041 .151 H4c +    .061            .042** 
BLOCKHOLD H5 -   -.022               .370 -.007 .682 H5 -  -.022             .429    -.030 .272 H5 -   -.025               .357 
Control Variables:              
STATEDUMMY     .041    .179   .068  .056*    .034           .273     .053    .076*  .042               .191 
ASSETSLN     .066   .104*  .096 .003**   .052          .191 .090    .004**     .057          .058* 
BKTOMKT    -.042               .115 -.010 .599  -.034               .343    -.035    .319     .012     .745 
 
Model Summary 
 
R = .243, R2 = .120,  
AdjR2 = .113,  
F = 2.653,sig.= .001 
R = .465, R2 = .285, 
AdjR2 = .241,  
F = 9.176,sig.= .000 
R = .175, R2 = .070, 
AdjR2 = .031,  
F = 2.105, sig.= .062 
R = .237, R2 = .118, 
AdjR2 = .082,  
F = 3.020,sig.= .000 
R = .271, R2 = .129, 
AdjR2 = .117,  
F = 2.407,sig.= .000 
Note: * hypothesis expectations. 
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6.4.1.1 Split sample results for companies with a State versus Non-State ultimate 
controlling shareholder (Table 6.10) 
Table 6.10 is presented in two panels – Panel A for State-based ultimate controlling 
shareholders (n = 972) and Panel B for non-State ultimate controlling shareholders (n = 
995). Focus is on comparing results between these panels. The explanatory power of the 
combined Tunneling and propping model for the State-based sample is Adjusted R
2
 = .176 
and for the non-State sample is Adjusted R
2
 = .023. This result points to the greater 
prevalence of prejudicial RPTs amongst companies that have a State-based ultimate 
controlling shareholder. 
 
From a comparison of Panels A and B in Table 6.10, the specific motivating conditions 
and enabling mechanisms that make State-based companies more likely to undertake 
prejudicial RPTs than non-State-based companies are highlighted as follows: 
 
i. In terms of motivating conditions for Tunneling, DIVPS is found to be 
significant for State-based companies (RPTOPERSELL has sig. = .000 and 
RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .103) as well as non-State-based companies 
(RPTOPERSELL has sig. = .022). The inference is that both State-based and 
non-State-based ultimate controlling shareholders have pre-expectations about 
their rights to annual cash returns from the company and will be more willing 
than non-State ultimate controlling shareholders to channel cash to themselves 
or other State related-parties when dividend payout is deemed to be below 
expectations. This further strengthens support for the acceptance of H1a. 
ii. The other motivating condition for Tunneling found to be significant is 
VOTECASHDIFF. This variable is significant below the level of .05 for both 
State and non-State samples, which is the theory of rent protection.  This infers 
that when there is a greater gap between control and cash flow rights for the 
ultimate controlling shareholders, there will be a higher need for rent protection 
and hence a greater incentive for the ultimate controlling shareholder to 
expropriate cash through Tunneling. Again this result strengthens the evidence 
in support of H1d.    
iii. In terms of motivating conditions for propping, PRIORLOSS is found to be the 
significant factor for both State and non-State samples (RPTFINBUY has sig. 
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= .000 and sig. = .039 respectively). It seems all ultimate controlling 
shareholders are prepared to undertake propping as a means of avoiding the 
CSRC designating of a ‘special treatment’ firm and potentially triggering a 
market for ownership control. Again this evidence adds weight to support of 
H2a.  However, the State sample shows that NONTRADESH appears to act as 
a significant offsetting buffer against the emergence of a market for ownership 
control (RPTFINBUY has sig. = .023). This factor is not available in the non-
State sample.  
iv. In terms of enabling mechanisms, different factors are effective for State 
compared to non-State ultimate controlling shareholders. First, for the State, the 
path dependencies of the CEO and the Chair are significant enablers of 
Tunneling (RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .048 and sig. = .089 respectively).  
CHAIRPATHDEP, but not CEOPATHDEP, is an enabler for propping 
(RPTFINBUY has sig. = .057).  By comparison, the non-State-controlled 
sample shows CEO path dependency is significantly related to Tunneling 
(RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .031) but not propping. On the other hand, 
CHAIRPATHDEP has not significant in the non-State sample. This result lends 
support for Nee’s (1989) theory and for H4b and H4c in State controlled 
companies but not in non-State controlled companies. 
v. A second highlight of the enabling mechanisms is that the existence of a cadre 
entrepreneur as the ultimate controlling shareholder is a significant enabling 
factor for Tunneling in the non-State sample (sig. = .017 for RPTOPERBUY), 
but is not relevant in the State sample. This is further evidence of the effects of 
Nee’s (1989) market transition theory on the practice of Tunneling and supports 
H4a. 
vi. A third feature of enabling factors is that blockholders are found to have a 
significant restraining effect on the enabling of propping in both the State and 
non-State samples alike (The relationship between BLOCKHOLD and 
RPTFINBUY shows sig. = .029 and sig. = .013 respectively). Hence, H5 is 
only supported in respect of propping, not Tunneling. The inference is that 
blockholders are themselves the prospective investors that have an interest in 
becoming the ultimate controlling shareholder and hence seeking an 
opportunity to create a market for ownership control.  Therefore, they would 
151 
 
oppose attempts to prop up the company by the existing ultimate controlling 
shareholder through loans and loan guarantees from related-parties. 
vii. Enabling mechanisms found to be non-significant in both the State and non-
State samples are EMOLEXEC, EMOLDIR, BRDSHOLD and SUPSHOLD. 
These variables were also non-significant in the Whole-sample results above. 
So H3a, H3b, H3c and H3e are all clearly rejected. 
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Table 6.10. Regression Results – State and Non State-Based Controlling Shareholders Samples 
Panel A - State 
Predictor variables RPT Categories for Dependent Variables 
 Tunneling only Propping only 
 
Tunneling & Propping combined 
 
 RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL    RPTFINBUY TOTALRPT 
 
 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Tunneling: 
Hypoth-
esis and 
expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
Hypoth-
esis and 
expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
  Sig. 
Hypothesis and 
expect direction 
     
     Beta 
     
    Sig. 
DIVPS H1a -   -.126          .000**                            -.041 .103*      H1a - -.141       .000*** 
DIVCOV H1b +    .015                .640  .011 .301      H1b +  .047            .213 
 FCFE H1c -    .042                .196 -.029 .181      H1c - -.043            .210 
VOTECASHDIFF     H1d +    .034            .301  .112 .000***         H1d +      .074        .034** 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Propping: 
             
PRIOR LOSS          H2a +   .015              .705 .127    .000***     H2a +   .077             .000*** 
ROE      H2b +   .079              .078* .007 .741 H2b +   .009          .451 
ROETHRESH      H2c +   .023           .542 .024 .363 H2c +   .026        .484 
NONTRADESH         H2d -   .017                .743    -.093 .023**    H2d -  -.094            .032** 
OWNDIRECT      H2e -  -.003         .944 .033 .469 H2e -  -.051       .482 
Enabling Mechan-isms 
forTunneling & 
Propping: 
             
EMOLEXEC H3a +    .037    .583  .002 .765 H3a +   .008 .940 .015 .766 H3a +    .035        .875 
EMOLDIR     H3 b+    .066 .305  -.008  .673     H3 b+    .008            .939     .008     .933     H3 b+ .022              .784 
BRDSHOLD H3c +    .006                  .866  .011 .518 H3c +  -.015             .709 .067 .177 H3c +    .010              .715 
BRDINDEPEN H3d -  .100                .012** .063 .114 H3d -       .057          .157 -.046 .235 H3d -    ..057               .211 
SUPSHOLD H3 e-   -.018               -.596 -.001 .978 H3 e-  -.003               .949 .004 .785 H3 e-   -.012              .995 
CADREENTRPR H4a+    .030                  .350  .001 .945 H4a+   .026               .513 .001 .985 H4a+    .044               .865 
CEOPATHDEP H4 b+    .005          .886  .057 .048** H4 b+   .022         .598 .069 .214 H4 b+    .050         .052** 
CHAIRPATHDEP H4c+    .030           .363  .051 .089* H4c+   .023            .577 .095 .057* H4c+    .066            .064* 
BLOCKHOLD H5 -   -.006               .857 -.007 .466 H5 -  -.063             .186    -.112 .029** H5 -   -.025               .094* 
Control Variables:              
STATEDUMMY     Na     na        na        na         na        na        na        na             na          na    
ASSETSLN     .106   .027**  .086 .050**   .028          .630 .090    .004**     .057          .394 
BKTOMKT    -.073               .321 -.006 .599  -.043               .422    -.035    .319     .012     .474 
 
Model Summary 
 
R = .213, R2 = .027 
AdjR2 = .019,  
F = 1.621,sig.= .039 
R = .865, R2 = .129, 
AdjR2 = .081,  
F = 4.176,sig.= .000 
R = .131, R2 = .017, 
AdjR2 = .004,  
F = 0.809, sig.= .668 
R = .277, R2 = .128, 
AdjR2 = .095,  
F = 3.720,sig.= .000 
R = .445, R2 = .198, 
AdjR2 = .176,  
F = 8.939,sig.= .000 
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Panel B – Non-State  
Predictor variables RPT Categories for Dependent Variables 
 Tunneling only Propping only 
 
Tunneling & Propping combined 
 
 RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL         RPTFINBUY TOTALRPT 
 
 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Tunneling: 
Hypoth-
esis and 
expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
Hypoth-
esis and 
expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
  Sig. 
Hypothesis and 
expect direction 
     
     Beta 
     
    Sig. 
DIVPS H1a -   -.058          .022**                            -.015 .346      H1a - -.056       .045** 
DIVCOV H1b +    .014                .652  .004 .823      H1b +  .017            .515 
 FCFE H1c -    .032                .244 -.022 .162      H1c - -.036            .321 
VOTECASHDIFF     H1d +    .039            .133  .055 .030**         H1d +      .084        .048** 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Propping: 
             
PRIOR LOSS          H2a +   .040              .254 .071 .039**     H2a +   .072             .050** 
ROE      H2b +   .007              .824 .001 .971 H2b +   .029          .261 
ROETHRESH      H2c +   .022           .515    -.005 .872 H2c +   .021        .484 
NONTRADESH           na                   na                   na                  na                        na                      na               
OWNDIRECT      H2e -  -.021         .553 .014 .696 H2e -  -.009       .751 
Enabling Mechan-isms 
forTunneling & 
Propping: 
             
EMOLEXEC H3a +    .039    .568  .033 .257 H3a +   .001 .984 .037 .597 H3a +    .047        .465 
EMOLDIR     H3 b+    .046 .485  -.014  .603     H3 b+    .006            .930     .030     .656     H3 b+ .021              .796 
BRDSHOLD H3c +    .019                  .802  .011 .530 H3c +  -.010             .792 .008 .819 H3c +    .020              .736 
BRDINDEPEN H3d - .002                 .946 -.013 .710 H3d -    .013             .700 -.006 .869 H3d -    .026           .496 
SUPSHOLD H3 e-   -.006               -.893 -.007 .755 H3 e-   .002               .943 .008 .810 H3 e-   -.006              .975 
CADREENTRPR H4a+    .055                  .110  .078 .017** H4a+   .026               .437 .015 .656 H4a+    .088               .033** 
CEOPATHDEP H4 b+    .003          .842  .052 .031** H4 b+   .034         .321 .031 .369 H4 b+    .020         .590 
CHAIRPATHDEP H4c+    .020           .602  .030 .253 H4c+   .025            .470 .035 .300 H4c+    .018            .467 
BLOCKHOLD H5 -   -.006               .659 -.003 .864 H5 -  -.002             .953    -.087 .013** H5 -   -.058               .173 
Control Variables:                                                
STATEDUMMY     . na                . na     na        na               na        na        na        na                 na          na    
ASSETSLN     .042                .196  .026 .119   .059          .259 .074    .156     .057          .394 
BKTOMKT     .034            .301 -.010 .668  -.030               .516    -.057    .211     .012     .474 
 
Model Summary 
 
R = .154, R2 = .024 
AdjR2 = .010,  
F = 1.835,sig.= .002 
R = .198, R2 = .039, 
AdjR2 = .025,  
F = 2.731,sig.= .000 
R = .117, R2 = .014, 
AdjR2 = -.003,  
F = 0.825, sig.= .651 
R = .158, R2 = .025, 
AdjR2 = .009,  
F = 1.526,sig.= .089 
R = .253, R2 = .038, 
AdjR2 = .023,  
F = 1.427,sig.= .002 
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6.4.2. Split sample results for larger versus smaller companies (Table 6.11) 
 
Table 6.11 presents results for a sample of the largest 20% of listed companies (n = 394) in 
Panel A and for the remaining 80% of listed companies (n = 1573) in Panel B. The 
explanatory power of the combined Tunneling and propping model for the larger 
companies sample is Adjusted R
2
 = .074 and for the smaller sample is Adjusted R
2
 = .026. 
This result indicates a greater prevalence of prejudicial RPTs amongst larger companies 
than smaller companies. This would be expected because larger companies will have more 
opportunity than smaller companies for executing RPTs because of more complex group 
structures comprising more subsidiaries and associate companies. 
  
From a comparison of Panels A and B in Table 6.11, the specific motivating conditions 
and enabling mechanisms that are different and similar for larger versus smaller companies 
are highlighted as follows: 
 
i. In terms of motivating conditions for Tunneling, DIVPS is found to be mildly 
significant for larger companies only (RPTOPERSELL has sig. = .022 and 
RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .041). However, the vote-to-cash differential of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder is the most significant motivating factor for 
large and small companies alike (RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .000 for both). 
These VOTERCASHDIFF results confirm the relevance of the rent-protection 
concept as a motivator for Tunneling.   
ii. In terms of motivators for propping, two differences between larger and smaller 
firms are found. First, the ROE threshold is a significant factor for smaller 
companies only (RPTFIN BUY has sig. = .007). This use of financing-type 
RPTs to prop up ROE to keep it at or slightly above 8% is found to be 
important to smaller companies for two possible reasons: they are more 
vulnerable to the emergence of a market for ownership control (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983) than larger companies, or they there is a higher proportion of 
growth companies who seek to expand through new rights issues. The second 
difference shown in Table 6.11 is that non-tradable shares are a significant 
offsetting propping motivator for larger companies only (RPTFINBUY has sig. 
= .039). This could be due to the fact that non-tradable shares held by 
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companies with State-based controlling shareholders remain in existence to a 
greater extent amongst larger listed companies.  A further influence on 
propping is found to be OWNDIRECT.  It is found to be significantly 
negatively related to RPTFINBUY for both large and small companies (sig. 
= .048 and .038 respectively).  When direct ownership by the ultimate 
controlling shareholder is higher, there will be a strong barrier to prospective 
takeover bid and therefore less incentive for propping. 
 
Finally, in terms of enabling mechanisms, two significant factors are identified in table 
6.11. They are:  
 
i. CADREENTRPR (i.e., cadre entrepreneurs who are also the ultimate controlling 
shareholder) have a significant enabling effect in the Tunneling model 
(RPTOPERBUY has sig. = .017 and .032 for larger and smaller companies 
respectively).  There is also evidence of some influence of CADREENTRPR in the 
propping model for larger companies only (sig. = .062).  These results give support 
to Nee’s (1989) theory of market transition.  In the sense that ultimate controlling 
shareholders seek to maintain their power and privilege from the old regime, they 
will want to facilitate prejudicial RPTs for personal gains.   
ii. CHAIRPATHDEP (i.e., the ‘path dependence’ of the Chair on the ultimate 
controlling shareholder) is significantly positively related to Tunneling 
(RPTOPERSELL has sig. = .052 for larger companies, and RPTOPERBUY has sig. 
= .036 for smaller companies).   These results support Nee’s (1989) argument that 
dependency of key management players (i.e., chairs) in State-controlled companies 
has been perpetuated from the old regime.  
iii. Enabling mechanisms found to be non-significant in both the larger and smaller 
companies samples are EMOLEXEC, EMOLDIR, BRDSHOLD, BRDINDEPEN, 
SUPSHOLD, CEOPATHDEP and BLOCKHOLD. These variables were also non-
significant in the Whole-sample results above. So H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d, H3e, H4b 
and H5 are all clearly rejected. 
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Table 6.11. Regression Results – Larger and Smaller Listed Companies Samples 
Panel A - Large (Top 20%) 
Predictor variables RPT Categories for Dependent Variables 
 
Tunneling only Propping only Tunneling & Propping combined 
 RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL RPTFINBUY TOTALRPTs 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Tunneling: 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
  Sig. 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
     
     Beta 
     
    Sig. 
DIVPS H1a -   -.094          .022**                            -.066 .041**      H1a - -.089       .068* 
DIVCOV H1b +    .013                   .511  .001 .931      H1b +  .003            .957 
 FCFE H1c -    .010                   .617 -.027 .137      H1c -     -.037            .474 
VOTERCASHDIFF     H1d +    .019               .174  .155 .000***          H1d +      .123        .027** 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Propping: 
             
PRIOR LOSS          H2a +   .014              .556 .027 .338     H2a +   .012             .811 
ROE      H2b +   .002              .968 .008 .789 H2b +   .004          .946 
ROETHRESH      H2c +  -.022           .678 .023 .326 H2c +   .055        .284 
NONTRADESH         H2d -  -.008                .893 -.093 .039**    H2d -  -.104            .046** 
OWNDIRECT      H2e -  -.010         .857 -.118 .048** H2e -  -.091       .083* 
Enabling Mechan-isms 
forTunneling & 
Propping: 
             
EMOLEXEC H3a +    .044    .204  .018 .571 H3a +   .043 .721 .072 .126 H3a +  -.139        .227 
EMOLDIR     H3 b+    .075 .129  -.033  .305     H3 b+    .022            .853     .036     .520     H3 b+ .019              .985 
BRDSHOLD H3c +    .014                 .358  .028 .160 H3c +  -.046             .397 .001 .971 H3c +    .010              .715 
BRDINDEPEN H3d -     -.032             .550 .004 .943 H3d -    .007             .897 -.079 .157 H3d -    .095 .115 
SUPSHOLD H3 e-   -.015                -.643 -.008 .670 H3 e-  -.039               .469 .003 .844 H3 e-   -.022              .668 
CADREENTRPR H4a+    .025                 .264  .079 .017** H4a+   .106               .062* .011 .756 H4a+    .022               .683 
CEOPATHDEP H4 b+    .006          .817  .004 .821 H4 b+   .067         .218 .067 .115 H4 b+    .011         .827 
CHAIRPATHDEP H4c+    .089           .052**  .008 .640 H4c+   .017            .751 .076 .083* H4c+    .077            .100* 
BLOCKHOLD H5 -   -.021                 .383 -.003 .879 H5 -  -.022             .429    -.080 .091* H5 -   -.098               .107 
Control Variables:              
STATEDUMMY     .041    .179   .004  .859    .067           .252     .059    .066*  .022               .706 
ASSETSLN      na     na     na     na          na     na     na     na          na     na 
BKTOMKT    -.042                .115 -.052 .002**  -.050               .385    -.035    .317     .029     .595 
 
Model Summary 
 
R = .284, R2 = .064, 
AdjR2 = .021,  
F = 1.653,sig.= .009 
R = .329, R2 = .108, 
AdjR2 = .076,  
F = 3.353,sig.= .000 
R = .170, R2 = .029, 
AdjR2 = .011,  
F = 0.730, sig.= .754 
R = .211, R2 = .047, 
AdjR2 = .026,  
F = 1.820,sig.= .012 
R = .347, R2 = .120, 
AdjR2 = .074,  
F = 2.616,sig.= .000 
 
157 
 
Panel B - Small (bottom 80%) 
Predictor variables RPT Categories for Dependent Variables 
 
Tunneling only Propping only Tunneling & Propping combined 
 
RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL RPTFIN BUY TOTALRPTs 
Motivating Condit-ions 
for Tunneling: 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
 
Beta 
 
  Sig. 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
     
     Beta 
     
    Sig. 
DIVPS H1a -   -.027          .244                            -.025 .327      H1a - -.030       .287 
DIVCOV H1b +    .024                 .341  .001 .957      H1b +  .016            .575 
 FCFE H1c -    .010                 .681 -.004 .733      H1c -  .002            .946 
VOTERCASHDIFF     H1d +    .028               .164  .122 .000***         H1d +      .085        .004*** 
Motivating Conditions 
for Propping: 
             
PRIOR LOSS          H2a +   .032             .284 .034 .175     H2a +   .036             .323 
ROE      H2b +   .031              .278 .006 .754 H2b +   .008          .776 
ROETHRESH      H2c +   .018           .532 .123 .007** H2c +   .064        .051** 
NONTRADESH         H2d -   .027                .459 .038 .165    H2d -  -.035            .321 
OWNDIRECT      H2e - -.028          .392 -.072 .038** H2e -  -.063       .050** 
Enabling Mechanisms 
forTunneling & 
Propping: 
             
EMOLEXEC H3a +    .094    .056*  .022 .235 H3a +   .047 .386 .042 .136 H3a +    .043        .421 
EMOLDIR     H3 b+    .105 .034**  -.009  .760     H3 b+    .031            .572     .016     .711     H3 b+ .019             .574 
BRDSHOLD H3c +    .034                 .264  .010 .501 H3c +  -.006             .852 .003 .837 H3c +    .018              .619 
BRDINDEPEN H3d -    .002                 .957 .108 .573 H3d -   .029          .360 .013 .674 H3d -    .024            .510 
SUPSHOLD H3 e-   -.010                -.737 -.014 .412 H3 e-   .002               .954 .001 .972 H3 e-    .019              .543 
CADREENTRPR H4a+    .025                  .064*  .323 .032** H4a+   .015               .663 .009 .756 H4a+    .058               .078* 
CEOPATHDEP H4 b+    .032          .157  .031 .216 H4 b+   .018         .544 .082 .054** H4 b+    .047         .187 
CHAIRPATHDEP H4c+    .039           .424  .072 .036** H4c+   .013            .656 .046 .142 H4c+    .052            .176 
BLOCKHOLD H5 -   -.038                 .166 -.016 .387 H5 -  -.029             .365    -.050 .143 H5 -   -.033               .294 
Control Variables:              
STATEDUMMY     .041    .179   .014  .424    .030           .404     .043    .173  .036             .323 
ASSETSLN      na     na     na     na          na     na     na     na          na     na 
BKTOMKT    -.068                .118 -.017 .389  -.056               .143    -.015    .605     .013     .667 
 
Model Summary 
 
R = .167, R2 = .028, 
AdjR2 = .019,  
F = 3.069,sig.= .000 
R = .229, R2 = .068, 
AdjR2 = .036,  
F = 4.353,sig.= .000 
R = .103, R2 = .011, 
AdjR2 = -.002,  
F = 0.871, sig.= .597 
R = .311, R2 = .097, 
AdjR2 = .033,  
F = 1.820,sig.= .002 
R = .203, R2 = .041, 
AdjR2 = .026,  
F = 2.756,sig.= .000 
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6.4.3. Additional analyses for sensitivity of measures of the dependent variable 
 
Proxy measures for the dependent variables, Tunneling and propping, used in this study 
have been based on selected classifications of RPTs.  That is, it has been argued that 
Tunneling is likely to be an ongoing feature of operating transactions with related-
parties; alternatively propping is likely to be embedded in financing and investing 
transactions with related-parties.  These assumptions about the sources of Tunneling 
and propping may not hold.  The sensitive of these proxy measures of the dependent 
variables can be assessed by substituting a different measure for them in the models. 
 
The practice of Tunneling and propping is based on RPTs set at values above or below 
their fair value.  It is the abnormal elements in RPTs that creates Tunneling and 
propping.  For example, the controlling shareholder (e.g., a State-owned enterprise) can 
arrange for other lower subsidiaries in its pyramid company group to purchase 
investment assets at an abnormally high purchase price from a higher subsidiary (i.e., a 
listed company it wishes to ‘prop up’), in order to boost the cash inflows of that listed 
company. Alternatively, the controlling shareholder can arrange sales of goods and 
services from the listed company to its subsidiaries at abnormally low sales price in 
order to expropriate cash and earnings through Tunneling.  
 
For sensitivity analysis, this study uses a measure of abnormal operating sales to 
related-parties (AbnRPTOPERSELL) as the indicator of the extent of Tunneling.   As 
well it used a measure of abnormal loans to related-parties (AbnRPTFINBUY) as the 
indicator of the extent of propping.   These new dependent variables are inserted into the 
following models:  
 
AbnRPTOPERSELL  =  α + β1 DIVPS  + β2 DIVCOV  + β3 FCFE  + 
β4VOTECASHDIFF + β5 STATEDUMMY  +  β6 ASSETSLN  + β7 BKTOMKT + 
β8 ENGINEERINGINDUS  +  β9 RETAILINDUS  + ɛ …. (1) 
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AbnRPTFINBUY  = a + β1 PRIOR LOSS  + β2 ROE  + β3 ROETHRESH  + β4 
NONTRADESH  + β5 OWNDIRECT + β6 STATEDUMMY  + β7 ASSETSLN  + 
β8 BKTOMKT + β9 ENGINEERINGINDUS  +  β10 RETAILINDUS  + ɛ    …. (2) 
 
Where 
 
AbnRPTOPERSELL  is abnormal operating sales to related-parties derived from 
the residual of the regression of actual operating sales to related-parties on those 
variables deemed to be the explanatory variables for the extent of Tunneling 
contained in actual operating sales to related-parties. The explanatory variables 
used to regress on actual sales are DIVPS, VOTECASHDIFF, CADREENTRPR, 
CHAIRPATHDEP, STATEDUMMY and ASSETSLN. These are the significant 
independent variables from results in column (1) of Table 6.9. 
 
AbnRPTFINBUY  is abnormal loans to related parties derived from the residual of 
the regression of actual loans to related-parties on those explanatory variables that 
provide a significant motivation and enablement for propping. The explanatory 
variables used to regress on actual loans are PRIORLOSS, OWNDIRECT, 
EMOLEXEC, CEOPATHDEP, STATEDUMMY and ASSETSLN for each 
company. These are the significant independent variables from results in column 
(4) of Table 6.9. 
 
ENGINEERINGINDUS and RETAILINDUS are dummy variables for the 
companies classified in the respective industries of engineering/manufacturing and 
retailing. These are the dominant industries in the sample. 
 
The results for the above two models are given in Table 6.12, based on the whole 
sample. A summary of these results and how they compare with results in Table 6.9 is 
as follows: 
 
i. Tunneling, as measured by AbnRPTOPERSELL, is found to be significantly 
positively related to VOTECASHDIFF (sig. = .013). This results is consistent 
with the significant positive relationship found between RPTOPERSELL and 
VOTECASHDIFF (sig.= .091). However, unlike the significant negative 
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relationship previously found between RPTOPERSELL and DIVPS, the result 
in Table 6.12 shows DIVPS to be non-significant.   
ii. Propping, as measured by AbnRPTFINBUY, is found to be significantly 
positively related to PRIORLOSS (sig. = .023). This result is consistent with the 
relationship between RPTFINBUY and PRIORLOSS (sig. = .016). However, 
unlike the significant negative relationship previously found between 
RPTFINBUY and OWNDIRECT, the result in Table 6.12 shows OWNDIRECT 
to be non-significant.   
Table 6.12. Regression Results Based on Abnormal RPTs – Whole Sample 
 
Predictor variables 
Tunneling only Propping only 
AbnRPTOPERSELL AbnRPTFINBUY 
Motivating Conditions 
for Tunneling: 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
Hypothesis 
and expect 
direction 
 
Beta 
 
Sig. 
DIVPS H1a - -.067 .123    
DIVCOV H1b + .004 .878    
 FCFE H1c - .004 .868    
VOTECASHDIFF     H1d + .125 .013**    
Motivating Conditions 
for Propping: 
      
PRIOR LOSS    H2a + .131 .023** 
ROE    H2b + .004 .872 
ROETHRESH    H2c - .028 .295 
NONTRADESH    H2d + .007 .793 
OWNDIRECT    H2e - -.034 .261 
Enabling Mechanisms 
Tunneling & 
Propping: 
      
EMOLEXEC H3a + .011 .830 H3a + .050 .388 
EMOLDIR     H3 b+ .029 .573 H3 b+ .005 .935 
BRDSHOLD H3c + .003 .919 H3c + -.002 .945 
BRDINDEPEN H3d - -.007 .788 H3d - .016 .580 
SUPSHOLD H3 e- -.002 .951 H3 e- -.007 .809 
CADREENTRPR H4a+ .084 .042** H4a+ .020 .536 
CEOPATHDEP H4 b+ -.055 .035** H4 b+ .091 .048** 
CHAIRPATHDEP H4c+ .053 .036** H4c+ .008 .786 
BLOCKHOLD H5 - .011 .665 H5 -   -.018 .524 
Control Variables:       
STATEDUMMY  .030 .374  .089 .050** 
ASSETSLN  -.043 .131  .075 .137 
BKTOMKT  -.021 .498  .030 .409 
ENGINEERINDUS  .032 .698  .030 .765 
RETAILINDUS  .005 .953  -.002 .981 
 
Model Summary 
R = .223 , R2 = .115 , 
AdjR2 = .101 ,  
R = .209 , R2 = .112, 
AdjR2 = .079 ,  
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F = 2.311, sig.= .002 F = 2.976, sig.= .000 
A further result to note in Table 6.12 is that the control variables for industry group do 
not significantly affect the regression results. In summary, the results derived from the 
use of selected classifications of RPTs as the proxy measures for Tunneling and 
propping (i.e., RPTOPERSELL and RPTFINBUY), are found not to be highly sensitive 
to alternative measures of selected classifications of RPTs (i.e., AbnRPTOPERSELL 
and AbnRPTFINBUY). 
 
6.5. Summary 
A summary and discussion of the results in Tables 6.9 to 6.11 against the theoretical 
perspectives underlying the hypotheses will be given in the next chapter.  Refer to Table 
7.1 in the concluding chapter.  
 
This chapter has presents the results of descriptive, univariate and multivatiate analysis. 
Data collected on RPTs, as proxies for the phenomena of Tunneling and propping, 
together with corporate financial and governance data as measures of determinants, is 
analysed. First, descriptive statistics have provided a financial profile on listed 
companies in China, with emphasis on categories of RPTs and features of directors, 
executives and shareholders. It compares these descriptive profiles between State-
controlled and non-State-controlled companies, and between larger and smaller 
companies.  
 
Second, results of correlation analysis have been provided. Correlations between 
dependent variables and independent variables have given preliminary tests of 
hypotheses. Significant correlations have been found that support H1a, H1d (concerned 
with motivation for Tunneling through rent-protection theory), H2a (concerned with 
motivation for propping through market for ownership control theory), H3a, H3b 
(concerned with enabling through governance characteristics), H4a, H4b and H4c 
(concerning enabling through market transition theory). Also correlations amongst 
independent variables have provided preliminary assessment of the absence of 
multicollinearity. 
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Third, regression results have shown the main findings for hypotheses tests. These 
regression results have been presented as separate models for Tunneling alone, propping 
alone and the combination of both. The analysis is conducted on the whole sample, as 
well as split samples that test State-controlled versus non-State controlled firms and 
larger versus smaller firms. The regression results have been found to support: (a) H1a 
and H1d concerning motivating conditions for Tunneling, (b) H2a, H2d and H2e 
concerning motivating conditions for propping, (c) H4a, H4b and H4c concerning 
enabling conditions for both Tunneling and propping, and (d) H3a and H5 concerning 
enabling conditions for propping only. Further analysis is provided in the last part of the 
chapter on the robustness of the RPT measures of Tunneling and propping, respectively.     
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
This study has investigated the principal-principal conflict problem as manifest in 
prejudicial related-party transactions.  Prejudicial RPTs are broadly defined as 
transactions that “unfairly prejudice” minority shareholders and favour majority 
shareholders. This study has contributed to the literature on the principal-principal 
conflict problem by developing new theory-driven models and providing evidence that 
addresses five research questions.   
 
The first two research questions are concerned with the motivations or incentives of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder that could generate a desire to have the company 
pursue Tunneling or propping transactions. These two research questions are 
underpinned by theories about ownership control, namely, rent-protection theory of 
ownership structure and the theory of emergence of a market for ownership control. The 
second two research questions relate to factors that enable or facilitate the carrying out 
of Tunneling or propping transactions. They draw on agency theory’s notion of bonding 
and on the application of transitional market theory to the corporate level. The above 
four research questions assume there is a conflict between the interests of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder and other shareholders. In the fifth and final research question,   
the position of the non-ultimate blockholders is considered. This final research question 
asks whether the non-ultimate blockholders are able to act as a corporate governance 
force that controls the Tunneling and propping activities sought by the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. 
 
 
From these research questions, sets of hypotheses have been developed and models 
specified. Using a census of listed companies in China in 2010, secondary data is 
collected from the CSMAR financial and corporate governance databases. The analysis 
entails sets of OLS regressions. These regressions test for the determinants of Tunneling 
only (two regressions on operating RPTs), propping only (a regression on investing 
RPTs and a regression on financing RPTs) and Tunneling and propping combined (a 
regression on total RPTs). 
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7.2. Summary of findings 
Table 7.1 provides a summary of the findings from Table 6.9 to 6.11.  It indicates which 
hypotheses are supported.   
 
The results in Table 7.1 reveal several significant findings.   
First, the most significant motivating conditions for Tunneling are revealed as DIVPS 
and VOTECASHDIFF.  DIVPS represents the cashflow right satisfied through non-
prejudicial means.  The result shows that when ultimate controlling shareholders can not 
satisfy their cashflow rights through non-prejudicial means, they tend to resort to 
Tunneling.  VOTECASHDIFF represents the extent to which the ultimate controlling 
shareholders direct and indirect voting rights are greater than cash flow rights from the 
company. The result shows that when voting power of the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is greatly than cash through non-prejudicial channels, Tunneling tends to 
occur.  Both results provide clear evidence in support of Bebchuk’s rent-protection 
theory of ownership control. The ultimate controlling shareholder whose voting power 
is greater than the legitimate cash obtained (mainly through dividends) will be 
motivated to get perceived ‘fair rent return’ on their voting power by Tunneling out cash 
to related-parties. This Tunneling is found to take the form of both operating buy and 
operating sales transactions. 
 
Second, the most significant motivating conditions for propping are found to be 
PRIORLOSS and OWNDIRECT.  PRIORLOSS is significant for both State and non-
State companies. It predominantly takes the form of financing buy transactions (i.e., 
borrowing and leasing from related-parties on interest or terms below market rates). 
This result infers that the avoidance of the CSRC’s ‘special status’ penalty, which could 
trigger the emergence of a market for ownership control, is the primary motivator for 
propping. It provides strong support for Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) market for 
ownership control theory.  OWNDIRECT (i.e. the ultimate controlling shareholder’s 
percentage shareholding in the listed company) is found to negatively affect propping. 
This result infers that the threat of market ownership control, and hence the need for 
propping, is lessened by the size of OWNDIRECT.   
 
Third, the significant enabling mechanisms for Tunneling are revealed as 
CADRENTRPR and CHAIRPATHDEP, whereas for propping they are EMOLEXEC 
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and CEOPATHDEP.   In terms of Tunneling, the enabling of this practice is generated 
by the founder-entrepreneur owner in the league with the aligned chair of the board.  In 
terms of propping, this practice is enabled through dependency of the executive on the 
controlling shareholder – namely CEOs who have career path dependency and the top 5 
executives who have higher emoluments.  These results support Nee’s (1989) 
transitional market theory in which practices of power and privilege are perpetuated.           
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Table 7.1. Summary of Results of Hypotheses Testing – Results from Table 6.9 (whole sample) and Table 6.10 and 6.11 (sub-samples) 
Hypothesis 
Tunneling Propping 
Tunneling & 
Propping combined 
RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL RPTFINBUY TOTALRPT 
1H a 
Dividend per share (DIVPS) is inversely related to the 
proportion of Tunneling in RPTs. 
Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
State, Non-state, 
Large 
Supported 
p < 0.01*** 
 
State, Large 
  Supported 
p < 0.1 * 
 
State, Non-state, 
Large 
1H b 
Dividend cover (DIVCOV) is positively related to the 
proportion of Tunneling in RPTs. 
- -   - 
1H c 
Free cash flow for equity (FCFE) is inversely related to 
the proportion of Tunneling in RPTs. 
- -   - 
1H d 
Direct and indirect voting rights (VOTECASHDIFF) of 
the ultimate controlling shareholder higher than cash 
flow rights will be positively related to the proportion of 
Tunneling in RPTs. 
Supported 
p < 0.1* 
Supported 
p < 0.01*** 
 
State, Non-state, 
Large, Small 
  Supported 
p < 0.01*** 
 
State, Non-state, 
Large, Small 
2H a 
Reporting a net loss in the prior year (PRIORLOSS) is 
positively related to the proportion of propping in RPTs. 
  - Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
State, Non-state 
Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
State, Non-state 
2H b 
The level of ROE (ROE ) is inversely related to the 
proportion of propping in RPTs. 
  - 
 
State 
- 
 
- 
2H c 
Reporting an ROE on or slightly above the 8% threshold 
(ROETHRESH) is positively related to the proportion of 
propping in RPTs. 
  - - 
 
Small 
- 
 
Small 
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Hypothesis 
Tunneling Propping 
Tunneling & 
Propping combined 
RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL RPTFINBUY TOTALRPT 
2H d 
The proportion of total shares held in non-tradable shares 
(NONTRADESH) is inversely related to the proportion 
of propping in RPTs. 
  - - 
 
 
State, Large 
Supported 
 P < 0.1* 
 
State, Large 
2H e 
Ultimate controlling shareholder’s direct ownership 
(percentage direct vote) (OWNDIRECT) is inversely 
related to the proportion of propping in RPTs. 
  - Supported 
P < 0.05** 
 
Large, Small 
Supported 
 P < 0.1* 
 
Large, Small 
3H a
 The emoluments of top 5 executives (EMOLEXEC) is 
positively related to the proportion of both Tunneling and 
propping in RPTs. 
- 
 
Small 
- - Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
- 
3H b 
The emolument of directors (EMOLDIR) is positively 
related to the proportion of both Tunneling and propping 
in RPTs. 
- 
 
 
Small 
- - - - 
3H c 
The percentage of share held by main board directors 
(BRDSHOLD) is positively related to the proportion of 
Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
- - - - - 
3H d 
The percentage of independent directors on main board 
(BRDINDEPEN) is inversely related to the proportion of 
both of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
- 
 
 
 
State 
- - - - 
3H e 
The percentage shares held by the supervisory board 
(SUPSHOLD) is positively related to the proportion of 
both of Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
     
4H a 
The cadre entrepreneur as the ultimate controlling 
shareholder (CADREENTRPR )has a positive effect on 
the proportion of both Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
Supported 
p < 0.1* 
 
Small 
 
Supported 
p < 0.1* 
 
Non-state, Large, 
Small 
- 
 
 
Large 
- - 
 
 
Non-state, Small 
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Hypothesis 
Tunneling Propping 
Tunneling & 
Propping combined 
RPTOPERSELL RPTOPERBUY RPTINVSELL RPTFINBUY TOTALRPT 
4H b 
The path dependence of the CEO (CEOPATHDEP) is 
positively related to the proportion of both of Tunneling 
and propping in RPTs. 
- - 
 
 
State, Non-state 
- Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
Small 
Supported P < 0.1* 
 
State 
4H c 
The path dependence of the chair (CHAIRPATHDEP) is 
positively related to the proportion of both of Tunneling 
and propping in RPTs. 
Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
Large 
Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
State, Small 
- - 
 
 
State, Large 
Supported 
p < 0.05** 
 
State, Large 
5H  
The percentage shares held by blockholders  (BLOCK-
HOLD) (top 2 to 10 share-holders) is inversely related to 
the proportion of both Tunneling and propping in RPTs. 
- - - - 
 
 
State, Non-state, 
Large,  
- 
 
 
State 
Note:  
‘State’ means that results from the sub-sample of state controlling shareholders support this hypothesis.  
‘Non-State’ means that results from the sub-sample of non-state controlling shareholders support this hypothesis.  
‘Large’ means that results from the sub-sample of the largest 20% of listed companies support this hypothesis.  
‘Small’ means that results from the sub-sample of the smallest 80% of listed companies support this hypothesis.  
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7.3. Implications 
These findings have several implications for theory and practice. First, empirical studies 
on Tunneling and propping phenomena have suffered from a lack of theoretically 
underpinning (Riyanto and Toolsema 2008; Cheung et al. 2009a; Jian and Wong 2010). 
This study has provided models and measures of variables that are grounded in theories 
of rent-protection for company control, the emergence of a competitive market for 
ownership control, and the dependencies and entrepreneurial control outcomes for 
companies in the transition of markets. It has found evidence that supports the 
application of these theories to the understanding of determinants of Tunneling and 
propping phenomena that is inherently prejudiced against non-controlling shareholders.  
Therefore, the implication for Bebchuk’s (1999) rent-protection theory is that it holds as 
a sound explanatory perspective on what motivate expropriation practices.  Similarly, 
the implication for Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) theory of market for ownership control 
is that it holds as a sound explanatory perspective on what motivate corporate propping 
practices.  Moreover, Nee’s (1989) transitional market theory has been applied in this 
study for the first time at the corporate level.  Results support the use of this theory to 
explain the enabling influences on Tunneling and propping in the unique context of 
China’s transitional economic with remnants of perpetuated power and privilege.   
 
This study also has implications for practice. It finds that conditions specific to China’s 
securities regulations concerning special listing treatment when losses are reported 
(PRIORLOSS) and also the holding of non-tradable shares (NONTRADESH) can have 
the side-effect of motivating controlling shareholders to engage in propping.  Results 
reveal that the key factor deemed to create a market for ownership control – namely, the 
risk of penalty by the securities regulator for reporting a net loss in consecutive years, as 
well as a weakening of the cushion of non-tradeable shares caused when more non-
tradable shares are converted to tradable – are significant conditions motivating 
propping. These CSRC regulations on listed companies, therefore, need to be reviewed 
in order to address the principal-principal shareholder problem.  
 
In the broader area of implementing corporate governance guidelines, the issue of the 
formality of independence of directors is not necessarily the focus of importance in 
protecting all shareholders rights. Rather, this study points to the impact of ‘path 
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dependence’ of Chair and CEO on the ultimate controlling shareholder, and also the 
emergence of ‘cadre entrepreneurs’ as the ultimate controlling shareholder. These are 
issues of dependence and power which enable Tunneling and propping to be pursued by 
companies at the cost of the minority shareholders. In China, these issues need 
considering by corporate governance regulators in order to address the principal-
principal shareholder problem.  
 
7.4. Limitations 
There are limitations in this study. First, the data is sampled from one year only. If 
data across several years has been collected, then panel regression analysis could be 
conducted. This would enable results to be generalized beyond one specific year, 
2010, in this study. However, the use of year prior to 2010 would have meant the 
data was not representative of ‘normal’ financial market conditions because of the 
impact of the GFC. 
 
Second, in modelling the relationships between the extent of Tunneling and 
propping and governance-type variables, endogeneity could be present.  For 
example, although emoluments and shareholdings in the company by directors and 
executives were hypothesised to affect the level of propping, the reverse causal 
relationship could exist, which would create bias due to the possible violation of the 
error independence assumption of OLS regression. Another example of endogeneity 
could be that, while a low dividend per share was hypothesised to cause greater 
Tunneling, the reverse relationship of Tunneling causing a lower dividend may exist.   
 
Third, there is a limitation with the choice of selective RPTs, together with total 
RPTs, as proxies for prejudicial RPTs. It has been assumed that operating RPT 
transactions are more likely to be used for Tunneling purposes, whereas financing 
and investing transactions are more likely to be used for propping purposes. 
Sensitivity testing with measures of the abnormal component of these RPTs has 
sought to give confidence to the suitability of these proxy measures.  However, data 
on more precise measures have not been obtained on the actual components of RPT 
transactions that are intentionally set at above or below fair value. Prior studies on 
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Tunneling and propping have also been limited by the unavailability of this data and 
the subjectivity of attempting to estimate it. 
 
Fourth, statistical data analysis methods used in this thesis for testing hypotheses 
have require the data to meet parametric assumptions.  Test of normality, skewness, 
hetero-skedascity, linearity and multi-collinearity have been undertaken and 
satisfied. However, in the process of satisfying these tests, there have been 
adjustments to some components of the data set. Hence, some companies have been 
excluded due to substantial missing data and other missing values have been filled 
with averages. Also some data has been undergone logarithmic transformation. The 
data could have been left in it is more pure, raw form rather than normalized, if non-
parametric analysis had been applied. Non-parametric results for bi-variate 
correlations or comparisons of means would have been a ‘safer’ way of presenting 
results, but a less potent way. A further aspect of data analysis is that interaction 
effects between independent variables, especially between ‘enabling’ corporate 
governance variables, have not been modelled. It was felt that insufficient theoretical 
foundation existed to include the interaction  of CEOPATHDEP with EMOLEXEC, 
or the interaction of BRDSHOLD with BRDINDEP in the model. 
 
7.5. Future Research Directions 
Future studies may consider addressing the limitations discussed above. First, the 
limitation was mentioned that the data is sampled from one year only. If data were to be 
collected across several years, then panel regression analysis could be conducted. Future 
studies could consider replicating the models in this study using secondary data from 
say 2008 to 2013. The period of the GFC (2008-2009) could be treated as a dummy 
variable in the models. Panel regression analysis on longitudinal data has an advantage 
over OLS regression on cross-sectional data in dealing with omitted or unobserved 
variables. The regression model for panel data will have a variable that captures all 
unobserved, time-constant factors that affect the dependent variable. An example of 
such an unobserved time-constant variable that might affect prejudicial RPTs is 
business culture.   
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Second, the models used in this study could be extended or refined in future research. 
For example, the propping model could be extended to consider the relationship 
between earnings management and propping. The controlling shareholder seeking to 
prop up earnings to quell the threat of a market for ownership control could choose to 
use income-increasing accruals (earnings management) or use no-interest loans from 
related-parties (propping) or both. Another possible direction for future research is to 
extend the Tunneling model to include predictor variables such as liquidity ratios and 
long-term solvency. The models in this study that compare results for State and non-
State controlled firms could be refined to provide a much finer categorisation of ‘State’ 
shareholders into various categories.   
 
Third, future research could seek greater depth of insight about some of the results of 
this study by taking a qualitative case study approach. If a future researcher could obtain 
access to key players and documents within some large listed companies and their group 
of subsidiaries, then a deeper understanding about the nature of Tunneling and propping 
practices could be uncovered. Also the attitudes to these practices of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder, the directors, supervisors and top executives could be compared 
and contrasted. Perceptions of these key players on the extent of regulatory enforcement 
of corporate governance principles in China regarding the protection of minority 
shareholders could also be a future line of investigation for qualitative researchers. 
Finally, future research could pursue cross-country comparative research using data 
from listed companies. Many countries with a domestic stock exchange now require 
their listed companies to disclose related-party transactions under IFRSs and to adopt 
corporate governance guidelines. Therefore, secondary data from developing or 
developed countries, or both, could be gathered in order to allow a cross-country 
replicate of this study. Such research would have relevance to international investors 
who would typically be a minority shareholder in various companies around the world.   
By modelling and testing the effects of motivators of, and enablers for, ultimate 
controlling shareholders to pursue Tunneling and propping practices in China, this study 
has provided a lead for future research in this area. 
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Appendix 1: Extracts from the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China  
Issued by:   
China Securities Regulatory Commission  
State Economic and Trade Commission  
January 7, 2001  
(Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002)  
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies  
  
Preface 
In accordance with the basic principles of the Company Law, the Securities Law and 
other relevant laws and regulations, as well as the commonly accepted standards in 
international corporate governance, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") is formulated to promote the 
establishment and improvement of modern enterprise system by listed companies, to 
standardize the operation of listed companies and to bring forward the healthy 
development of the securities market of our country.  
 
The Code sets forth, among other things, the basic principles for corporate governance 
of  listed companies in our country, the means for the protection of investors' interests 
and rights, the basic behavior rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, 
managers and other senior management members of listed companies.  
 
The Code is applicable to all listed companies within the boundary of the People's 
Republic of China. Listed companies shall act in the spirit of the Code in their efforts to 
improve corporate governance. Requirements of the Code shall be embodied when 
listed companies formulate or amend their articles of association or rules of governance. 
The Code is the major measuring standard for evaluating whether a listed company has 
a good corporate governance structure, and if major problems exist with the corporate 
governance structure of a listed company, the securities supervision and regulation 
authorities may instruct the company to make corrections in accordance with the Code. 
  
Chapter 1. Shareholders and Shareholders' Meetings 
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(1) Rights of Shareholders 
1. As the owner of a company, the shareholders shall enjoy the legal rights stipulated by  
laws, administrative regulations and the company's articles of association. A listed  
company shall establish a corporate governance structure sufficient for ensuring the full  
exercise of shareholders' rights.  
 
2. The corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair treatment toward 
all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. All shareholders are to enjoy equal 
rights and to bear the corresponding duties based on the shares they hold.  
 
Page 1 of 1113. Shareholders shall have the right to know about and the right to 
participate in major matters of the company set forth in the laws, administrative 
regulations and articles of association. A listed company shall establish efficient 
channels of communication with its shareholders.  
 
4. Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights through civil  
litigation or other legal means in accordance with laws and administrative regulations. 
In the event the resolutions of shareholders' meetings or the resolutions of the board of  
directors are in breach of laws and administrative regulations or infringe on 
shareholders legal interests and rights, the shareholders shall have the right to initiate 
litigation to stop such breach or infringement. The directors, supervisors and managers 
of the company shall bear the liability of compensation in cases where they violate laws, 
administrative regulations or articles of association and cause damages to the company 
during the performance of their duties. Shareholders shall have the right to request the 
company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law. 
 
(3) Related Party Transactions 
12. Written agreements shall be entered into for related party transactions among a 
listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements shall observe principles of 
equality, voluntarity, and making compensation for equal value. The contents of such 
agreements shall be specific and concrete. Matters such as the signing, amendment, 
termination and execution of such agreements shall be disclosed by the listed company 
in accordance with relevant regulations.  
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Page 2 of 1113. Efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to prevent its 
connected parties from interfering with the operation of the company and damaging the 
company's interests by monopolizing purchase or sales channels. Related party 
transactions shall observe commercial principles. In principle, the prices for related 
party transactions shall not deviate from an independent third party's market price or 
charging standard. The company shall fully disclose the basis for pricing for related 
party transactions.  
 
14. The assets of a listed company belong to the company. The company shall adopt 
efficient measures to prevent its shareholders and their affiliates from misappropriating 
or transferring the capital, assets or other resources of the company through various 
means.   
 
listed company shall not provide financial guarantees for its shareholders or their 
affiliates. 
 
Chapter 2. Listed Company and Its Controlling Shareholders 
(1) Behavior Rules for Controlling Shareholders 
 
19. The controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed company 
and other shareholders. The controlling shareholders of a listed company shall strictly 
comply with laws and regulations while exercising their rights as investors, and shall be  
prevented from damaging the listed company's or other shareholders' legal rights and  
interests, through means such as assets restructuring, or from taking advantage of their  
privileged position to gain additional benefit.  
 
20. The controlling shareholders shall nominate the candidates for directors and  
supervisors in strict compliance with the terms and procedures provided for by laws,  
regulations and the company's articles of association. The nominated candidates shall  
possess certain relevant professional knowledge and the capability to make decisions or  
supervise. The resolutions made by the shareholders' meetings electing personnel or the  
Page 3 of 11board of directors' resolutions appointing personnel shall not be subjected 
to approval procedures by the controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders are 
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forbidden to appoint senior management personnel by circumventing the shareholders' 
meetings or the board of directors.  
 
21. The important decisions of a listed company shall be made through a shareholders'  
meeting or board of directors' meeting in accordance with law. The controlling 
shareholder shall not directly or indirectly interfere with the company's decisions or 
business activities conducted in accordance with laws; nor shall they impair the listed 
company's other shareholders' rights and interests.  
 
(2) Independence of Listed Company  
22. A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such 
aspects as personnel, assets and financial affairs, shall be independent in institution and  
business, shall practice independent business accounting, and shall independently bear  
risks and obligations. 
 
23. The personnel of a listed company shall be independent from the controlling  
shareholders. The management, financial officers, sales officers and secretary of the 
boar of directors of the listed company shall not take posts other than as a director in a  
controlling shareholder's entities. In the case where a member of a controlling 
shareholder's senior management concurrently holds the position of director of the listed  
company, such member shall ensure adequate time and energy to perform the work for 
the listed company.  
 
24. The assets invested by a controlling shareholder in a listed company shall be  
independent, complete and with clear indication of ownership. Where controlling  
shareholders invest non-cash assets into a listed company, ownership transfer 
procedures shall be completed and explicit boundaries for such assets shall be clarified. 
The listed company shall independently register such assets, independently set up 
account for such assets, and independently carry out business accounting and 
management for such assets. The controlling shareholders shall not misappropriate or 
control such assets or interfere with the listed company's management of such assets.  
 
25. A listed company shall establish sound financial and accounting management 
systems in accordance with laws and regulations and shall conduct independent 
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business accounting. Controlling shareholders shall respect the financial independence 
of the company and shall not interfere with the financial and accounting activities of the 
company.  
 
26. The board of directors, the supervisory committee and other internal offices of a  
listed company shall operate in an independent manner. There shall be no subordination  
relationship between, on the one hand, a listed company or its internal offices and, on 
the 
other hand, the company's controlling shareholders or their internal offices, and the  
latter shall not give plans or instructions concerning the listed company's business  
operation to the former, nor shall the latter interfere with the independent operation of  
the former in any other manner.  
 
27. A listed company's business shall be completely independent from that of its  
controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries shall not 
engage in the same or similar business as that of the listed company. Controlling 
shareholders shall adopt efficient measures to avoid competition with the listed 
company. 
 
Chapter 3. Directors and Board of Directors 
 
(2) The Duties and Responsibilities of Directors 
 
33. Directors shall faithfully, honestly and diligently perform their duties for the best  
interests of the company and all the shareholders.  
 
34. Directors shall ensure adequate time and energy for the performance of their duties.  
 
35. Directors shall attend the board of directors meetings in a diligent and responsible  
manner, and shall express their clear opinion on the topics discussed. When unable to  
attend a board of directors meeting, a director may authorize another director in writing  
to vote on his behalf and the director who makes such authorization shall be responsible  
for the vote.  
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36. The board of directors shall abide by relevant laws, regulations, rules and the  
company's articles of association, and shall strictly fulfill the undertakings they made  
publicly.  
 
37. Directors shall earnestly attend relevant trainings to learn about the rights,  
obligations and duties of a director, to familiarize themselves with relevant laws and  
regulations and to master relevant knowledge necessary for acting as directors.  
38. In cases where the resolutions of board of directors violate laws or regulations or a  
listed company's articles of association and cause losses to the listed company, directors 
responsible for making such resolutions shall be liable for compensation, except those  
proved to have objected and the objections of whom have been recorded in the minutes.  
39. After approval by the shareholders' meeting, a listed company may purchase 
liability insurance for directors. Such insurance shall not cover the liabilities arising in  
connection with directors' violation of laws, regulations or the company's articles of  
association. 
 
(5) Independent Directors 
49. A listed company shall introduce independent directors to its board of directors in  
accordance with relevant regulations. Independent directors shall be independent from 
the listed company that employs them and the company's major shareholders. An 
independent director may not hold any other position apart from independent director in 
the listed company.  
 
Page 6 of 1150. The independent directors shall bear the duties of good faith and due 
diligence toward the listed company and all the shareholders. They shall earnestly 
perform their duties in accordance with laws, regulations and the company's articles of 
association, shall protect the overall interests of the company, and shall be especially 
concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being infringed. 
Independent directors shall carry out their duties independently and shall not subject 
themselves to the influence of the company's major shareholders, actual controllers, or 
other entities or persons who are interested parties of the listed company.  
 
51. Relevant laws and regulations shall be complied with for matters such as the  
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qualifications, procedure of election and replacement, and duties of independent 
directors. 
 
Chapter 4. The Supervisors and the Supervisory Board 
  
(1) Duties and Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board 
 
59. The supervisory board of a listed company shall be accountable to all shareholders. 
The supervisory board shall supervise the corporate finance, the legitimacy of directors,  
managers and other senior management personnel's performance of duties, and shall 
protect Page 7 of 11the company's and the shareholders' legal rights and interests. 
 
60. Supervisors shall have the right to learn about the operating status of the listed  
company and shall have the corresponding obligation of confidentiality. The 
supervisory board may independently hire intermediary institutions to provide 
professional opinions.  
 
61. A listed company shall adopt measures to ensure supervisors' right to learn about  
company's matters and shall provide necessary assistance to supervisors for their normal  
performance of duties. No one shall interfere with or obstruct supervisors' work. A  
supervisor's reasonable expenses necessary to perform their duties shall be borne by the  
listed company.  
 
62. The record of the supervisory committee's supervision as well as the results of  
financial or other specific investigations shall be used as an important basis for  
performance assessment of directors, managers and other senior management personnel.  
 
63. The supervisory board may report directly to securities regulatory authorities and  
other related authorities as well as reporting to the board of directors and the 
shareholders' meetings when the supervisory board learns of any violation of laws,  
regulations or the company's articles of association by directors, managers or other 
senior management personnel. 
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Appendix 2: Accounting Law of the People's Republic of 
China 
Adopted by the Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National 
People's Congress on January 21, 1985; amended in accordance with the Decision on 
Revising the Accounting Law of the People's Republic of China adopted at the Fifth 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 
December 29, 1993; revised at the 12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
Ninth People's Congress on October 31, 1999 and promulgated by Order No.24 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China on October 31, 1999) 
Contents 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Chapter II Accounting Practice 
Chapter III Special Provisions on Accounting Practice of Companies and Enterprises 
Chapter IV Accounting Supervision 
Chapter V Accounting Offices and Accounting Personnel 
Chapter VI Legal Liability 
 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is enacted with a view to standardizing accounting acts, ensuring the 
truthfulness and completeness of the accounting materials, strengthening economic 
management and financial control, raising economic results and maintaining the order 
of the socialist market economy. 
 
Article 2 State organs, social organizations, companies, enterprises, institutions and 
other organizations (hereinafter generally referred to as units) must handle accounting 
affairs in accordance with this Law. 
 
Article 3 All units must set up account books according to law and ensure their 
truthfulness and completeness. 
 
Article 4 The person in charge of a unit shall be responsible for its accounting work as 
well as the truthfulness and completeness of its accounting materials. 
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Article 5 Accounting offices and accounting personnel shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law, conduct accounting practice and exercise accounting 
supervision. No unit or person may, by any means, suggest, instruct or compel any 
accounting office or accountant to forge or alter any accounting document, account 
book or other accounting material or to submit any false financial accounting statement. 
No unit or person is allowed to retaliate upon any accountant because of his resistance 
against any act violating the provisions of this Law in the performance of his duty. 
 
Article 6 Moral encouragement or material award shall be given to any accountant who 
has shown conscientiousness in implementing this Law, devotion to his duty and 
consistence in principle, thus achieving remarkable results in his work. 
 
Article 7 The department of finance under the State Council shall administer the 
accounting work throughout the country. Departments of finance under local people's 
governments at or above the county level shall administer the accounting work in their 
respective administrative areas. 
 
Article 8 The State practises a unified accounting system. The State's unified accounting 
system shall be formulated and promulgated by the department of finance under the 
State Council in accordance with this Law. For those trades which have special 
requirements on accounting practice and accounting supervision, the relevant 
departments of the State Council may, in accordance with this Law and the State's 
unified accounting system, formulate concrete measures or supplementary provisions 
for the implementation of the State's unified accounting system and submit them to the 
department of finance of the State Council for examination and approval. 
 
The General Logistics Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army may, in 
accordance with this Law and the State's unified accounting system, formulate concrete 
measures for the implementation of the State's unified accounting system in the army 
and report them to the department of finance of the State Council for the record. 
 
Chapter II Accounting Practice 
Article 9 All units must fulfil accounting practice, fill in and prepare accounting 
documents, record account books and work out financial accounting statements 
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according to the economic and business transactions actually taken place. No unit may 
fulfil accounting practice on the basis of untrue economic and business transactions or 
false materials. 
 
Article 10 Accounting procedures shall be conducted and accounting be practised with 
respect to the following economic and business transactions: 
(1) receipts and disbursements in cash and in negotiable securities; 
(2) acceptance, delivery, increase, decrease and use of property; 
(3) occurrence and settlement of claims and debts; 
(4) increase and decrease of capital and funds; 
(5) computation of income and expenditure, expenses and costs; 
(6) computation and treatment of financial results; and 
(7) other transactions that are subject to accounting procedures and accounting practice. 
 
Article 11 The fiscal year shall start on January 1 and end on December 31 on the 
Gregorian calendar. 
 
Article 12 Renminbi shall be the basic accounting currency in accounting practice. 
The units that use a currency other than Renminbi as chief currency in their business 
receipts and expenditures may select one specific currency as their basic accounting 
currency, but the accounts to be reported in their financial statements shall still be 
converted to and expressed in Renminbi. 
 
Article 13 Accounting documents, account books, accounting statements and other 
accounting materials must all comply with the unified accounting system of the State. 
Where computers are used for accounting practice, the software and accounting 
documents, account books, financial accounting statements and other accounting 
materials produced therefrom must also comply with the provisions of the State's 
unified accounting system. No unit or person may forge or alter any accounting 
documents, account book or other accounting material, or submit any false financial 
accounting statement. 
 
Article 14 Accounting documents include original documents and accounting vouchers. 
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In handling the economic and business transactions specified in Article 10 of this Law, 
original documents must be filled in or obtained, and be promptly submitted to the 
accounting office. Accounting offices and accounting personnel must, in accordance 
with the provisions of the State's unified accounting system, examine and verify the 
original documents and are entitled to deny any untrue or illegal original document and 
report the case to the person in charge of the unit or and to return any original document 
which carries inaccurate or incomplete records and require it to be corrected or 
supplemented in accordance with the provisions of the State's unified accounting 
system.  All entries recorded in the original documents may not be altered; if an original 
document contains mistake, it shall be replaced with a new one or corrected by the 
issuing unit and a stamp of the issuing unit shall be affixed right over the place where 
the correction is made. If the amount of money in an original document is wrong, the 
issuing unit shall correct it by issuing a new document and may not do it by a correction 
on the original document.  Accounting vouchers shall be prepared according to the 
examined and verified original documents and related materials. 
 
Article 15 Entries into account books must be based on the examined and verified 
accounting documents and comply with the provisions of related laws, administrative 
regulations and the State's unified accounting system. Account books include general 
ledgers, detailed ledgers, journal books and other auxiliary books. Entries to an account 
book shall be recorded in the order of the pages consecutively numbered. Any 
occurrence of mistake, skip of page, omission of number or skip of line in the entry to 
an account book shall be remedied according to the method specified in the State's 
unified accounting system, and the interested accountant and the person in charge of the 
accounting office ( or the accountant-in-charge) shall affix their seals right over the 
place where remedy is made. If computers are used for accounting practice, the entries 
and corrections of account books shall comply with the provisions of the State's unified 
accounting system. 
 
Article 16 All economic and business transactions take place in a unit shall be recorded 
and calculated in the account books set up according to law, and no unit may, in 
violation of the provisions of this Law and the State's unified accounting system, set up 
privately any other account book for recording and calculating such transactions. 
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Article 17 All units shall regularly check the records in their account books against the 
property in kind, amount of money and related materials and shall ensure the 
conformity between the records in the account books and the actual amount of property 
in kind and money, the conformity of the related contents between the account books 
and the accounting documents, the conformity of the corresponding records between the 
relevant account books, and the conformity between the records of account books and 
the related contents in the accounting statements. 
 
Article 18 The accounting method used by a unit shall be consistent throughout all 
periods and may not be changed arbitrarily; if it is necessary to change the method, it 
shall be changed according to the provisions of the State's unified accounting system, 
and the cause for the change, the situation and impact of the change shall all be 
explained in the financial accounting statement. 
 
Article 19 Such probable items as guarantee provided by a unit and pending legal 
proceedings shall be explained in the financial accounting statement in accordance with 
the provisions of the State's unified accounting system. 
 
Article 20 Financial accounting statements shall be prepared on the basis of the 
examined and verified records of the account books and the related materials 
information and comply with the requirements set by this Law and the State's unified 
accounting system for the preparation of financial accounting statements as well as the 
provisions concerning the target and time limit of their submission; if other laws and 
administrative regulations provides otherwise, those provisions shall govern. 
A financial accounting statement shall be composed of the accounting statement, notes 
to the accounting statement and explanations on financial conditions. The basis for 
preparing financial accounting statements to be provided to the different users of 
accounting materials shall be uniform. If the accounting statements, notes to the 
accounting statements and explanations on financial conditions must, as stipulated by 
related laws and administrative regulations, be subject to auditing by a certified public 
accountant, the auditing report issued by the certified public accountant and the 
interested certified public accountant's office shall be provided together with the 
financial accounting statement. 
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Article 21 The financial accounting statement shall be signed and stamped by the person 
in charge of the unit, the person in charge of the accounting work and the person in 
charge of the accounting office (or the accountant-in-charge). If a unit has a chief 
accountant, it must also be signed and stamped by the chief accountant. The person in 
charge of the unit shall guarantee the truthfulness and the completeness of the financial 
accounting statement. 
 
Article 22 The language used for accounting records shall be Chinese. In the national 
autonomous areas, a national language commonly used in the area may concurrently be 
used for accounting records. A foreign investment enterprise, foreign enterprise or any 
other foreign organization in the territory of the People's Republic of China may 
concurrently use a foreign language for its accounting records. 
 
Article 23 All units shall establish and properly preserve archives for their accounting 
documents, account books, financial accounting statements and other accounting 
materials. The period of preservation of the archives and the procedures for their 
destruction shall be stipulated jointly by the department of finance under the State 
Council and the relevant departments. 
 
Chapter III Special Provisions on Accounting Practice of Companies and 
Enterprises 
Article 24 Accounting practice of companies and enterprises shall, in addition to the 
compliance with the provisions of Chapter II of this Law, comply with the provisions of 
this Chapter. 
 
Article 25 Companies and enterprises must, according to the economic and business 
transactions actually taken place and in accordance with the provisions of the State's 
unified accounting system, verify, compute and record their assets, liabilities, creditor's 
rights, incomes, expenses, costs and profits. 
 
Article 26 In fulfilling accounting practice, companies and enterprises may not commit 
any of the following acts: 
(1) arbitrarily changing the verification standards or computation method for their 
assets, liabilities and creditor's rights, and falsifying the statement of their assets, 
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liabilities and creditor's rights by false statement, over-statement, no-statement or under-
statement; 
(2) false statement of or concealing their incomes, delaying or anticipating the 
verification of their incomes; 
(3) arbitrarily changing the verification standards or computation method for their 
expenses and costs, and falsifying the statement of their expenses and costs by false 
statement, over-statement, no-statement or under-statement; 
(4) arbitrarily adjusting the computation and distribution method for profits, conjuring 
up false profits or concealing profits; or 
(5) any other act violating the provisions of the State's unified accounting system. 
 
Chapter IV Accounting Supervision 
Article 27 All units shall establish and perfect their internal accounting supervision 
system. The units' internal accounting supervision system shall meet the following 
requirements: 
(1) The limits of, responsibilities and powers of the persons to record the accounts, the 
persons to examine and approve economic and business transactions and accounting 
affairs, the persons to deal with economic and business transactions and accounting 
affairs and the persons to keep money and property shall be clearly defined as well as 
mutually separated and constrained; 
(2) The mutual supervision and mutual constraint procedures for making and 
implementing the decisions on important external investment, assets disposition, capital 
allocation and other important economic and business transactions shall be clearly 
defined; 
(3) The scope, time limit and organizational procedures for inventory-taking of property 
shall be clearly defined; and 
(4) The measures and procedures for regular internal auditing of accounting materials 
shall be clearly defined. 
 
Article 28 The person in charge of a unit shall guarantee that the accounting office and 
accounting personnel perform their duties according to law, and may not suggest, 
instruct or compel the accounting office and accounting personnel to handle accounting 
affairs in violation of law. 
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Accounting offices and accounting personnel are entitled to refuse the conduct of any 
accounting affair violating the provisions of this Law and the State's unified accounting 
system, or to rectify any such violation according to their duties and powers. 
 
Article 29 The accounting offices or the accounting personnel shall, whenever 
discovering any unconformity between records of account books and property in kind, 
money and related materials, handle the case without delay if they have the power to 
handle it on their own according to the provisions of the State's unified accounting 
system; if they do not have the power to handle the case on their own, they shall 
immediately report it to the person in charge of the unit and request him to ascertain the 
cause and to handle it. 
 
Article 30 Any unit or person is entitled to accuse any act violating the provisions of 
this Law and the State's unified accounting system. The department receiving the 
accusation shall, in accordance with the division of duties and functions, deal with the 
case without delay according to law if it has the power to do so; if the department does 
not have such power, it shall, without delay, transfer the case to the department which 
has the power to deal with it. The department receiving the accusation and the 
department responsible to deal with the case shall keep secret for the accusing person, 
and may not disclose the name of the accusing person and transfer the accusing 
materials to the unit or person accused. 
 
Article 31 Units which, according to the provisions of relevant laws and administrative 
regulations, shall be subject to auditing by a certified public accountant, shall truthfully 
provide accounting documents, account books, financial accounting statements and 
other accounting materials as well as related situations to the empowered certified 
public accountants' office. 
No unit or person may, by any means, request or instruct a certified public accountant 
and the interested certified public accountants' office to issue any untrue or improper 
auditing report. 
Departments of finance are entitled to supervise the procedures and contents of the 
auditing reports issued by certified public accountants' offices. 
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Article 32 Departments of finance shall exercise supervision over the following 
situations in all units: 
(1) Whether account books have been established according to law; 
(2) Whether the accounting documents, account books, financial accounting statements 
and other accounting materials are truthful and complete; 
(3) Whether the accounting practice complies with the provisions of this Law and the 
State's unified accounting system; and 
(4) Whether the persons engaged in the accounting work have the qualifications. 
In exercising supervision over the situations mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) of the 
preceding paragraph, if there is suspicion of serious law-violation, the department of 
finance under the State Council and its designated agencies may make inquiries of the 
units which have economic and business transactions with the unit under supervision 
and of the financial institutions at which the unit under supervision has opened 
accounts; the units and financial institutions involved shall render support. 
 
Article 33 Departments in charge of finance, auditing and taxation, the people's banks as 
well as securities regulatory and insurance regulatory authorities shall, in accordance 
with the duties and functions specified by the relevant laws and administrative 
regulations, exercise supervision over and conduct inspection of the accounting 
materials of the related units. 
The supervisory and inspection departments mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall 
issue inspection conclusions after exercising supervision over and conducting inspection 
of the accounting materials of the related units according to law. If the inspection 
conclusion made by a supervisory and inspection department is sufficient to meet the 
requirements of other supervisory and inspection departments for performing their 
duties and functions, the other supervisory and inspection departments shall make use of 
the conclusion and shall avoid making repeated account inspection and verification. 
 
Article 34 Departments and their personnel exercising supervision over and conducting 
inspection of the accounting materials of the related units according to law have the 
obligation to keep confidential all State secrets and commercial secrets that came to 
their knowledge in their supervision and inspection. 
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Article 35 All units must, in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws and 
administrative regulations, accept the supervision and inspection conducted according 
to law by the relevant supervisory and inspection departments and honestly furnish 
accounting documents, account books, financial accounting statements and other 
accounting materials and relevant situations, and may not refuse inspection, conceal 
materials or report falsely. 
 
Chapter V Accounting Offices and Accounting Personnel 
Article 36 Each unit shall, according to the needs of its accounting affair, set up an 
accounting office or staff a relevant office with accountant and designate a person as 
accountant in charge. Where conditions do not so permit, the unit may entrust its 
bookkeeping to an intermediary agency engaged in bookkeeping and established with 
due approval.  Any large and medium-sized enterprises owned by the State, or in which 
State-owned assets have a controlling stake or dominant position, must institute a chief 
accountant. The qualifications, the procedures for appointment and dismissal and limits 
of duties and powers of the chief accountant shall be prescribed by the State Council. 
 
Article 37 In all accounting offices, an internal auditing system shall be instituted. 
A cashier shall not concurrently take charge of auditing, custody of accounting archives 
or recording the revenue, expense or claims and liability accounts. 
 
Article 38 Whoever engages in accounting work must obtain a professional accountant 
qualification certificate. A person in charge of an accounting office (or an accountant-
in-charge) in a unit shall, in addition to obtaining a professional accountant qualification 
certificate, have the professional title of certified accountant or above, or have engaged 
in accounting work for more than three years. Measures for the administration of 
professional qualifications for accountants shall be stipulated by the department of 
finance under the State Council. 
 
Article 39 Accounting personnel shall abide by their code of ethics and improve their 
professional quality. Education and training for accounting personnel shall be enhanced. 
 
Article 40 A person who is investigated for criminal responsibility according to law due 
to any illegal acts pertaining to his accounting position such as making untrue financial 
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accounting statement or false account, concealing or intentionally destroying accounting 
documents, account books or financial accounting statement, embezzling or 
misappropriating public funds or seizing property by taking advantage of his position, 
may not obtain or obtain again a professional accountant qualification certificate. 
Besides the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph, whoever is punished by 
revocation of his professional accountant qualification certificate may not obtain again a 
new professional accountant qualification certificate within five years from the date of 
revocation of his original certificate. 
 
Article 41 An accountant to be transferred to another place or to leave his post must 
fulfill the hand-over procedure with the person to take over his post. The person in 
charge of the accounting office or the accountant in charge shall supervise the hand-
over procedure to be fulfilled by ordinary accountants. The person in charge of the unit 
shall supervise the hand-over procedure to be fulfilled by persons in charge of the 
accounting office or accountants in charge; when necessary, the competent authority 
may send people to jointly supervise the hand-over. 
 
Chapter VI Legal Liability 
Article 42 Whoever, in violation of the provisions of this Law, commits any of the 
following acts, the department of finance under the people's government at or above the 
county level shall order it to make corrections within a given period of time and may 
concurrently impose a fine of not less than 3,000 yuan but not more than 50,000 yuan 
on the unit and a fine of not less than 2,000 yuan but not more than 20,000 yuan on the 
person-in-charge directly responsible and other persons directly responsible; if the said 
person is a State functionary, the unit to which he belongs or the interested unit shall 
give him administrative sanctions according to law in addition: 
(1) failing to set up account books according to law; 
(2) setting up an account book in private; 
(3) failing to fill in or obtain original documents as stipulated or the original documents 
filled in or obtained do not comply with the provisions; 
(4) entering into an account book on the basis of accounting documents not examined 
and verified, or in a manner not conforming to the provisions; 
(5) arbitrarily changing the accounting method; 
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(6) the basis for preparing financial accounting statements provided to different users of 
accounting materials is inconsistent; 
(7) not using the language or basic accounting currency for accounting records as 
stipulated; 
(8) failing to preserve accounting materials as stipulated, causing thus damage or losses 
of accounting materials; 
(9) failing to set up and implement the unit's internal accounting supervision system as 
required, or refusing supervision conducted according to law or failing to truthfully 
provide relevant accounting materials and relevant particulars; or 
(10) employing accounting personnel in a manner not complying with the provisions of 
this Law. 
Where any of the acts mentioned in the preceding paragraph constitutes a crime, 
criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law. 
Where any of the acts committed by an accountant as mentioned in the first paragraph 
constitutes a serious case, the department of finance under the people's government at or 
above the county level shall revoke his professional accountant qualification certificate. 
If relevant laws stipulate otherwise on the punishment of acts mentioned in the first 
paragraph, the provisions of those laws shall govern. 
 
Article 43 Where forgery or alteration of an accounting document or account book or 
preparation of a false financial accounting statement constitutes a crime, criminal 
responsibility shall be investigated according to law. 
If the offence mentioned in the preceding paragraph does not constitute a crime, the 
department of finance under the people's government at or above the county level shall 
circulate a notice of criticism and may concurrently impose a fine of not less than 5,000 
yuan and not more than 100,000 yuan on the unit and a fine of not less than 3,000 yuan 
and not more than 50,000 yuan on the person-in-charge directly responsible and other 
persons directly responsible; if the said person is a State functionary, the unit to which 
he belongs or the interested unit shall give him in addition administrative sanctions 
according to law such as removal from position up to expulsion from public function; 
with regard to the accounting personnel involved, the department of finance under the 
people's government at or above the county level shall revoke their professional 
accountant qualification certificates. 
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Article 44 Where concealment or intentional destruction of any accounting document, 
account book or financial accounting statement that shall be preserved according to law 
constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law. 
If the offence mentioned in the preceding paragraph does not constitute a crime, the 
department of finance under the people's government at or above the county level shall 
circulate a notice of criticism and may concurrently impose a fine of not less than 5,000 
yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan on the unit and a fine of not less than 3,000 yuan 
and not more than 50,000 yuan on the person-in-charge directly responsible and other 
persons directly responsible; if the offender is a State functionary, the unit to which he 
belongs or the interested unit shall give him in addition administrative sanctions 
according to law such as removal from position up to expulsion from the public 
function; with regard to the accounting personnel involved, the department of finance 
under the people's government at or above the county level shall revoke his professional 
accountant qualification certificate. 
 
Article 45 Whoever suggests, instructs or compels an accounting office, an accountant 
or any other person to forge or alter any accounting document or account book or to 
prepare any untrue financial accounting statement or to conceal or intentionally destroy 
any accounting document, account book or financial accounting statement that shall be 
preserved according to law shall be investigated for his criminal responsibility 
according to law if the offence constitutes a crime; if the offence does not constitute a 
crime, a fine of not less than 5,000 yuan and not more than 50,000 yuan may be 
imposed; and if the offender is a State functionary, he shall be given in addition 
administrative sanctions according to law such as degradation, removal from position or 
expulsion from the public function by the unit to which he belongs or by the interested 
unit. 
 
Article 46 The person in charge of a unit who retaliates against any accountant who 
performs his duties according to law and rejects acts violating this Law in form of 
degradation, removal from position, transfer to another job, disengagement or expulsion 
from the public function shall be investigated for his criminal responsibility according 
to law if the offence constitutes a crime; if the offence does not constitute a crime, 
administrative sanctions shall be given according to law by the unit to which the 
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offender belongs or by the interested unit. The reputation of the accountant retaliated 
shall be rehabilitated and his original position and grade be restored. 
 
Article 47 The functionary of a department of finance or of a relevant administrative 
department who, in exercising supervision and administration, abuses his power, 
neglects his duty, practices favoritism or irregularity or divulges State secrets or 
commercial secrets shall be investigated for his criminal responsibility according to law 
if the offence constitutes a crime; if the offence does not constitute a crime, 
administrative sanctions shall be given according to law. 
 
Article 48 Whoever in violation of the provisions of Article 30 of this Law, discloses 
the name of an accusing person and transfers the accusing materials to the unit or person 
accused shall be given administrative sanctions according to law by the unit to which he 
belongs or by the interested unit. 
Article 49 Whoever violates the provisions of this Law and concurrently the provisions 
of other laws shall be punished according to law by the interested departments within 
the scopes of their respective powers. 
 
Source: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383953.htm, 
viewed on 30 March 2013 
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Appendix 3: Definitions and Methods of Computing Ultimate 
Controlling Shareholder, Control Rights and Ownership 
Rights, as Given in the CSMAR Database 
 
Field Name Explanation 
Ultimate 
controlling 
shareholder 
Defined as the standard of the Measures for Administration of 
Takeover of Listed Companies, that is, 
1. The one with the maximum shareholding in the shareholder list 
of listed company unless opposite evidence exists; 
2. The one who can execute and control superior voting rights 
than the shareholder with the maximum shareholding of a 
listed company; 
3. The one who holds and controls 30 precent or above of shares 
and voting rights unless opposite evidence exists; 
4. The one who can decide the election of over half of members 
of board of directors of a listed company by executing voting 
rights; 
5. The one who is under other circumstances as the stipulations of 
CSRC. 
Control 
Rights 
 
It is also called voting right.  The database adopts the calculation 
methods of La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Salines, A. Shleifer (1999) 
and S. Claessens, S. Djankov, J. Fan, L. Lang (2000). That is, the 
percentage control rights of the ultimate shareholder is determined 
through the ‘shareholding relation chain’ as the multiple of 
percentages of voting rights starting from the weakest layer(s) in a 
chain(s). 
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Ownership 
Rights 
It is also called cash flow right, which means the ownership of 
ordinary shares held directly and indirectly in the listed company 
by the ultimate controlling shareholder. Indirect ownership can be 
achieved through structures of multi-layer pyramid shareholding 
chains and cross-shareholdings.  The database adopts the 
calculation methods of La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Salines, A. 
Shleifer (1999) and S. Claessens, S. Djankov, J. Fan, L. Lang 
(2000). That is, the proportion of shares held by the ultimate 
controlling shareholder is multiplied through by each layer of the 
shareholding relation chain. 
Source:  CSMAR Database User Guide ‘GTA_HLD-2012’, section 3, pp.29-30.  
 
 
